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Art, Autonomy, and Community 
Dissertation Abstract
This dissertation represents an investigation o f the interlock between art and autonomy 
beginning with a general discussion about the uses o f the terms, ‘art’ and ‘autonomy’. I 
investigate various contemporary views about human freedom and autonomy and advance the 
view that art enhances human autonomy through the vehicle o f imagination, a theme developed 
by Kant. My contention is that sometimes an artwork expresses something especially 
meaningful, such as a belief or value, that moves or touches the spectator in a way that no other 
medium can. Often our cultural, institutional, social, and political preconceptions color our 
background beliefs and expectations about our lives, our relationships, and omr environment. 
These beliefs and expectations sometimes blind us to concepts, attitudes, principles, or beliefs 
that we take for granted but which we should not accept as a society, or as members o f a society, 
and might not accept if we were consciously aware o f them. Many o f these institutionalized 
practices limit human possibility, and by extension autonomy. It is often through art that we are 
able to articulate these background beliefs and practices, to view the world through the lens of a 
paradigm other than one to which we are accustomed. One o f the most intriguing aspects of this 
investigation is the extent to which art functions as a social connective, bridging time and 
culture, enabling human beings to both discover themselves and to master their realities. Art 
allows us to articulate our human possibilities, most importantly, to connect to other human 
beings, and develop our capacities to live autonomous lives.
Chapter 1 
Art and Autonomy
This study of the interrelation between art and autonomy emphasizes the social 
context in which we humans engage in certain enterprises. By way o f beginning, in the 
following pages I propose to outline the relationship between art and autonomy, in 
particular to present a generalized discussion of the way we use the terms' and 
'autonomy'. We will note various philosophical views about art, as well as various 
contemporary views about human freedom and autonomy.
The fundamental problem I approach in the following pages is to identify the 
connection between art and human autonomy. I believe art enhances human autonomy 
through the vehicle o f imagination. My view involves the contention that sometimes an 
artwork expresses something especially meaningful, such as a belief or value, that moves 
or touches the spectator in a way that no other medium can. My argument is grounded on 
a view that cultural, institutional, social, and political preconceptions color our 
expectations about life, relationships, and our environment. Often these expectations blind 
us to concepts, attitudes, principles, or beliefs that we take for granted but which we 
should not accept as a society, and would not accept if we were consciously aware of 
them. Sometimes accepted practices or attitudes in a society are not examined by its 
members; indeed it would be impossible to examine every belief. Nevertheless, many of 
these beliefs and assumptions which are never articulated form the background beliefs of 
our lives.
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My use of the term 'autonomy' is broader than conventional uses o f the term by 
moral philosophers. Like most moral philosophers, I use 'autonomy' to roughly mean 
self-regulated human action, but I go further to use it in a nontraditional sense in 
connection with the social and political environmoit. That is, if art makes conscious some 
o f the hidden assumptions embedded in our cultural and social traditions, and makes it 
possible for us to examine and change those assumptions, then it also enhances our ability 
to actualize our view o f human possibility as self-regulating, self-governing individuals.
Art provides a way for us to examine our paradigmatic ideas and preconceptions 
by bringing them to light through imagination, through Wittgenstein's 'as if,' or as 
Kendall Walton says, through make-believe, rendering them open for conscious 
examination. Many of our institutionalized practices and assumptions limit human 
possibility, and autonomy. We know that scioitific and technological advances change our 
views about the scope o f human possibility and generate social changes along with changes 
in the parameters of human existence. Art often gives us such a vision of human and 
social possibility before those possibilities are ever actualized. Just as mathematicians 
postulate imaginary entities and then go on to do proofs about them, art postulates, by way 
o f imagination, ways o f social and human well-being that can then be socially and 
individually realized. Such advances contribute to human flourishing and also, as I 
propose, to autonomy.
A definition of art, or a discursion into the nature of art is an intimidating, and 
possibly, futile exercise. Historically, Western philosophy has been more concerned with 
beauty than with art, as we see in Socrates' discussion of beauty in the Symposium as a 
spiritual reality that is reflected in human beings and material things. Aristotle establishes 
another historical tradition by equating beauty with order in his Poetics. Controversies 
about the subjective or objective nature o f beauty were fueled by David Hume's position 
that aesthetic value is an emotional response. Kant and Nietzsche advanced the 
philosophical notion that categories other than Beauty may spark aesthetic interest.
Philosophical inquiries into the nature of art have variously speculated that art is 
essentially mimetic, representational, emotional or expressive. Other views include 
formalist as opposed to instrumental accounts. The nineteenth century saw dialectical, 
intuitionist, and organicist accounts of the nature of art. The twentieth century has been 
particularly fhiitfiil with new versions of the dialectical account along with an institutional 
account and a corresponding procedural account.
To confuse the issue even more, some philosophers contend that works of art are 
individuated by their media, while others focus on the textual nature o f art and the 
translatability of texts among various available media. Recent views of art in Western 
philosophy tend to emphasize the nonfunctional aspects o f art, although it seems vacuous 
to say that a thing is a work of art just by virtue of its lack o f function. This dispute 
accounts for the classification of architecture as art and non-art at various times in art
history. Other positions, not necessarily distinct from the ones I have already listed, take 
a functional t^proach and focus on the religious, political, historical, and social function 
of art. It seems that it is reckless, risky in the extreme to attempt a generic definition of 
art.*
What does seem uncontroversial is that art is an artifact that somehow "brackets"
experience. Moreover, it is not so much an end as a process, a way of experience. This
description allows the artworld to include things such as Rembrandt's paintings,
Duchamp's ready-mades, the Kilasanatha Temple in India, and "happenings" such as the
orchestrated flying of kites in Sacramento, California. Timothy Binkley says,
when Rauschenberg erased the De Kooning, it was not the 
work (the labor) they did which made the art. A work of art 
is not necessarily something worked on; it is basically 
something conceived. To be an artist is not always to make 
something, but rather to engage in a cultural enterprise in 
which artistic pieces are proffered for consideration....^
Perhaps we can say that art is an artifact that is endowed with aesthetic value. It 
transforms experience and that transformation is universal. Universal, because it may be 
accessed by all humans, but it is nevertheless a unique articulation of experience. To say 
that art is intuitional, or institutional, and so on, is to ignore many aspects of art that
* Melvin Rader and Bertram Jessup. Art and Human Values (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976) 124-125. Thomas Munro. The Arts and Their 
Interrelations (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1949) 543.
2 Timothy Binkley, “Peirce: Contra Aesthetics,” Journal o f Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
35.3 (1977) 265-277.
distinguish it from other human enterprises. It may be that art is a distinct kind of activity 
rather than a distinguishable product. We might say that art is a process that brings a 
dimension to human experience that is not accessible through ordinary human pursuits. 
Art may be a kind of knowing that liberates us from the mundane and elevates us to higher 
levels o f experience.
It also seems that art has a uniquely social function. All arguments about how 
individuals create art and the social place of art aside, in every epoch, art is socially 
defined and integrated. Just as in scientific developments, certain developments in art can 
occur only when the social climate permits. Art as both ontological object and functional 
object, oftai goes beyond the strictly aesthetic. I wish to examine one aspect o f this non- 
aesthetic value that derives from aesthetic value. The institutional value o f art lies beyond 
its capacity to mimic, or reproduce, or express experience because it encodes human 
experience in such a way that generations of participants have access to the nuances of that 
experience that would otherwise be unavailable to them. We may find that an implication 
of this view will be that art allows us to see the world through the lens o f a paradigm 
different from our own.
It is clear, from any overview of the history of a philosophy of art, that there are 
philosophers and psychologists, who attack art. There are others who praise it. 
Sometimes the same philosopher does both, as when Tolstoy expresses the views of so- 
called Christian Communists saying that art is limited to those artifacts that both honor the
fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of m an/ In effect, it isn't art if it doesn't fulfill 
both demands. But, Tolstoy also thinks beauty may be symptomatic of the evil in art since 
it expresses the gratification o f the soises and panders to unjust and irreligious sentiments.
When investigating the ontological place o f art, other philosophers as diverse as 
John Dewey, Plato, and Aristotle believe that art has moral, social, and political 
implications. Plato, o f course, takes the strongly negative stand that since art is but an 
imitation of the imitation o f the real world, it is antithetical to the pursuit of truth. It 
seduces the beholder to pursue the vulgar instead o f the more noble occupation, which is 
the pursuit of truth. Dewey takes the opposite, but extreme view, arguing that even the 
most ordinary of objects that surround us in everyday life are imbued with aesthetic value. 
It does not require much o f a cognitive stretch when he extends his thesis to say that 
ordinary experience is aesthetic experience if only we attune ourselves to a holistic and 
uninhibited range of apprehension and perception o f the world. This means that moral 
experience has aesthetic undertones, as does political and social experience. Aristotle takes 
a moderate approach; art is not to be spumed, but he acknowledges its social volatility, 
capable o f pushing the beholder to the outer limits o f joy or despair. As the beholder 
approaches these emotional limits, he is purged o f unruly emotions, which makes him 
more fit for human society.
3 Leo Tolstoy, What is Art? Ed. W. Gareth Jones. Trans. A. Maude. (Bristol: Bristol 
Classical Press, 1994)
Kant holds art in such esteem that he renders aesthetic apprehension inert, void of 
desire and base passions. But he tethers the aesthetic imagination to the moral, linking it, 
however, toiuously to the world of human action. Danto more directly endorses the view 
that art is a force for change in the social stams quo and that it may also initiate the 
ovatum of some prevailing state of af6irs. Indeed, it is precisely this potency of art, says 
Danto, that leads thinkers and apologists for the status quo to emasculate art by conferring 
only intrinsic value, which is the philosophical ground o f the slogan "art for art's sake". 
If we are persuaded that art appeals only to the aesthetic taste and lacks the capacity to 
change or affect the course of human events, we reify art, giving it a noble status, but we 
also cripple it.
There are two distinct points of analytical departure when we engage an 
investigation into art. One has to do with the status of art, or with the status of a particular 
work; in short, an ontological analysis of art. The other has to do with the question about 
the efficacy of art, its function. Nelson Goodman considers the latter to be "...the matter 
of primary and peculiar concern".^  That is my position also, that the function of art, more 
than its ontology, is worth our critical concern because o f its vigor and its ability to 
persuade participants to choose one course of action over another.
This is not to say that ontological investigations are not philosophically defensible 
or important. Nor are the questions entirely distinct. It is not clear why "The Rembrandt
Nelson Goodman, Ways ofWorldmaking. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.), 70.
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painting remains a work of art, as it remains a painting, while functioning only as a 
blanket; nor why the stone from the driveway may not strictly become art by functioning 
as art. Art is multifunctional, but the real force of art rests in its ability to expand our 
individual visions of human possibility. The implication o f this claim, if  correct, 
reinforces the claims of the two great pessimists about art, Freud and Plato. Freud’s 
contempt for art is couched in his view that the function of art is to provide an escape from 
"reality." Art alienates the beholder from the actual. Freud draws parallels between the 
purpose of art and the purpose of neurosis. Indeed, neurosis is the lesser o f the two evils 
because it simply rests on a denial o f reality. Art, on the other hand, is insanity because 
its ground is in substitution for reality.
I am inclined to hold a more favorable view of art, somewhat akin to the views of 
Nelson Goodman and Herbert Marcuse (which is not to say their views are similar). The 
framework o f these theories is unmistakably like that o f Freud’s, and to a lesser degree, 
Plato’s.
There is a great deal of difference between making it a criterion of art that it further 
the human good, or contribute to human flourishing and making it a criterion that it have 
no instrumental use at all. I am also not suggesting here that art must be viewed 
instrumentally, so that it is valued insofar as it does contribute in a positive manner to the 
human condition. This is a view taken by various groups, including John Ruskin, who
Goodman, 60.
believed that art has three functions: to enforce religious sentiment, to perfect one's 
ethical state, and to do material service/ It seems clear that some forms of art contribute 
to the quality of human existence. They give zest to our language, interest to our leisure, 
order to our movements, and voice to our innermost aspirations. Although the work of 
art is not a copy of nature, the artist draws his data from nature and presents his images 
in the familiar and available forms he sees around him.
A great deal of space in the literature o f aesthetics is given over to the individuation 
of art from ordinary experience. Those who hold this view think art is a form of human 
expression that isolates us from the real world around us. So, we find art ensconced or 
performed in great museums, theaters, and concert halls, isolated from the comings and 
goings of ordinary human existence. In such gracious surroundings we are given distilled 
interpretations of events and imaginings o f various artists through their individual 
expressions, which we then enjoy subjectively.
The great irony is that art is nothing less and nothing more than a political and 
social construct invested with ideology, but sanctified and abstracted by established 
ideologies of art in such a way that its expression is camouflaged by this effort to isolate 
art from the rest of life.’ This is especially true with interpretations of art that reinforce 
the illusion that art somehow transcends ordinary experience because of its aesthetic
* John Ruskin, Lectures on Art. (New York: Marnard, Merrill & Co., 1893).
’ Cf. Arthur Danto, The Philosophical Disenfranchisement o f Art, Chapter 1. A similar
theory is also held by Plato concerning the political import o f art.
signifîcance, because of its ability to record and perpetuate pristine abstract values and 
truths. What such interpretations of art do, however, is to protect and perpetuate 
ideologically social and political tendencies, as for example, the subjugation and 
mistreatment of some groups o f people at the hands of others, or to substantiate 
questionable social and political practices and the authority that enforces those practices. 
Art is unquestionably a vehicle o f social and political authority capable o f depriving people 
of their autonomy by reinforcing social and political practices that rob them of their ability 
to self-legislate and govern themselves, that validates the authority of established 
institutions, institutions that often define a culture and a civilization. In short, art often 
functions as propaganda for those who stand to gain from social and political status quo.
On the other hand, just as art may express an agenda that hampers individual 
autonomy, it may also express shared historical experiences, giving form to real feelings 
and beliefs that contend for conscious and collective expression. Art may express 
sentiments that challenge and subvert ideologically enforced illusions about society and 
culture. Furthermore, artistic imagination may lead the participant to question values that 
are not altogether beneficial to social order and progress and that impose on us values that 
oppress the disenfranchised and the voiceless in a society. Thus, it gives voice to the mute 
and power to the powerless. Art is a vehicle by which we may glimpse the hidden
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authority that guides social custom and law and that illegitimately guides individual 
consciousness and behavior and hampers autonomous expression o f existence.
In philosophical literature, "autonomy" is a term that suffers both from frequent use 
and ambiguity of meaning. One finds assertions that certain disciplines such as art history 
or the history o f architecture have claim to conceptual autonomy from a general view of 
history. Or, one finds reference to the "autonomy" o f certain works o f art with regard to 
critical interpretation, or their relationships to other works produced by an artist, or as 
representatives o f a certain stylistic period. In terms of personal, human freedom, 
autonomy is a term that Kant and other philosophers use to express a highly technical and, 
often, arcane feature of rational personhood. Use of the term is embedded in moral, 
political, and social states of affairs, any of which casts its shadow on the perception of 
autonomy. More recent philosophical literature introduces 'autonomy' in order to navigate 
the narrow distinction between freedom and liberty, or perhaps, some combination of the 
two.
I wish to investigate various views about human autonomy and to consider the 
intertwining of autonomy with the creation o f and experience of art. Since much of this 
discussion involves at least implicit views about the values and projects an individual holds 
dear, I will also briefly discuss prevailing views about the relationship between autonomy 
and morality.
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8Isaiah Berlin develops a dual notion of liberty based on a controversial distinction 
between n^ative liberty and positive liberty.* I examine his discussion first, not because 
it is the most definitive discussion o f liberty, or the most satisfying. Berlin's discussion 
of positive and negative freedom, while misleading, accomplishes three things relevant to 
the view about autonomy I try to develop: it firmly anchors the conception of autonomy 
in the social and political context, it brings to light differences in political ideology when 
the distinction is applied, and it also develops certain criteria for a workable conception 
of autonomy. Above all, Berlin's discussion develops the concept o f autonomy as an 
ethical position with social and political implications.
Berlin sees coercion and obedience as central notions o f politics that are intelligible 
only in the broad context of social issues. Political institutions are grounded on certain 
levels of obedience and coercion, with the protection o f individual privacy and the 
constitution o f public authority an issue in theories of autonomy. In particular, freedom 
for some often depends upon the restraint of others. Berlin acknowledges that the 
concq)tions o f freedom that we have are relative to our conception of persons and draws 
a distinction between the 'rational' and the 'irrational' self. He sees the 'rational' self as 
a social or collective aspect of the self which, it is sometimes thought, wills the individual 
to achieve a higher level of freedom. In terms of what Berlin calls 'positive freedom, ' the 
irrational self is that part of a person driven by desires and emotions; it is that part of a
Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Four Essays on Liberty. ( New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), 118-172.
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person that strives for rationality and completeness, but in so doing, risks a loss of 
personal identity and the subjugation of part o f the self.
In this light, we see that there are two political senses of “freedom," the negative 
and the positive. Negative freedom has to do with the deliverance o f an individual from 
restraint or compulsion by others, whether individuals or institutions. Positive freedom 
is the freedom an individual has to regulate or control the course of his or her life. One 
implication of positive liberty is the power to choose what one wishes to say, do, believe, 
or support. Positive liberty can be assessed in response to the question: "By whom am I 
ruled?"® Positive freedom is directed at the nature of individual freedom within society, 
the areas of life that manifest this freedom, and the source of control. It derives, then, 
from the desire for self-mastery. Given this description, positive freedom is a feature of 
individual autonomy, if  we take 'autonomous' to roughly designate a self-directing or self­
regulating individual. Self-mastery is inherent to positive liberty. But, in practice, for the 
rational person, positive liberty amounts to even more, it is self-empowering. Berlin 
refers to this feature when he writes:
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on 
external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the 
instrument o f my own, not of other men's, acts of will. I 
wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, 
by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes 
which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be 
somdxxiy, not nobody; a doer-deciding, not being decided 
for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or
Berlin, 130.
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by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave 
incapable of playing a human role, that is of conceiving 
goals and policies of my own and realizing them. This is at 
least part of what I mean when I say that I am rational, and 
that it is my reason that distinguishes me as a human being 
from the rest of the world. I wish, above all, to be 
conscious o f myself as a thinking, willing, active being, 
bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain 
them by references to my own ideas and purposes. I feel 
free to the d%ree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved 
to the degree that I am made to realize that it is not.‘°
Berlin, then recognizes a connection between positive liberty and rationality; a 
connection which, we will find, must be addressed in an investigation of autonomy as 
well. By nature, rationality is self-empowering, but on the rationalist view, rationality is 
not an innate characteristic o f human beings. Insofar as a person is rational, she will not 
deny truth, whether political or moral. But rationality is a function of education on this 
view, for those who are uneducated are somehow less than rational and must be subjected 
to the rationalizing influence of education and instruction from those who are educated, 
the rational intelligentsia. Rationality is not a natural human state, it is taught and learned. 
The natural person, according to such rationalists, must be subordinated to the laws of 
reason, immutable and discoverable by foolproof scientific methods and, surely, this is the 
path to true freedom.
The result of this approach is a slippery-slope to a kind of rational despotism, 
however baiign, where the individual does not follow his own "inner light," but achieves
10 Berlin, 131.
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a rational state in virtue of his latent rational will and the guidance and direction from 
those who have realized their rational potential. It is the initiates to rationality who decide 
for him how he is to achieve rational self-direction, which conforms to the rationality of 
others because all humans instantiate the laws of rationally through their rational faculties. 
This leads to a paradox that drives theories of self-realization. If something is good for 
me, then if someone makes me achieve it, then I am not being coerced, because I have 
willed it whether I know it or not. I am truly free even though my empirical self rejects 
this freedom.
An interesting feature of this characterization is that it is like Kant's in the sense 
that certain traits of character and minimal rationality are necessary features of the 
autonomous individual. The degree of positive freedom enjoyed by an individual is 
relative to the percq)tion of himself as a responsible, self-regulating agent, which involves 
a relationship between human desire and freedom. Control o f some of one's desires 
increases the agent's freedom and conversely, lack of control of desire severely limits 
freedom.
The caution here is to determine exactly which desires are intended, since some 
desires influence the development of autonomous individuals, such as: the desire for self­
regulation, the desire for the development of some degree of rationality, or the desire for 
equality, and so on. It appears that some control must be exerted over base desires and
15
passions, since on this account, some desires are constituent to being a self, particularly 
an autonomous self and others are not.
Negative freedom is a function o f the degree o f control exercised by sources 
external to the individual. Berlin casts negative freedom as a necessary condition for 
freedom rather than freedom itself. While negative and positive freedom are distinct ends, 
with positive freedom conceptually associated with autonomy, negative freedom does make 
essential contributions to individual autonomy, in my own view. Negative freedom is 
traditionally thought to be freedom from interference in one’s liberties. Specifically, it has 
to do with a basic notion about individual rights within political institutions. It is clear that 
the freedom of some must be limited in the interest o f other principles governing political 
interactions, but it is not clear just what the practical application of negative freedom is 
because no universal criterion exists for adjudicating between the demands o f individual 
freedom and the demands imposed by other principles, such as the demands of justice 
which aititle the individual to a minimum of freedom and restrains others from depriving 
her of it.
We can see that my characterization of liberty renders neither positive nor negative 
descriptions taken alone, sufficient for full autonomy. Positive freedom comes closest to 
the view o f autonomy that I hope to develop. Yet, without some conception of negative 
freedom, such as limits on political authority and limits on the manipulation of individuals 
by outside agents, autonomy, in its fullest sense, is not possible.
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On some views, the noumenal self is the source of real autonomy. Just how this 
self functions is unclear. The implication is that real autonomy has to do with individual 
self-control generated by some transcendent level of the self. The result, as we have seen, 
is that certain values can be Intimately imposed on behalf of an individual's rational will. 
The problem with this characterization is that it over-rationalizes autonomy as an 
expression of enlightened self-direction, a criticism we can also lodge against Kant, as we 
shall see in the following pages. Certain parts o f the self such as the emotions, and 
instinctual drives characteristic of the fiilly developed human are sacrificed to a kind of 
"hyper-rationality.'' It is plausible that the autonomous individual need not surrender her 
emotions and instincts completely to rational control. Some emotional and instinctual 
drives seem to play a role in legitimate exercises of autonomy.
The distinction between the two kinds of freedom, admittedly, is a somewhat 
superficial one, since some features o f both kinds o f freedom must be embedded in the 
institutional structure of society in order to provide conditions for individual autonomy. 
For example, thae must be some place for n^ative liberty in society as a qualification for 
individual autonomy, as in Mill's proviso that proscribes the state from interfering in an 
individual's behavior if not harming others; as part of this, the individual is protected from 
undue supervision by the State. On the other hand, positive freedom may be encouraged 
by the state insofar as it encourages the individual to act in her own self-interest. The bias 
toward either one of the freedoms may be predicated on a view of what it is to be human.
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to be a person. Yet, it may be more productive to view positive and negative freedom as 
two aspects of the same concept.
Individual autonomy is also a function o f other social needs. The desire for 
individual freedom varies with relation to circumstantial conditions. For example, 
individuals who are illiterate, hungry, or homeless may value freedom less than other 
social goods. In cases such as these, legal and political authority that satisfies basic needs 
may promote human freedom rather than limit it. Perhaps, in an ideal sense, autonomy 
stands in some sort of semantic and ontological relation to authority, particularly authority 
over one's self. Negative freedom does not appear to bear any necessary connection to a 
democratic state, since the source, or nature, o f political control is extraneous." Severe 
limits were placed on individual freedom in ancient Athens (particularly with respect to 
women and slaves) even though it stands, at least nominally, as an early example of the 
Greek democratic city-state. Negative freedom has to do with minimal levels of external 
control, such as, for example, freedom from coercion, and not with the nature of political 
control, although Kant thinks political and judicial compulsion does play some role in an 
individual's external freedom.
Autonomy is not only a moral and political ideal, but a social one as well. In a 
moral sense, discussions about autonomy focus on the capacity or necessity for individuals 
to will or submit to some moral code. In this social sense, autonomy is not just the desire
" Berlin concurs with this view.
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for freedom. It is also the need that we have, as rational individuals, for others to 
recognize our humanity, our rationality, our individuality, and our rightful personhood. 
It involves a notion of the person as independent of at least some forms of manipulation 
and coercion while maintaining a capacity for self-determination.
Autonomy involves the psychological fact that humans strive for respect. Berlin 
talks about it as a desire for status, understanding, and cohesion." On my reading, this 
craving for status is a manifestation o f the human desire to be recognized as individual 
agent, the validation of the cog/ro." I realize my discussion of this aspect o f autonomy 
is limited, but for our purposes, we can think o f this drive for respect that is a property 
of human psychology as the social sense of autonomy. It is a function o f the values, 
attitudes, beliefs, and institutions o f a society, all o f which are in turn affected by 
collective social forces. The latter are paradigmatic forces that shape our view of 
autonomy and the autonomous individual, resistant to inflection or change.
Gerald Dworkin expresses a similar view when discussing moral autonomy, saying: 
"A central feature of moral principles is their social character."” He elaborates this point 
by noting the dqiendence of moral interpretations upon tradition. Elsewhere, he discusses
" Berlin, 158.
"  V . Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness. (New York: Washington Square Press, 
1972), 120-121 and 336-337.
” Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice o f Autonomy. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 36.
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the claim that one's moral principles are one's own, not in the sense that one creates or 
invents one's own morals, but in the sense that one somehow, in a nontrivial way, 
rationally chooses to incorporate certain given moral principles as guiding principles in 
one's life. This doesn't always take place as a conscious decision. In fact, it more often 
takes place as an attempt to construct a moral framework for oneself that avoids perceived 
inconsistencies in an established moral framework.
The moral framework is one that is given by way of our social and cultural history. 
The moral influences into which we are bom are ineluctable. They are the complex 
interrelation o f heritage, climate, and environment into which we are bom and that 
influence, for good or ill, our lives and the lives of our communities. We are further 
subject to social forces exercised and received unknowingly as we are brought into human 
communities made up of Emilies, friends, classes and various social, political, and moral 
institutions. Given these factors, it makes no logical, empirical, or conceptual sense to 
claim that we are capable o f inventing our own moral law, any more than we are capable 
of inventing gravity.**
A primary function of moral practice, then, is to harmonize human society. Morals 
facilitate our ability to function socially, to interrelate as individuals. Morality is the 
vehicle by which natural, social antagonisms may be lessened and contractarian solutions
** Cf. Dworkin, 37.
** V . Dworkin, 15.
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offered in the case of problems generated by mutually intrusive behaviors. As individuals, 
we make and acknowledge claims upon one another and develop expectations about our 
common behaviors. Moral law serves to institutionalize the claims we have upon one 
another and our expectations about behaviors. Hence, morals are essentially social because 
they make a claim upon the individual and provide criteria for assessing the merit of 
individual behaviors, deriving their authoriQr from the shared or "internal" aspect.*’ This 
is not to say that morals guide our actions only when others are part of our environment. 
Some o f our moral actions are natural expressions o f our drive to govern and regulate 
ourselves. For example, if  one were the only survivor of a shipwreck and landed on a 
remote, unpopulated island, and truly subscribed to a moral agenda, she would not commit 
wanton moral transgressions, even in the absence o f a community of other moral beings. 
Nevertheless, in ordinary societies, any individual who extracts himself from moral 
demands also severs himself from the social commerce o f the community. Adequate 
descriptions of the nature of autonomy require us to conceptually place the autonomous 
individual within a pre-existing social, moral, and political framework. Autonomy is not 
a characteristic o f a presocial or premoral state o f being.
Similarly, whenever we encounter a work o f art, we behold an object that is the 
repository of centuries of human progress as well as a history of different ways human 
beings have apprehended the world and expressed these apprehensions. A social
*’ Dworkin, 36.
21
institution, art is symptomatic of the complexity and interplay of forces and drives that 
constitute human society. Human society is, at least partially, driven by social and 
institutional forces that establish norms o f behavior for each member of that society. 
Perhaps more insidiously, these social and institutional forces create ideological paradigms 
that color the perception of the world subscribed to without question by a society, culture, 
gender, class or race o f people, to the exclusion of other possible, rational views.’® That 
we view the world paradigmatically becomes obvious when we confront persons of other 
cultures or faiths or traditions.
Less obvious are the underlying assumptions and presuppositions constituting 
prevailing paradigms that ought to be subject to challenge and change, but, too often, 
elude our critical understanding just because they are so much the fabric of our everyday 
lives. Besides being difficult to detect, these assumptions and presuppositions, both 
expressed and unexpressed, are rigid and impervious to change. They minimize the 
individual and subject him to social and institutional expectations o f behavior.
In a certain sense, art functions as a replacement for reality, just as Freud 
suspected, but not in a way that may be construed as an expression of neurosis or
’* I use 'paradigm' in a broad, rather than a narrow sense. In a broad sense, the word 
means a way of seeing the world that is based upon custom, tradition, world-view, and 
such. In a narrow sense, it means a scientifically based view. Thus, for example, a 
broad use of the word may lead us to say that persons of different cultures, such as 
Northern Europeans and American Indians hold differing paradigms about the world, 
partly because of opposing views about the nature o f private property, but also for 
many other institutionally shaped reasons.
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psychosis. By way o f symbolism and imagination, it expands our vision o f human 
possibility. When, through art in virtue of imagination, we expand our vision of 
possibility, we are also able to see beyond our paradigmatic restraints, beyond the 
limitation imposed on us by society, institutions, other individuals, and most importantly, 
ourselves.
Art is able to challenge and alter the assumptions and presuppositions inherent in 
prevailing paradigms despite their rigidity. This, too, is a point I hope to argue in the 
following pages. One of the dangers posed by such paradigmatic underpinnings has to do 
with the fact that they subject and minimize the individual. The individual becomes 
subsCTvient to the accepted practices and institutions of a society. Before we can change 
these elements we have to apprehoid them and we must be able to apprehend possibilities 
relevant to the present human and individual condition.
Humanizing institutions and societies involves capturing abstract ideals and 
principles and, by way o f imagination and a view of the possible, personalizing these 
institutions and societies in order for the individual to use them to enrich his experience. 
Art can not only serve to challenge that which is negative or antithetical to the forces that 
humanize and civilize us; it provides a way for humans to make a place for themselves in 
the world. To build a cultural and social world that is hospitable to human freedom, 
individuals must be able to assimilate the prevailing paradigm. This means that, on a 
personal and individual level, a person must be able to find for himself the answers to
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pressing questions, to find the "fit" between his beliefs and the world as it is given to him 
socially. When we expand the view of our own possibilities, we are more open to a self- 
determined future.
We have probably all experienced at least a version of this liberating experience as 
we read the great myths as children, or even any o f the many fairy tales that populate our 
literary culture. For «cample, the story of "Hansel and Gretel" involves the separation o f 
two children from their parents. Perhaps as children, we harbored an unexpressed fear of 
being lost or of losing track of our parents. A reading of this story might have led us to 
identify with the plight of Hansel and Gretel and, as a result, draw on our internal 
resources as we recognize our ability to face challenges on our own. One of the points I 
hope to argue is that art is the vehicle most adapted to "knocking" on the gates of 
possibility just because it can then "overlay" reality with a "virtual reality" construed by 
imagination and possibility.
The point of all this talk of possibility and imagination and social paradigms is to 
trace the connection between art and human autonomy. Art is a social institution that is 
unique in its ability to probe the hidden assumptions and convictions of prevailing 
paradigms. It is by way o f status ^«o-preserving paradigms that humans, too often, are 
locked into certain approved modes of behaving, believing, aspiring, and thinking. Even 
our most personal beliefs about ourselves are paradigmatically directed. We know, firom 
nothing more than a casual glance at cultures and historical epochs, that paradigms do
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shift, although they obstinately resist shifting, that ways of believing and apprehending the 
world change over time and over societies. Elements of these paradigms often stifle 
human energies, human relationships, human attitudes, and human beliefs, even while they 
sometimes lift, encourage, and empower us. Because art can be used to probe the hidden 
framework o f paradigmatic beliefs, it can also throw some of these beliefs into relief so 
that we may r^ard and evaluate them. Often, when "light is shone" on these beliefs, they 
are seen to be useless, dehumanizing, unjust, or somehow in violation of important first- 
order principles; hence these beliefs warrant change and adjustments. At the risk of over­
simplifying a delicate, finely tuned social and psychological process, I hope to describe 
and to argue that one desirable function of art is just to mask reality, to enclose us in a 
virtual reality by employing the mechanism of possibility and, thereby, to give us an 
inkling of our more autonomous selves.
Autonomy, as I use it, is distinct from ordinary social and political freedom. Yet, 
it is a feature of the production and experience of art. It is a self-directing freedom and 
a state o f moral and social independence, and most importantly, interdependence. 
Educators, philosophers, and artists often hold some view about the connection between 
social or political freedom and art. The weak version of the thesis is that the creation and 
observation of art thrives in an open and democratic society. An extreme version o f this
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view is that art is impossible in a society without political freedom. Proponents of this
view claim that art is, in some way, a necessary component of political freedom.*®
This is not to say that political freedom and aesthetic freedom are synonymous.
Aesthetic freedom is freedom in the creation and sqjpreciation o f art and is often viewed
as a necessary element of the experience of art. Kant offers a version o f the theory in the
Critique o f Pure Judgement with his claim that beauty is evidence o f the noumenal world.
In this sense, aesthetic freedom is not the absence of external, physical, or societal
restraints. Rather, it is a version of the very human ability to rise among the limitations
imposed upon us by everyday life and assert our irmer freedom. It is a correlate o f our
religious, intellectual, and moral freedoms.
Because aesthetic freedom can exist under diverse forms of social order, we see that
this is a freedom dependent not upon circumstances, but on the "freedom to express some
idea and some feeling in an artistic manner, and to practice the techniques necessary to
such expression." “  It is a freedom from internal constraint, even self-subjugation, and
finds highest expression in fine art. While many values may be expressed as we create and
appreciate art, all are ancillary to and not definitive of art. Jessup and Rader write:
Art is free and self-expressive. It is concerned in its way to 
present all that life in its full qualitative immediacy is and 
can be. And its way is simply to express-not to explain.
‘® Cf. Melvin Rader and Bertram Jessup, Art and Human Values (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), 334.
“  Rader and Jessup, 337.
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not to condemn, not to justify. In art, the human spirit is 
self-expressive—that is all and that is enough. Even when 
life is grim, the effect of this expression is to liberate.^ *
There is no necessary correlation, then, betweoi a political or social state of affairs 
and an artistic creation. The artist may live in a society characterized by political and 
social repression, yet produce art that lends itself to the view that there is much about our 
world that is altogether pleasing and satisfying. On the other hand, the artist may live in 
a free, democratic political and social environment, yet produce art that indicts some 
rqrressive feature of the world. One of the many functions o f art is a normative one, just 
because it presents a view o f some aspect of the world as it could be. Art, by nature, 
resists the complete assimilation of reality. Through art, we are able to grasp the gap 
between reality and value, the distance between truth and perception, and the separation 
between the ideal world and the real world.
As we have seen, autonomy is closely connected to the distinction Isaiah Berlin 
makes between negative and positive aspects of freedom. The ideal of human autonomy 
is more than the external lack o f constraint, compulsion, or control. Rather, autonomy 
entails the internal capacity of human beings to understand and accept the necessary 
workings of the world around, yet resist passive acceptance of those limitations in favor 
of active participation. To be autonomous is to be engaged in a world that is not of one's 
making, yet to engage it as an internally free, self-determined individual.
Rader and Jessup, 339.
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Art expresses that which is uniquely human, but paradoxically, it accomplishes this 
by liberating the individual from the practical context and transferring individual 
experience, by way of imagination and possibility, to the objective domain about which 
I will have more to say later. It is precisely this capacity to isolate certain experiences 
from the practical context, and to pay attention to internal relationships and intrinsic 
qualities that makes aesthetic experiences possible. Because aesthetic experiences, 
particularly those associated with fine art, isolate some aspect of human experience and 
express it in all its immediacy, without apology or excuse, some art enables the 
participant, whether artist or beholder, to transcend her immediacy and to comprehend 
human self-expression without the distortion of egoism and self-concern. The subjective 
becomes objective, and what is objective is something that can be addressed and 
confronted.
Theorists' views about art are largely determined by their underlying concepts of 
art as product-oriented, artist-oriented, audience-oriented, or utilitarian in nature. A 
philosophy of art, then, may establish the work, the creator, the audience, or the effects 
o f the work as the theoretical locus of art. What this means is that some theorists 
concentrate on intrinsic aspects of the artwork, and think it sullies the study of the work 
to interpolate any investigation of the artist's intentions, his identity, or the work's impact 
on the audience. Monroe Beardsley, for example, stresses the autonomy, independence, 
and relative self-sufficiency o f art. All aesthetic attention is focused on the work itself.
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Others think it essential to aesthetic investigation to consider the artist's conscious or 
unconscious intentions as they are expressed through the work, the creative process, the 
artist's identity, or perhaps even her views about society. Richard Wollheim expresses a 
VCTsion of this orientation in Panting As An A n ^  when he claims that a work of art may 
be thought o f as the instantiation of the artist's intentions. John Dewey, among other 
theorists, thinks the impact of the work on the audience, or the interaction between the 
work and the audience is of fundamental importance in any study of art. In Xrr as 
Experience he defines aesthetic experience as a kind o f "lived experience," an experiential 
continuum between aesthetic and other human experience^. Utilitarian investigations 
focus on the instrumental significance of art, especially the functional aspects of art, such 
as the effect o f art on society or culture. Terry Eagleton, for example, sees art as a 
significant cultural object only insofar as it serves a political agenda^ "*.
Moreover, after even the most elementary survey of relevant literature, we can see 
that the philosophy of art, while often classified as a species of value theory, involves 
much inquiry in areas that have little to do with the study o f values, as such, yet focuses 
attention on intriguing studies o f the instrumental worth of art. Julius Moravscik, for 
example, argues for a view of art devoid of analytic definitions and based on pre-theoretic
“  Richard Wollheim, Painting As An Art (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 
“  John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: G.P. Pumam’s Sons, 1934)
Terry Eagleton, The Ideology o f the Aesthetic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990)
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intuitions, or commonsense understandings, comparable to those that ground other 
disciplines such as medicine, chemistry, and linguistics."
My own view is that, considered pre-theoretically and intrinsically, art is an organ 
o f human communication that makes possible through imagination shared perceptions of 
the world, cross-culturally and across time; art exhibits potent instrumental force in human 
relations. Let us conjecture that interdependence is a more integrated and more developed, 
possibly more rational, state of the human condition than independence. Given that 
conjecture, I hope to show that art contributes to human interdependence because it makes 
it possible for humans, particularly the artist and spectators, to communicate information 
outside the level of conscious awareness.
Admittedly there are many facets, both intrinsic and instrumental, of a given work 
of art, but a fundamental aspect is the capacity of a work of art to evoke an aesthetic 
perception. But what does it mean to perceive aesthetically? Some views about art define 
a work of art with reference to its audience. That is, art is determined by the response it 
evokes. Others see art as a mode of perception and response. They afford no objective 
criteria for determining a work of art other than the awakening o f an aesthetic response on 
the part of the perceiver in the presence of the work of art. Yet, an aesthetic response is 
not inevitable in response to the work. One person at any given moment is not guaranteed 
a perceptually aesthetic experience in the presence of an art work.
25 Julius Moravscik, "Why Philosophy of Art in Cross-Cultural Perspective?" Journal o f  
Aesthetics and Art Criticism. Volume 51, #3, Summer, 1993.
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Further, an aesthetic response, while never inevitable is always possible. Given 
the right mental attitude, the right environment and conformation, almost anything may 
be, and seemingly is, perceived aesthetically. We see sunsets, pieces o f driftwood, and 
various artifacts, such as shovels, barbed wire, and beds aesthetically. Any object is at 
least potentially the ground o f an aesthetic experience and some o f these are art objects. 
Yet, despite the general source of aesthetic experience, whatever ways we define and 
delineate art, any work that we classify as an artwork exhibits this experiential facet. Art 
is a particular species of the aesthetic experience and acquires its status as art with 
reference to such categories o f experience, not in virtue of certain necessary attributes of 
the work itself. We find ample proof of this in the puzzles presented by artistic look- 
alikes, such as Warhol's Brillo Box, Duchamp's snow shovels, bottle racks, and bicycle 
wheels, Rauschenberg's bed, and so on.
It is not the content of experience that distinguishes aesthetic from non-aesthetic 
experioices, but rather the mode of those experiences. Art is not just a way of escaping 
actual existence; it stimulates an alternate mode of perception, different from that 
employed in day-to-day living. Because of this alternate mode of perception, we are able 
to perceive the world through alternate paradigms. The experience of art is the interaction 
o f the person with the environment, that enables her to disengage from the deep concern
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for self and for her future. Art amplifies experience without isolating the individual from 
ordinary experience. It is a class o f perceptually differentiated "lived experience.
Aesthetic experience involves a release from the concerns o f self, from self­
responsibility and self-concern. My theory of this release is a variation o f the finely 
developed theories o f aesthetic "disinterestedness" we frnd in Kant and Shaftesbury. 
Aesthetic disinterestedness is the human capacity to find release from perceiving things and 
events only in the light of the effect they may have on us and our futures. It is the ability 
to perceive a thing beyond the confines o f self-interest and involves a suspension, or 
"bracketing" of our own narrow concerns for some period o f time, a brief recess from the 
onerous concerns and responsibilities of human existence that are the result o f human 
consciousness.
Absence o f self concern is a distinguishing characteristic of the aesthetic 
experience, but does not sufficiently explain the aesthetic percqjtion. Beyond the negative 
condition, absence of self concern, is the positive condition, a liberated or heightened 
capacity to respond to an object.
A component o f this aesthetic experience is imagining. It is imagination that 
generates alternate realities, albeit not actual realities, and renders them objective in a way 
that invites exploration and discovery. Kendall Walton, in his book Mimesis and Make- 
Believe, discusses the notion of fictional worlds and their "malleability. " Says Walton,
“  cf. John Dewey, Chapters 1 and 2.
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"We can arrange their contents [of the worlds of make-believe] as we like by manipulating 
props or even, if  necessary altering principles o f generation. We can make people turn 
into pumpkins, or make sure the good guys win, or see what it is like for the bad guys to 
win."^ If the fictional world has been engendered by an artist, we enjoy more than just 
a fictional world to explore; we also gain from the talent and insight the artist brings to the 
creation.
In particular, Walton notes a benefit we derive from the experience, through
imagination, o f imaginary worlds:
There is a price to pay in real life when the bad guys win, 
even if we learn from the experience. Make-believe 
provides the experience—something like it anyway—for free.
Catastrophes don't really occur (usually) when it is fictional 
that they do. The divergence between fictionality and truth 
spares us pain and suffering we would have to expect in the 
real world. We realize some o f the benefits o f hard 
experience without having to undergo it.“
Thus, it is imagination that provides the link between art and reality. We are 
allowed to approach some of our very immediate existential problems, to grapple with and 
overcome them. I believe this description also applies to the human capacity for 
autonomy, or self-determination, if you will. It is in virtue of the world of imagination, 
as exemplified by the artwork, that an artist may express certain inclinations toward a
^ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundation o f the Representational 
Arts (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 67-68.
Walton, 68.
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more developed state of human freedom, to extend the limits of human existence. To this 
extent the work of art functions as an expression o f an imaginary world. Such an 
imaginary world may even demonstrate a kind o f objectivity that renders the experience 
of it open to a community o f beholders. It is the imaginative experience that makes it 
possible for us to explore our autonomy through art and we will examine this claim in the 
coming pages. First, however, we consider a brief overview of Kant’s position on the 
interconnection between art and autonomy.
Chapter 2 
Kant
Kant's project in the Critique o f Judgment is to establish a theory about the 
interlock between the areas o f human concerns addressed by his first two critiques: Vie 
Critique o f Pure Reason and The Critique o f Pure Practical Reason. He begins his first 
Critique by analyzing the conditions for knowledge and concludes by giving us a requisite 
condition for spanning the natural and moral orders. As we look briefly at his universal 
and transcendental concerns, we will find that Kant articulates a theory o f autonomy that 
rests on human relationships in the context of aesthetic experience. Before we turn to an 
investigation of Kant's view o f autonomy and its relevance to the aesthetic community, we 
might look over Kant's analysis in the critiques.
Kant's first enterprise in The Critique o f Pure Reason was to explain how it is that 
rational agents conceive of a natural world. Kant's analysis plays off o f Hume's analysis, 
but avoids what is sometimes (controversially) thought of as Hume's skeptical conclusion. 
Where Hume had regarded the categories of experience as synthetic judgments that result 
from habit and custom, and without claim to catain types of objective ontological validity, 
Kant proposed a project whereby he could derive the categories from the understanding, 
from the possibility of human consciousness in general and prior to experience. Kant was 
convinced these concepts were not simply abstractions from experience as Hume had
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maintained, but that they were an intrinsic feature o f human consciousness. In so doing, 
Kant's most important challenge was to show that some judgments are both synthetic and 
a priori. His position accords in at least some ways with Leibniz's contention that thought 
determines the conditions to which experience conforms. According to Kant's 
formulation, we achieve theoretical knowledge in a process that involves three "moments"; 
the combination o f sensations into perceptual intuitions by the Imagination under the 
categories of time and space, the synthetic union of intuitions about the world into 
conceptual judgments about such phenomena according to the a priori categories, and the 
arrangement of these judgments about natural experience into a metaphysical view of the 
universe as an orderly system that is regulated by certain universal ideas.
Furth^, Kant's analysis of theoretical knowledge establishes a dualism in both his 
ontology and his q)istemology that is grounded on a corresponding dichotomy between the 
sensible or phenomenal world, and the supersensible or transcendental world. His dualism 
hearkens back to Plato's ontology. Unlike Plato's epistemological formulation, however, 
Kant thinks that we can not know things in themselves as they exist in the noumenal world. 
Yet, Kant avoids Berkeley's idealist position because he thinks the phenomena which are 
open to the perceiving subject are an aspect of things in themselves. The phenomenal 
world is the domain of science, and the noumenal world is the domain o f morality. The 
domain of morality is governed by Practical Reason and the domain o f science is governed
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by Theoretical Reason. Practical reason is a function of the human will and is rooted in 
the possibility of freedom.
In the Critique o f Practical Reason Kant establishes moral order on the basis of 
freedom of the will, the immortality o f the soul, and the existence of God as inferences 
from his fundamental principles o f morality. In fact, the categorical imperative, Kant's 
test for making a moral decision, amounts to deciding whether one, as a rational being, 
could will that a particular principle justifying an action should be a universal law of 
nature. This test of moral decision making also requires the moral principle in question 
to be consistent with other laws governing the universe. Kant saw the moral order with 
its promise of individual freedom as one that is consistent with the causally determined 
natural order and the moral law as constitutive of the moral nature o f human beings. 
Moreover, the postulates of practical reason, freedom of the w ill, the immortality o f the 
soul and the existence of God, stand as theoretical propositions that are not themselves 
demonstrable, but which are the necessary consequence of an unconditional a priori 
practical law.
Having established the domains of science and morality, Kant's project in the 
Critique o f Judgment is to establish a consonance or compatibility between the two. He 
thought it necessary to bridge the gap between the sensible realm with its accompanying 
concept of nature and the transcendental world with its concept of freedom. Here, he 
addresses the connection between causal necessity and freedom o f the will, and between
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phenomena and noumena. It is in the nature of the aesthetic experience that he establishes 
this link. In particular, reflective judgment, characteristic o f the aesthetic response, is the 
point of connection between reason and understanding.
Reflective judgment does not constitute experience—rather it regulates experience. 
A subject who engages in reflective judgment will not gain further knowledge about an 
object, which means it is not a judgment that is based on sensations. It is a judgment 
governed by rules. Kant suggests that these reflective judgments allow us to recognize 
order or purpose in our experience without being able to demonstrate or describe that 
order. Reflective judgments, unlike judgments of understanding or imagination, do not 
require a determinate concept. It describes, as we will see, a subjective use of our 
faculties in making judgments.
It is in the notion of "purposiveness" that Kant thinks he finds the intermediary
between the natural and the moral realms:
Now even if  an immeasurable gulf is fixed between the 
sensible realm of the concq>t of nature and the supersensible 
realm o f the concept of freedom, so that no transition is 
possible from the first to the second (by means o f the 
theoretical use of Reason), just as if they were two different 
worlds of which the first could have no influence upon the 
second, yet the second is meant to have an influence on the 
first. The concept o f freedom is meant to actualise in the 
world of sense the purpose proposed by its laws, and 
consequently nature must be so thought that the conformity 
to law of its form, at least harmonises with the possibility of 
the purposes to be effected in it according to laws of 
freedom.—There must, therefore, be a ground of the unity 
of the supersensible, which lies at the basis o f nature, with
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that which the concept of freedom practically contains; and 
the concq)t of this ground, although it does not attain either 
theoreticadly or practically to a knowledge o f the same, and 
hoice has no peculiar realm, nevertheless makes possible the 
transition from the mode of thought according to the 
principles o f the one to that according to the principles of 
the other, " ”
Peculiar to aesthetic experiences are what Kant calls judgments o f taste. The 
Critique o f Judgment includes Kant's critique of aesthetic and teleological judgments, both 
of which figure prominently in his analysis o f the moral. It is important to note that Kant 
does not want to equate aesthetic and moral judgments, an easy error to make when he 
makes claims like 'beauty is the symbol of the morally good. What Kant does say is 
that aesthetic experience establishes a nexus between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds 
that is apprehended through moral judgment. Aesthetic judgments guide us to an 
apprehension of a transcendent world, while moral judgments drive us to find content in 
these aesthetic apprehensions.
The faculty of taste exercised in an aesthetic judgment derives pleasure that is 
grounded on purposive connections; a purposiveness that is not grounded on logic or 
morality, but is grounded on the subjective, the psychological, and the affective. It is.
”  Immanuel Kant, Kritik o f Judgment, trans. J.H. Bernard, D .D. (London: Macmillan 
and Co., 1892) Introduction n.
“  Kant, Section 59.
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however, perspectiveless. Aesthetic contemplation of objects is pleasurable because of the 
firee play and harmony o f the Imagination and the Understanding.
The feeling of pleasure is occasioned by reflection upon the formal characteristics 
of an object, and Kant distinguishes the formal as an object of intellectual apprehension 
which is distinct from sensual apprdioision, yet empirically grounded in the object. What 
this means is that aesthetic ideas are rational ideas that transcend the limits o f possible 
human experience yet rq)resent in a sensible mode certain characteristics o f the noumenal 
world.^ * Our perceptions o f beauty depend upon these aesthetic ideas, given to us both 
through art and through nature. Thus, an artist, given any sort o f medium, uses the 
vehicle of imagination to go beyond the limits o f human experience to present intimations 
of the noumenal world that are not found in the phenomenal world. For example, an artist 
who paints a beautiful face conveys not just some contingent belief that this is a beautiful 
face, but that this representation somehow gives us the universal and timeless essence of 
beauty. It is as if the artist gives us a glimpse o f a transcendental realm through an object 
in the natural world. Kant realized that concepts limit the imagination, but can give us a 
glimpse of a transcendental world that lies just beyond our grasp. The "aesthetic 
experience, which involves a perpetual striving to pass beyond the limits o f our point of 
view, seems to 'embody' what cannot be thought.
Kant, Sections 74-75.
Roger Scruton, Kant (London: Oxford University Press, 1982) 88.
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Kant believes that aesthetic experience turns on a pleasure that is induced without 
the mediation o f a concept and without the incitement of desire, Kant's much-maligned 
thesis o f aesthetic disinterestedness. He develops his thesis o f disinterestedness in the 
wake of the powerful empirical tradition in aesthetics offered by such philosophers as 
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, who emphasized the primacy o f sensation in the aesthetic 
experience. Moreover, the empiricists generally thought judgments o f taste were rooted 
in pain and pleasure and that aesthetic judgments evoked sensuous satisfaction without the 
intrusion of intellectual analysis, sometimes without appeal to formal elements or criteria 
for the judgment. Hume, for example, conceived of aesthetic pleasure as sensuous, 
relative, and subjective. He claimed that sensible qualities are not found in the objects of 
sensation, but originate in the perception. While British empirical tradition places 
sometimes unacceptable limits on aesthetic experience, we can take this notion of aesthetic 
disinterestedness to be a first and critical step toward the view that the aesthetic is a 
distinctive mode of experience. Not a new idea in western philosophical thought, aesthetic 
disinterestedness nevertheless represented a theoretical shift that is brought to full fruition 
in Kant.^ ^
” Evidence of aesthetic disinterestedness can be found in the work o f various writers such 
as Aquinas, and, of course, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Burke, Addison, and Moses 
Mendelssohn. We can also find at least implicit demands for aesthetic disinterestedness 
in the XJpanishads and in various Indian commentaries that argue artistic consciousness 
should be freed from all natural and practical relationships, investing it with meaning 
and positive value, cf. Sneh Pandit, An Approach to the Indicm Theory o f Art and 
(New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, LTD, 1977) 104,137-138.
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Some contemporary theorists distrust the notion of disinterestedness because they 
consider it elitist and hyper-refined. Yet, aesthetic disinterestedness on Kant's analysis 
frees us from our human tendency to perceive things in the light of the effects they may 
have on us. The introduction of disinterestedness into an analysis o f the aesthetic 
experience lifts us above selfish concern we may have when we regard an object; we no 
longer perceive the object instrumentally, or with regard to some end; we perceive the 
thing as it is in itself. Aesthetic disinterestedness allows a release from self-concern and 
contributes to the universality o f the aesthetic experience.
When we perceive a beautiftil thing, according to Kant, we don't need to have a 
concq>t of it in order to know what sort of thing the object ought to be. The reason is that 
aesthetic objects have no meaning and depend on no definite concepts even though they 
please.^ Nevertheless, judgments of taste are contemplative and are indifferent to the 
actual existence of the object. Since it is not a judgment of cognition, it is not based on 
ordinary logic, nor is it dependent upon the phenomenal existence o f the object. It is 
nothing other than a judgment with subjective content. Aesthetic contemplation is 
emancipated from all self-intraest or desire. It is coupled with disinterestedness and is free 
from the preoccupation with phenomenal aspects o f objects in the sensible world, but its
Kant, Section SO.
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apparent purposiveness is noumenal. Kant thought this noumenal purposiveness "promotes
the sensibility o f the mind for the moral feeling."^*
John Dewey also captures the spirit of aesthetic disinterestedness when he says:
Taken at its best, that is to say, with a liberal interpretation, 
contemplation designates that aspect o f perception in which 
elements of seeking and of thinking are subordinated 
(although not absent) to the perfecting of the process of 
perception itself. To define the emotional element of 
esthetic perception merely as the pleasure taken in the act of 
contemplation, independent of what is excited by the matter 
contemplated, results, however, in a thoroughly anaemic 
conception of art. Carried to its logical conclusion, it would 
exclude from esthetic perception most o f the subject-matter 
that is enjoyed in the case of architectural structures, the 
drama, and the novel, with all their attendant reverberation.
Not absence of desire and thought but their thorough 
incorporation into perceptual experience characterizes 
esthetic experience, in its distinction from experiences that 
are especitdly 'intellectual' and 'practical.
Dewey's interpretation, which is not far different from Kant's, although it is 
critical of Kant, describes contemplation and disinterestedness as constitutive of aesthetic 
experience, enhancing and interpreting experience, and bringing the subject to a 
heightened sensitivity. Kant's thesis about aesthetic disinterestedness affords universal 
satis6ction in the aesthetic object because the object does not evoke a concept. Since the 
judgment is inherent to all aesthetic expression, it must be grounded on some faculty that
35
36
Kant, Section 49.
John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Putnam and Sons, 1934)
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may be presupposed in all rational creatures. Kant thinks o f this as the a priori universal 
rule that consists in the subjective universal validity of pleasure derived from aesthetic 
experience. The perception of beauty is an a priori judgment and is one that Kant thinks 
can be attributed to all rational subjects.
Aesthetic disinterestedness untethers aesthetic perception from the purely practical
context. No finite concepts can exhaust the content o f an aesthetic object or a work of art.
Because aesthetic content does not translate into concepts, the aesthetic transcends the
limitations of the phenomenal world and somehow brings transcendental ideas such as
God, freedom, infinity, and immortality into the province of human experience. Albert
Hofstadter wrote:
[It] leads man into the realm of his most genuinely human 
freedom. It opens up for him an intuitive grasp o f the 
infinite that is ownmost to him. In it, he is with the 
infinite....The aesthetic Idea as the symbolic image o f the 
intellectually inexpressible source, ground, and possibility 
of the real, with which man can be united as own with own, 
remains a lasting result of Kant's works, a concept of art 
that is the first step toward an aesthetics capable o f handling 
the deepest questions...and of bringing art into its true place 
in the context of human fteedom.^ ^
The aesthetic liberates human experience and establishes a relation between the 
phenomenal and the noumenal worlds that is only suggested in moral experience. It 
releases experience from one context to another, marked by absence of self-concern
Albert Hofstadter, "Kant's Aesthetic Revolution," Journal o f Religious Ethics, Volume 
3.2: 186.
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through disinterestedness, and reveals the possibility of experience that is multi­
dimensional and transcendental in scope.
n.
I now turn to a limited study of Kant's contribution to our understanding of human 
autonomy in the context of the aesthetic experience. Kant is the figure in the history of 
philosophy who is the conduit through which the philosophical thinking of the period 
known as the Enlightenment has been collected and conveyed to modem thought. It was 
during this era o f western cultural thought that philosophers began to develop a 
consciousness of 'humanity' and to develop philosophical interest in the individual and the 
'Self.' The philosophers of the Enlightenment also developed and articulated views about 
individuals as the repository of inalioiable rights that hold simply because they are rational 
creatures. In fact, this view of inalienable rights, articulated in particular by John Locke 
and Jean Jacques Rousseau, grounds the ideologies of the American and French 
revolutions.
In aesthetics, Kant generated a revolution just as significant as his "Copemican 
revolution" in epistemology and metaphysics. Some scholars think that without Kant's 
Critique o f Judgment, aesthetics as we know it would never have evolved. There is no 
question that since Plato no other philosophy gave aesthetic experience such a critical role 
in philosophy. By all counts, Kant was the first philosopher who recognized the
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importance o f a theory of aesthetics to metaphysics and moral theory. For only a creature
who is rational can experience beauty, and without the experience of beauty, rationality
lacks force. As Roger Scruton observes:
Aesthetic experience intimates to us that our point of view 
is, after all, only our point of view, and that we are no more 
creators of nature than we are creators of the point of view 
from which we observe and act on [nature]. Momentarily 
we stand outside that point o f view, not so as to have 
knowledge of a transcendent world, but so as to perceive the 
harmony that exists between our faculties and the objects in 
relation to which they are employed. At the same time we 
sense the divine order that makes this harmony possible.^ *
Kant develops his view of rationality and human nature in the shadow o f Rousseau, 
who distinguished human from other creatures not on the basis of intellect and rationality, 
but on the capacity for autonomy, in the sense that humans are capable of self-legislation 
and self-direction. Kant's aesthetic revolution is generated at least in part by his concern 
with the problem of individual freedom in the context of a causally determined world and 
in the context o f a society of other autonomous and rational creatures that comprise the 
social community. Perhaps the most important aspect of his aesthetic analysis penetrates 
to the transcendental source o f human autonomy, the ground of individual autonomy 
within the community of rational beings. Kant presents an analysis of individual autonomy 
in aesthetic experience in order to bridge the gap between his phenomenal and noumenal 
worlds.
” Scruton, 80.
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In the first and second Critiques, Kant's analysis had severed the worlds of nature
and morality. Thus, the problem Kant addresses in the third Critique is the possibility that
the moral domain exercises some influence on the natural domain, and that moral laws
have force in the natural world. What Kant has to explain in order for moral imperatives
and inducements to be brought to bear is that moral law has force in the natural world.
Kant himself says that human freedom is the base of the transcendental realm which forms
the backdrop for the natural and the moral worlds:
Now even if  an immeasurable gulf is fixed between the 
sensible realm of the concq>t of nature and the supersensible 
realm o f the concept o f freedom, so that no transition is 
possible from the first to the second (by means o f the 
theoretical use of Reason), just as if they were two different 
worlds of which the first could have no influence upon the 
second, yet the second is meant to have an influence upon 
the first. The concept of freedom is meant to actualize in 
the world of sense the purpose proposed by its laws, and 
consequently nature must be so thought that the conformity 
to law of its form, at least harmonises with the possibility of 
the purposes to be effected in it according to laws of 
freedom.—There must, therefore, be a ground of the unity 
o f the supersensible, which lies at the basis of nature, with 
that which the concept of freedom practically contains; and 
the concept of this ground, although it does not attain either 
theoretically or practically to a knowledge of the same, and 
hence has no peculiar realm, nevertheless makes possible the 
transition from the mode of thought according to the 
principles o f the one to that according to the principles of 
the other.^’
39 Kant, Introduction, Section II.
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The universality of the principles of the moral law, as Kant shows, is grounded on 
duty, but if  duty is to make legitimate demands upon human behavior it must also 
presuppose autonomy on the part o f the agent. Autonomy is nothing if not rational. So, 
the essence o f morality is autonomy, freedom that is universally attributed to all rational 
creatures. John Kemp suggests that Kant establishes the place of human agency in the 
natural order, not by arguing theoretically for a metaphysical order, but by showing that 
there is nothing that logically precludes belief in the transcendental world o f freedom and 
objective truth, no matter how dependent upon subjective features of the human mind. 
The ideas of reason and the ideas o f the transcendental realm are ideas that Kant believes 
surface in rational consciousness as God, freedom, and immortality, and also in moral 
imperatives and aesthetic imagination. Moral and aesthetic sensibility serve only to remind 
us that we are to behave as if we are members o f a transcendental world, while limited in 
fact to the natural world. The domains of the aesthetic and the moral are intimations of 
our ties to the noumenal.'*®
For the Kantian subject, the great gap that occurs between the noumenal and the 
phenomenal is mediated by the aesthetic idea. When an aesthetic idea is expressed, for 
example, in a work of art, an image is expressed that suggests a rational idea whose source 
is the noumenal.^ * In his discussions o f artistic genius, which he defines as the capacity
‘*° cf. John Kemp, The Philosophy o f  Kant (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) 90- 
91.
cf. Hofstadter, 186-187.
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to imagine aesthetic ideas that are counterparts to rational ideas, Kant assumes that works
o f art paradigmatically have moral content/^ Aesthetic experience, under Kant's
description, enables us to place ourselves in the context o f a transcendental order that lies
beyond the reach of thought, but nevertheless defines the contours of human freedom and
agency/^ Says Kant;
We have in the world beings o f but one kind whose 
causality is teleological, or directed to ends, and which at 
the same time are beings of such a character that the law 
according to which they have to determine ends for 
themselves is represented by themselves as unconditioned 
and not dq>endait on anything in nature, but as necessary in 
itself. The being o f this kind is man, but man regarded as 
noumenon. He is the only natural creature whose peculiar 
objective characterization is nevertheless such as to enable 
us to recognize in him a supersensible faculty—his freedom— 
and to perceive both the law of causality and the object of 
freedom which that faculty is able to set before itself as the 
highest end—the supreme good in the world. **
The dimension in human existence, then, that is the ground for the union of 
freedom and nature is the aesthetic experience. This union is exemplified in the judgment 
of taste, where nature and freedom are linked in experience. The primary focus of Kant's
42
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Kant, Sections 49 & 50.
This interpretation of the aesthetic idea, when applied to art, ultimately freed it from 
the highly formalized limitations o f taste and culture that were in force during the 
Enlightenment and rendered art a vehicle capable of expressing the human drive for 
autonomy.
Kant, Section 84.
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analysis was directed at this rational personhood and human Aeedom. But Kant's 
understanding o f freedom is somewhat limited for two reasons: (a) he did not grasp the 
broad connotation of the word, and (b) his rational agent suffers from an excessive 
individualism. Kant’s agent is considered in isolation, a state that distorts our 
understanding of rational agency and is therefore unrealistic. Adequate ascriptions of 
autonomy require some acknowledgement that rational individuals exist in community and 
are socially defined. As we will see, because of these flaws, Kant is able to give us only 
a preliminary and partial concept of autonomy.
m
Kant provides a transcendental framework or condition of possibility for human 
freedom in his third Critique. Kant's search for human freedom began in the first Critique 
with metaphysics through his moral theory to aesthetics, which opens his view of the 
transcendental as the ultimate source of our autonomy. His work certainly represents great 
progress in our philosophical conception of autonomy. Kant's contribution to our 
understanding of human autonomy has to do with his insight that autonomy is a state that 
is contingent upon our capacity to view others as cognitive, moral, and rational agents. 
These agents are equal to ourselves and their goods and ends are regarded as equal and 
consistent with our own. Aesthetic ideas in general are the ground of our search for 
autonomy. But, it is through imagination that this transcendental view of human autonomy
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is opened to our limited perspective in the aesthetic experience and it is through 
imagination that we may confer the possibility o f autonomy on other agents. Albert 
Hofstadter comments that art "as expression of aesthetic Ideas, becomes the medium by 
which man's ultimate freedom, his Being-with-the infinitely transcendent-as-own is 
disclosed for imagination and made available for the life o f feeling in this finite temporal 
world.
Along similar lines, Kant's vision of human autonomy focuses on autonomy of the 
will; in other words, freedom is the power to will an end o f action for oneself in 
accordance with reason. So, the laws of freedom are principles by which an agent guides 
action. Kant conceives of the agent as capable of acting on the basis o f reason alone. Any 
other stimulus to act, such as emotion, desire, interest, or self-interest, is considered 
heteronomous and belongs to the causal realm or the natural world. Heteronomous action 
is not free in the strict sense since the agent is not the source of the action. Roger Scruton 
likens heteronomous acts to the actions of a bullet or a gear in a machine. We can't 
reasonably claim that a car 'acts' or a gear in a machine 'acts' any more than we can say 
that our actions are our own if they are not free. The discussion of heteronomous acts 
figures into the free will/determinism controversy that peppers philosophical literature and 
vexes philosophers who consider the problem.
Hofstadter, 187.
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Kant addresses this ancient dilemma of the incompatibility o f freedom of the will 
and the causal determinacy o f the natural world. Ralf Meerfoote remarks that Kant 
distinguishes between positive and n^ative conceptions of freedom and identifies positive 
freedom with autonomy.^ Under this description, Kant sees a free action as one that 
incorporates positive conceptions o f freedom and is controlled by pure a priori reason. 
He believes we are free from the causal demands of the phenomenal world because we are 
more than phenomenal beings. An agent is said to be the source o f his or her actions 
whenever he or she acts with critical awareness and deliberation choosing one action over 
another. So, in the second Critique Kant tells us that autonomous agents are those who 
act on the basis of reason alone, and not on heteronomous demands, especially when those 
demands do not accord with those agents' rational impulses.
We can say that actions based on deliberation or independent o f impulses derived 
from the senses are free. Kant's analysis suggests that rational agents are free for two 
reasons: (1) all rational actions presuppose at least minimal levels o f freedom, since it 
would be false to ascribe an action to a particular agent if this were not the case, and (2) 
human consciousness implies self-consciousness and hence, agency and spontaneity to act. 
Makkreel also sees Kantian freedom as the capacity to make decisions and choices based
^ Rudolf Makkreel, "Kant on the Nondeterminate Character of Human Actions," in Karu 
on Causality, Freedom, and Objectivity, editors, William A. Harper and Ralf Meerbote 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984) 138-163.
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on conscious deliberation, and autonomy as therefore inherently conscious and ffee/^ We 
may conclude that Kantian rational agents are autonomous because they generate rational 
choice and the capacity for self-determination and self-articulation.
As Roger Scruton notes, our perspective on the world comprises two aspects: first, 
a sense o f transcendental unity that underlies our knowledge o f nature, and secondly, a 
soise of transcendoital freedom that underlies our capacity for practical reason. We distill 
our sense o f the unity of consciousness and transcendental freedom from our knowledge 
o f the phenomenal world and both are assumed a priori as preconditions for human 
knowledge. Scruton further says that the unity of consciousness, the starting-point for all 
knowledge of truths and transcendental freedom, is the starting-point for all deliberation. 
In a negative sense, they are transcendental starting-points because they lie at the limit of 
what can be known.^ * This means that freedom, which amounts to a perspectival 
viewpoint on the phenomenal world, can not also be part of that world. It is this a priori 
assumption of our own autonomy that is a part of the ground of our perspective, an 
extension of our transcendental selves.
But talk of transcendental selves leads Kant to met^hysical difficulties with respect 
to this idea o f a transcendental freedom. For one thing, how are we to individuate 
transcendental selves from one another or decide what constitutes identity for a
Makkreel, 147.
Scruton, 61.
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transcendental self? And for another, how can we say that a self that exists 
tianscendentally can nevertheless cause an event in the phenomenal world? Kant realized 
that human autonomy issues in a paradox; that if we are, as he contends, citizens o f a 
transcendental world, the categories of understanding do not apply to us and that this 
paradox is insoluble on the basis o f theoretical reason and only hinted at in practical 
reason/^ That we have a sense of awe and respect for the moral law is attributable to our 
transcendental origin and perspective.
Despite these metaphysical difficulties, Kant maintains that inherent to the aesthetic 
experience is the subject's sense of community. One can even say that community is the 
groundwork of the aesthetic idea. This is not to say that Kant accepts social grounds as 
a reason to take an interest in art or the beautiful. He does not think that the aesthetic is 
a subliminal attempt to link us to other humans or with society, or to maintain society. 
On these points, it is a mistake to think that Kant believes strengthening our sociability 
strengthens our pleasure in art or the aesthetic. Kant rejects an empirical interest in 
Beauty, and in particular, rejects sociability as the ground of an aesthetic (or for that 
matter, moral or social) theory because he does not seek the empirical foundations of the 
aesthetic experience, but its a priori conditions.™
Scruton, 79.
™ Kant, Section 41.
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Kant also makes it clear that aesthetic judgments concern subjective feelings and 
are emotive judgments as well. For Kant, a genuinely aesthetic judgment is subjective. 
It is subjective even though we take pleasure in our perception of an object and mistakenly 
transmute those qualities to claims about the object. With respect to this point, Kant 
recognizes two logical peculiarities o f aesthetic judgments. Even though aesthetic 
experience is subjective, it claims the agreement of all rational creatures as though it were 
an objective judgment; and although the agent cannot provide any sort o f proof for 
aesthetic claims, an aesthetic judgment nevertheless has "exemplary validity" providing 
us with the justifiable expectation that others will agree with our judgment.**
Aesthetic judgments are, therefore, necessarily intersubjective because of the 
universality in the content of such judgments and our expectation that others will agree 
with our judgments. On this view aesthetic judgments intimate the possibility of genuine 
communication in human experience.*^ It is in the fieeplay between imagination and 
understanding that we derive a sense o f the unity of experience without concepts. Albert 
Hofstadter acknowledges the moral significance o f this aesthetic response because the 
existence of natural beauty stands as a sign the world is hospitable to our objectives. 
Implicit, then, in our aesthetic judgments, like our moral ones, is the appeal we make to 
other rational beings, on the basis o f our "common structure and operation o f our cognitive
** Kant, Sections 31, 35, 38.
*^  Hofstadter, 182.
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faculties in imagination and understanding”^  ^ that others will assent to our judgments. 
Although one's imaginative free play in aesthetic judgment is totally subjective—it is 
universal in meaning. In aesthetic judgment, we "speak with the voice o f all humanity to 
the whole human community; the freedom of people. In this experience I join myself to 
humanity and invite humanity to join with me...in the mutual freedom which beauty grants 
u s.” ^ Our aesthetic experiences are analogous to our moral experiences because this 
freedom of imagination is analogous to freedom o f will. We apprehend the aesthetic as 
an experience o f freedom with aesthetic judgments bearing a symbolic relation to moral 
good.
As members of Kant's Kingdom of Ends, populated by autonomous individuals, 
we join in a genuinely human communion of autonomous individuals because the 
experiaice allows us to transcend the confines o f subjectivity. In Kant's aesthetic theory, 
individual autonomy is fleshed out and given a dimension that it did not have in his moral 
theory. In the Third Critique, Kant adds to the concept o f the autonomous individual as 
a self-determining, self-legislating member of the Kingdom o f Ends by defining that 
individual precisely as a member, one individual among other, equally autonomous, 
individuals who realize their humanity and their rationality in the context of the other. 
These individuals do not submit themselves to external authority, but to the governance
” Hofstadter, 182.
^ Hofstadter, 182.
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of inner authority and rationality. Such individuals govern, determine, and define 
themselves, and are, in a word, autonomous. They are agents who never regard others as 
means, but as equally rational and autonomous members o f the community.
This is one way that Kant describes the conjunction of the aesthetic with the moral. 
To regard and behave toward others as citizens of a Kingdom of Ends means that we 
engage Kant's Categorical Imperative. True freedom for Kant is "this absolutely 
universally valid Being-with-other-as-with-own which is attained by means of the 
autonomous rational self-determination of each individual. In aesthetic judgment, the 
agent serves as a reflection of the sensus communis and gives it a universal voice.
Exactly what Kant means by this sensus communis is not entirely clear, and as one 
might expect, is the subject of various interpretations by scholars of Kant. Martin 
Schonfeld, for example, thinks that Kant is ambiguous about the notion in sections 20 and 
40 o f the third Critique. Says Schonfeld: "On the one hand, it seems to Kant that we 
need to have some universal sense o f this sort in order to allow for the possibility of 
talking coherently about Beauty and understanding each other but then again, it is not clear 
where and how we can identify such a sense...
What Kant does say about the sensus communis is that it is a sense common to all 
rational creatures, an operation of reflection that allows us to account for, at least in
" Hofstadter, 175.
^ Martin Schonfeld, personal communication, June 10, 1996.
57
theory, the judgments of other rational subjects. It is the capacity to discard narrow and 
private judgments in favor o f a "universal standpoint”, a perspective that consists of our 
a priori capacity to communicate feelings and impressions without a mediating concept.^
According to Kant:
under the sensus communis we must include the idea of a 
sense common to all, i.e. of a Acuity of judgment which, in 
its reflection, takes account (a priori) o f the mode of 
representation o f all other men in thought, in order, as it 
were, to compare its judgment with the collective reason of 
humanity, and thus to escape the illusion arising from the 
private conditions that could be so easily taken for objective, 
which would injuriously affect the judgment. This is done 
by comparing our judgment with the possible rather than the 
actual judgments of others, and by putting ourselves in the 
place of any other man, by abstracting from the limitations 
which contingently attach to our own judgment.**
Put this way, the sensus communis appears to function as a condition o f aesthetic 
understanding and communicability. It makes it possible to execute judgments that accord 
with those of our fellow beings and which stand as expressions of our common humanity. 
A judgment o f taste is a vehicle of communication.”  Judgments of taste cultivate "our 
individual judgment through a dialogue based on the capacities for reason and feeling
”  Kant, Section 39.
** Kant, Section 40.
Kant, Section 40.
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which we possess in common with others. On the basis of this sensus communis we 
acknowledge the rational and affective capacities o f others in such a way that we cultivate 
intersubjective harmony, accord, and dialogue between subjects.
Rudolf Makkreel intaprets the sensus conununis as a "subjective communal context 
more fundamental than an objective context. He also views it as an aspect of aesthetic 
judgment that allows us to orient ourselves away from self-interest to consider the 
perspective of a community of subjects, to universalize our judgment. Such experiences 
give depth and insight into our relationships to other individuals, particularly our 
understanding of politics and culture.
Kant makes it clear that the universality o f taste comes through the "common 
understanding o f Men" and in particular the maxims of common human understanding 
which are: (1) to think for oneself; (2) to put oneself in the place of everyone else; and 
(3) always to think consistently. The first maxim enjoins us to reason independently of 
the prejudices and external influences around us, and the second encourages us to go 
beyond the narrow confines of subjectivity and to enlarge our thoughts to arrive at a 
universal standpoint. This represents the escape from subjectivity and the ability to
“  Kemal, 126.
Makkreel, 65.
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perceive another subject as an indq)aident perspective on the world. It also acknowledges
others as subjects, who join with us to create a network of intersubjectivity.“
Salim Kemal comments on Kant’s third maxim, "to always think consistently":
We relate our judgmoit to others' in our present community 
in the consciousness that this activity is not monolithic but 
a creative grasping capable of change. We seek consistency 
because it provides us with a mechanism for moving 
towards the inclusive order of the ideal of universality from 
our present community, with its determinate forms, 
arbitrary associations, and conflicts. The search for 
consistency becomes an examination o f our responses to 
diagnose, in those instances where universality fails us, why 
that failure occurs. Through such continuous labour, the 
ability to think o f others and o f ourselves as members o f a 
community presumably becomes more powerful.®
Aesthetic experience, in particular, is an expression of the sensus communis 
because of the universal standpoint that it requires. Makkreel's interest is in the 
interpretation required by judgments of taste and in the function of imagination in 
interpretation. He shows that there is a systematic interrelation between our experience 
of beauty and our interpretation o f that experience. This interrelation turns on our 
"communal context", on our ability to propose order and meaning for the data of
Kant, Section 41.
® Kemal, 163.
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experience.** Thus, aesthetic experience depends on this operation o f imagination 
grounded on and articulated through the sensus communis.
IV.
On this Kantian account, the aesthetic experience contributes to individual 
autonomy because the subject enters into a reciprocal relationship with other subjects to 
create culture and community, thereby contributing to the autonomy of all who participate. 
Salim Kemal recognizes dual aspects of the Kantian 'subject', with one being entirely 
subjective and distinct while the other renders us able to enter into rational and emotive 
dialogue with other subjects, but it is clear that Kant never fully recognizes the importance 
of this aspect. Although a judgment o f taste is a subjective act, it is grounded on 
intersubjective validity of a community.** Kant notes that individuals are not sovereign 
subjects with respect to the aesthetic experience, but are always suitor[s] for agreement 
from others. Their autonomy is warranted only insofar as it receives confirmation from 
other subjects.**
Yet, we should not make the mistake of thinking the aesthetic experience is any less 
subjective because of its dq)endence upon intersubjective validity; "because the experience
Makkreel, 65.
** Kemal, 123.
Kant, Section 19.
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is subjective, only other subjects can grasp it in its subjectivity. The juxtaposition of 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity leads one to wonder whether the judgment of taste is 
fundamentally self-undermining. Such a judgment is at once aesthetic, and therefore, an 
expression of subjective experience, and also a judgment claiming assent from the aesthetic 
community. It depends on immediate pleasure rather than reason, but is the expression 
o f a rational subject. One gets the sense from Kant that the experience o f beauty is a 
uniquely human experience that turns on the intersection of reason and nature and is a 
central feature o f our humanity. Kant characterizes the aesthetic experience as 
disinterested, subjective, universal, and generated by the harmonious free play of 
imagination and understanding.^ Such judgments involve pleasure and because they 
concern only the relation between subject and object, are entirely subjective. But, as we 
have seen, these judgments are necessarily communicable" and are thus inextricably bound 
to the aesthetic judgments of other subjects who assent on the basis of their own subjective 
and independent judgments.
Kant's explanation about such subjective judgments and the confirmation of those 
judgments by other members of the aesthetic community tells us something else about
" Kemal, 124.
“  Kant, Section 9.
" Kant, Section 21.
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aesthetic judgmoit. Judgments o f taste, built on the experience of pleasure, do not follow
ordinary patterns o f assent:
The claim that an object is beautiful depends essentially on 
an experience of pleasure and cannot be inferred or deduced 
from any general property of the object....By this account, 
the actual judgement of taste must satisfy two criteria— 
particular judgments must gain confirmation from the 
community and the confirmed judgement must depend on 
the subject's autonomous activity in grasping and ordering 
some material in a pleasurable judgement. In effect Kant's 
theory points to a mutual dependence between the subject 
and the community. Neither gains serious employment 
without the other. The subject's particular claims remain 
questionable until the community validates them, and the 
force of the communier remains ineffective until the subject 
deploys it in the act of judging some material. The 
individual's acts have a social character at the same time as 
the social formation must make room for the individual's 
autonomous activity.™
Perhaps instead o f emphasizing "aesthetic disinterestedness" as the distinguishing 
characteristic o f Kantian aesthetics, we should instead think of "subjective universality". 
Kant's explanation of the universality of the aesthetic experience necessarily involves the 
possibility of more than one subject's participation in a judgment of taste. The universality 
o f the experience is not contingent upon properties that inhere in the object, but rather 
upon the participation of a community of subjects. Moreover, the extent and force of that
™ Kemal, 122-123.
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universality is apparent only as the participating subjects form a community and explore 
the details o f that connection through the experience.’*
This relation o f mutuality and communication allows us to describe aesthetic 
experience without established rules and criteria for judgments of taste, often criticized as 
a weak point in Kant's aesthetics. Yet his analysis is persuasive just because he gives us 
no canon o f aesthetic rules against which we must measure our aesthetic judgments; 
judgments o f taste afford opportunities for rational subjects to build relationships. This 
is not to say that an individual can not give reasons for an aesthetic judgment with respect 
to a particular and unique aesthetic object. But judgments o f taste "celebrate the relation 
of individual to community, which is ever in process, for the individual’s autonomous 
judgemait is always in search of a warrant from the community, which is itself always in 
a process o f development that depends on assent from its members."”
The paradoxical nature of Kantian aesthetics should be evident by now. Kant talks 
about aesthetic judgments that are universally valid, yet subjective; purposive without a 
purpose; exhibit exemplary necessity but are not necessary truths; involve a pleasure that 
is abstract; express beauty that is "free" and without content. Kant's depiction of the 
aesthetic experience reveals its dependence on immediate pleasure, not on reason, and 
warrants its demand for universal assent. Our feelings and judgments are deemed aesthetic
”  Kemal, 161,
”  Kemal, 125.
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because of their direct relation to experience without a concept. For this reason, no 
subject can judge the aesthetic quality of an object if  that object has never been a direct 
object of her experience. Contrast this with scientific judgments, which we may receive 
through intermediate means such as authoritative sources. If we are not, however, 
acquainted with works of Botticelli or Stravinsky, we have no reason to accept another's 
informed opinion that these works are beautiful.^
Nor do aesthetic judgments admit of mediation or argument because they are free 
of concepts. Beauty is not a concept, according to Kant, else it would admit of dispute and 
p r o o f . W e  can not regard another subject as an authoritative voice that something is 
beautiful; we make aesthetic judgments only through direct and unmediated experience. 
Although subjectively valid, aesthetic judgments exhibit the peculiarity of claiming the 
assent of other subjects, as if they were objective judgments resting on knowledge that 
could be established by proof.^  ^ Judgmoits of taste support and depend upon a community 
of rational subjects. Although subjective, aesthetic judgments do not describe a subject's 
state of mind, but evaluate an individual empirical experience, pleasure.^ ® This experience 
(of pleasure) is counted as universally valid and necessary. We see that aesthetic
^ Kant, Section 29.
Kant, Sections 33, 40.
Kant, Section 33.
Kant, Sections 33-37.
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judgments also have a normative character since they are the products o f rational subjects. 
Insofar as a subject is endowed with cognitive faculties and we justifiably assume his 
faculties reflect a similar capacity in all rational beings, we can say that aesthetic 
judgments are valid for everyone and everyone ought to regard a particular object as 
beautiful.^
Kant tells us that the pleasure we derive from the experience o f beautiful objects
is generated by the free play o f imagination. Imagination functions as one of our rational
faculties to bring unity to perception. Only rational beings can perceive the unity of an
experiaice or art work and Kant makes it clear that the perception o f unity is the ground
o f aesthetic experience. Further, through this free exercise of imagination, Kant thinks
we can bring concerts to bear on an experience that is, itself, without conceptual content:
The cognitive powers, which are involved by this 
representation are here in free play, because no definite 
concqrt limits them to a definite rule of cognition. Hence, 
the state of mind in this representation must be a feeling of 
the free play o f the representative powers in a given 
representation with reference to a cognition in general....a 
representation by which an object is given, that is to become 
a cognition in general, requires Imagination, for the 
gathering together the manifold o f intuition, and 
Understanding, for the unity of the concept uniting the 
representations. This state of free play o f the cognitive 
faculties in a representation by which an object is given, 
must be universally communicable; because cognition, as 
the determination of the Object with which given
77 Kant, Sections 37-38.
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representations (in whatever subject) are to agree, is the 
only kind o f representation which is valid for every one.’*
Moreover, like other cognitions and judgments, Kant supposes an aesthetic
experience to admit o f universal communication. Our feelings, excited by an aesthetic
experiaice, are univosally communicable and this further attests to the presence of a sense
common to all rational creatures.”
The subjective universal communicability o f the mode of 
representation in a judgment of taste, since it is to be 
possible without presupposing a definite concept, can refer 
to nothing else than the state of mind in the freeplay o f the 
Imagination and the Understanding...We are conscious that 
this subjective relation, suitable for cognition in general, 
must be valid for every one, and thus must be universally 
communicable, just as if it were a definite cognition resting 
always on that relation as its subjective condition.
Whenever we experience the beautiful, Kant presupposes the capacity to 
communicate our most private and personal reactions along with a sympathy for 
humankind in general that "constitutes the spirit of humanity", which we may construe as 
intersubjectivity. Thus, Kant connects the aesthetic experience to the human condition, 
involving a universal feeling of sympathy and an ability to engage in communication of 
a personal nature. This relation determines our sociality. Aesthetic experience contributes
78
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to our "ability to grasp the humanity of others, to treat them as subjects like ourselves, 
without subsuming them as objects that are means to our ends, [so that we are disposed to 
treat] others as ends and equals.
Kant's analysis of the sublime also emphasizes the relation between aesthetics and 
morality where we are given license to conceptualize abstractions through imagination. 
Through such experience, we may "transcend the limits imposed by embodiment."*^ 
Judgments o f taste, which universalize our perspective, convey the idea that our private 
sensations and feelings are not the only expression of subjectivity. In addition, it 
contributes to our capacity for moral sentiment or respect for moral ideas; moral ideas 
which also stand open to universal apprehension by autonomous subjects.
Kant links aesthetic and moral judgments on the basis o f the manner of judgment 
rather than on the content of those judgments. He even suggests that the universal nature 
of aesthetic judgments cultivates moral feelings because it fosters our ability to treat other 
subjects as ends and to transform ourselves from being subjects who are limited to private 
feelings to subjects who are capable of universal perspectives with a shared sensibility and 
sensitivity to other subjects.*’ Kemal observes: "the universality o f aesthetic judgements 
cultivates moral feeling-the ability to treat other subjects as ends and to distinguish oneself
*' Kemal, 117.
*’ Kemal, 113.
*’ Kant, Section 60.
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as an agent having only 'private' feelings hnom oneself as an agent capable of a 'universal' 
perspective in which we accommodate ourselves to...others.
We may draw two inferences from this: one is that the apprehension of beauty 
through the aesthetic experience is at least one means o f deepening autonomy through 
intersubjectivity. Secondly, our humanness appears through the arrangement of our 
relationships with others. With respect to the second point, Kant thinks of the aesthetic 
experience as a uniquely human and humanizing experience because it is founded on both 
reason and nature in a way that is significant only for rational creatures. He also sees the 
aesthetic experience as the defining point of our humanity. Our universal feeling of 
sympathy and our "ability to communicate universally our inmost feeling" are constitutive 
of the social life of humanity.*  ^ The communicability of aesthetic feeling generates a kind 
of relation that occurs between mutually responsive individuals and is grounded on our 
capacity to comprehend the humanity o f other subjects and to treat them as subjects like 
ourselves, rather than as objects, and to suppose these other subjects are members of the 
Kingdom of Ends.^ Aesthetic perception is unmistakably social in character and Kant's 
theory about the judgment of taste, then, is grounded on the intersubjective nature of
”  Kemal, 117.
“  Kant, Section 60.
“  Kemal, 117.
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aesthetic judgment. Such a judgment depends upon an at least theoretical corroboration 
by a community of subjects.
With respect to the first inference, Kant makes it clear that an autonomous subject 
is a self-legislating member of humanity, an expression of moral personhood, and that he 
does not achieve autonomy despite, or without, otho  ^subjects. Because it is fundamentally 
intersubjective, autonomy implies a community o f human beings, rather than isolation 
from other subjects. "Our moral behavior is autonomous but neither isolated from that of 
other subjects nor removed from cultural progress. The individual must be capable of 
legislating for himself as a member o f the Kingdom o f Ends....a subject cannot develop 
his humanity while disregarding others'."”
Kant's views about autonomy and the structure of the aesthetic experience form 
part of his complex account of the contribution of aesthetics to culture and the conditions 
for morality. He provides practical connotations for aesthetic activity in his discussion of 
culture as a context in which subjects recognize one another as compatible and social 
equals placed in a social and historical setting.** He regards "...beauty and aesthetic 
judgements [as] a part o f culture because they promote our humanity through an activity
Kemal, 121.
** Kant, Section 41.
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in which we treat each other as subjects who are ends in themselves, capable of 
reasoning...."*’ Culture is a kind of progressive entoprise that promotes human rationality 
and the social, not just individual, good. It is progressive in two ways: Firstly, because 
it grows in relation to the participation o f various members of the community and 
secondly, because it leads us to overcome ourselves in order to develop our rationality, 
while diminishing the influence o f irrational tendencies. Culture then becomes a vehicle 
for bridging the gulf between nature and freedom that Kant discusses in his introduction 
to the third Critique. It facilitates our efforts to regard humans as ends and moral
persons.’’
Culture is also the intersection of aesthetic judgment and morality. Kant describes 
the collective cultivation of our moral sense as culture, or as the ground of morality, and 
that aesthetic judgment contributes to culture. Aesthetic apprehension linked with the 
cultivation of our moral sensibility contribute to cultural development.’  ^ Imagination and 
the sensus communis contribute to Kant's model o f culture and history, the product of this 
multitude of autonomous and rational agents.’* Culture both promotes our ability to set
*’ Kemal, 126.
Kemal, 121 & 164.
”  Kemal, 120.
Kant, Sections 52 & 70.
’* Kemal, 165.
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ends and to behave and progress morally. Kant thinks o f the "power to set ends", or to 
establish our own agendas as a characteristic feature o f human autonomy. This is a 
capacity to behave according to moral principles toward which every rational creature 
strives. Kant's aesthetic that incorporates the "communicability of sensation"^ and "taste 
as a kind of communicative sense"’  ^provides a direct link to our endeavor to cultivate 
moral feeling.
In Kantian terms, individual autonomy and aesthetic judgments constitute part of 
the larger process in which we all engage, that o f developing humanity and becoming a 
community of subjects. Autonomy, like the aesthetic, always figures in the relation of the 
subject to the community and is always in process. The aesthetic, like the autonomous 
individual, can not stand alone, out of context and independent of other forms and 
activities of life. Kant recognizes the connection between community and judgments of 
taste and between the universality of aesthetic judgments and moral judgments.^ 
Furthermore, participation of individual subjects in aesthetic judgment not only validates 
the social order, it also "gives us the possibility of generating new and liberating ones from 
that source by changing social life as our participation in the community develops.
^ Kant, Section 39. 
”  Kant, Section 40.
96 Kant, Section 60.
^  Kemal, 125.
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Aesthetic judgment testifies to the ever changing relationship o f the subject to the
community, "for the individual's autonomous judgement is always in search of a warrant
from the community, which is itself always in a process o f development that depends on
assent from its members."®*
Human autonomy is manifest in the universality o f aesthetic judgments because
when we judge aesthetically we implicitly r^ard subjects as free, feeling, rational beings.
The autonomy of the subject plays a crucial role in the universality of aesthetic judgments,
for it is through and because of aesthetic experience and the judgment of taste that we
apprehend freedom in nature. Freedom, as a presupposition of morality
proves its objective reality in nature by means of the effects 
it can produce there....W e have therefore in us a principle 
capable o f determining the Idea of the supersensible within 
us, and thus also that of the supersensible without us, for 
knowledge, although only in a practical point of 
view....Consequently the concept of freedom (as 
fundamental concq>t of all unconditioned practical laws) can 
extend Reason beyond those bounds within which every 
natural (theoretical) concept must remain hopelessly 
limited.®®
As we develop our aesthetic sensitivity towards universality, we also develop those 
universal feelings o f sympathy and communication that generate moral feeling and 
contribute to our humanity and autonomy, a topic we turn to next.
®* Kemal, 125.
®® Kant, Section 91.
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Chapter 3
Art and the Community o f Experience: Semantic and Aesthetic Content
We have seen that Kant thinks art provides an aesthetic experience, essentially 
social in nature. Aesthetic apprehension is a vehicle by which we may move from an 
individual viewpoint to a social and communal viewpoint, to that universality imparted by 
intersubjectivity. This view is echoed in various ways by John Dewey, Roger Scruton, 
Terry Eagleton, Richard Wollheim, and Ernst Gombrich, all of whom recognize the affect 
aesthetic factors play in the communal aspect of works o f art. What I assume in this 
argument but do not attempt to prove, is the notion that interdependence is more 
integrated, developed, and more desirable, and possibly a more rational state o f the human 
condition than independence. The world we are given is one composed of innumerable 
subjects as we engage our practical concerns in this intersubjective world. Given that 
assumption, I hope to further develop the view that art contributes to human 
interdqjendence because it makes it possible for the artist and spectators, to communicate 
information that transcends temporal and social limitations.
Though there are many intrinsic and instrumental aspects of a given work o f art, 
the fundamental capacity of a work of art is its potential to evoke an aesthetic experience. 
What does it mean to experience art aesthetically? Some views about art define art with
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reference to its audience. In other words, art is determined by the response it evokes. 
Other theorists see art as a mode o f perception and response. They afford no objective 
criteria for determining the nature of a work o f art other than the awakening o f an aesthetic 
response on the part o f the subject in its presence.
A version of Kant’s disinterestedness, the absence o f self-concern, a kind of 
psychic distance, may distinguish the aesthetic experience, but it alone does not fully 
explain aesthetic perception. Drugs and other mind- and mood-altering substances may 
release us from self-concem, but the consequence is a flattening o f our psychological 
responses and a corresponding incapacity to respond to things in our environment. Beyond 
this negative condition, absence o f self-concem, is the positive condition—a liberated or 
heightened capacity to respond to an object. In contrast to the effects o f drugs or mind- 
altering substances, art has the capacity to enhance our responses to our environment.
Jerry Farber elaborates upon this capacity in A Field Guide to the Aesthetic
Experience, where he says:
Art is defined by the frame that separates it from the 
practical context. This frame is what makes possible the 
aesthetic liberation o f experience. The individual self, the 
"me" passes from the ever-threatened ever-embattled frame 
of its own narrow identity into that other frame, that refuge 
from the practical context, which is a work of art. But to 
live liberated, not in any refuge, but in the midst o f the 
practical context, requires something akin to a deframing of 
that very self which we have, since early infancy, learned to 
establish. The boundaries are retained, you might say, but 
without their former meaning....Aesthetic liberation is 
accomplished by transferring experience from one frame to
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another more or less parallel frame which is not subject to 
self-concem ....Art does reveal the possibility, within its 
frame at least, o f experience which is fiill, dimensional, 
affective and liberated. Some people may be led to make a 
connection between this revelation and their ordinary lives 
as they are lived out in the practical context. Others may 
not, and among them may well be those who have the most 
continual need o f art.‘“
According to Farber, we enjoy a thing aesthetically when the contents of that object 
are somehow bracketed or framed, either literally or figuratively. When we think of an 
artwork, the work is framed in such a way as to create pattern and coherence that 
emphasizes internal relationships in the work. Framing occurs in various ways, all specific 
to the work in question. For example, dance may frame certain bodily movements, a 
musical work may frame a certain sound in order to call attention to it, poetry makes use 
of the patterns we find in language by framing riiyme schemes, syllabic organizations, and 
visual constructs o f the line upon the page. Likewise, a book tends to frame its contents; 
a frame literally frames a painting, and so on. The frame both distinguishes an object of 
aesthetic attention and reveals the patterns and symbols that occur within the frame.
n.
If we think of art as a type of communication, and an art work as a message, as an 
artifact with informational content, we may also think of the of the work as a complex of
Jerry Farber, A Field Guide to the Aesthetic Experience. (North Hollywood, 
California: Foreworks Publishers, 1982): N. 246.
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symbols. An art work encodes a message using available symbols from a repertoire, or 
collection, of symbols and relevant rules of usage. We may further consider the artist to 
be a transmitter of such a message and the beholder o f the work to be a receptor. Since 
art functions in various media, we may also suppose that any pair of individuals in a 
society may be conversant in a number of media. As such, some information will be 
common to various transmitters and receptors in varying degrees. For example, two 
individuals may share knowledge of English, have high school diplomas, have traveled to 
Europe, have read certain books, play a particular musical instrument, know how to play 
chess, and so on, with innumerable combinations. The transmission of information 
through some repertoire of symbols presupposes a degree of knowledge common to the 
transmitter and the receptor. A receptor may become progressively more adept at 
decoding the information carried in the symbols as she increases her level of cultural 
literacy, or familiarity with the symbols and information used by the transmitter.
We might also think of a particular kind o f art work, such as a text, that is 
comprised of a repertoire of symbols where the message conveyed by the text is 
apprehended in accordance with the level of the receptor's knowledge, education, social 
background, and so on. The message grasped may also be a function of the reading 
habits, cultural facility, and general knowledge of a given social group. Thus, a given text 
may be perceived in one way by a preliterate child or an illiterate adult, in another way 
by an individual who is unfamiliar with the language of the text, in still another way by
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an editor who examines the formal structure o f the printed matter, or even in another way 
by a literary critic, and still another by an "average" reader. Also, a given reader is
capable o f altering her skills in a way that makes it possible for her to grasp a variety of
repertoires, and of increasing her capacity to apprehend intelligible messages.
Both Richard Wollheim and Ernst Gombrich take note o f the influence of extrinsic
knowledge upon aesthetic perception:
'What strikes us as a dissonance in Haydn', Gombrich 
writes, 'might pass unnoticed in a post-Wagnerian context 
and even the fortissimo of a string quartet may have fewer 
decibels than the pianissimo of a large symphony orchestra. '
Again, Gombrich cites Mondrian's Broadway Boogie- 
Woogie which, he says, in the context o f Mondrian's art is 
certainly expressive of 'gay abandon'" but would have a 
quite different emotional impact on us if we learnt that it 
was by a painter with a propensity to involuted or animated 
forms, e .g ., Severini.'"
Gombrich and Wollheim agree that knowledge and interpretation are features of 
even the most elemental apprehension of art, particularly cases where, for example, we 
are given two dimensions, but apprehend three, or when we interpret paint strokes as 
blades of grass, or fiir, or eyelashes.*® While Gombrich and Wollheim limit the scope 
of ancillary knowledge with respect to the interpretation of an art work, believing only that 
knowledge specifically about art is relevant, we can go further and describe aesthetic
*°* Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980) 57.
*® Wollheim, 66.
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apprehension as perception that is in all cases heavily affected by and informed by 
experience and information that is not essentially aesthetic. Aesthetic perception is 
ultimately inseparable from non-aesthetic aspects o f existence.
The function of the various artistic symbols is to stimulate the imagination to the 
point o f grasping some underlying emotional, moral, or intellectual content. This claim 
is significant because the meaning of a particular text may vary depending on the reader's 
ability to grasp the information encoded in the work. When we speak o f the informational 
content o f an artifact, we refer to that which makes possible the exchange of ideas, 
concepts, orders, and beliefs between individuals. Informational content depends on 
relationships between individuals and varies according to certain abilities on the part of the 
receptor. Such features as familiarity with the object, mnemonic capacity, and 
sociological background often figure into the receptor's ability to apprehend the 
information contained in a work.
When we speak of the informational content of a work of art, it is worth asking 
whether we can ever possess the full range of information given through an artwork. It 
would seem that if  this were possible, we could code the information or message into a 
shorter symbol, such as a title of a work, the call number of a book in a library, or the 
opening bars of a symphony, or perhaps a certain position of the feet to indicate a 
particular work of dance. While the informational content of an art work is often coded 
or reduced, the full extent of what is symbolized is never fully given to us in the
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abbreviated form. We rarely exhaust the information conveyed by a work o f art, simply 
because o f the limits of memory, percq)tion, and the inability to assimilate all o f the 
percq)tual elements of a work. However, in extreme examples of this encoding, such as 
repetitive musical introductions to television shows and musical accompaniments to 
television advertisements, the effect is one o f triteness. Think, for example, o f beloved 
and familiar works of classical music used to accompany television or radio commercials 
for clothes soap, the maddening familiarity that accompanies the repeated viewing of the 
commercial, and the banality that results from such misuse of the art work.
Messages imparted by the text sometimes vary in meaning and are distinguished 
by relative levels of semantic and aesthetic content. Every message displays some 
measure o f both kinds of content. What this means is that there are two types of 
collections of symbols in an artwork, with two sets of integrated structures, often 
organized in original ways. Both convey information, but information of different sorts. 
Semantic information is formal, structured, and translatable. Aesthetic content is grounded 
on states o f knowledge common to the artist and spectator and is largely untranslatable, 
which is to say the information conveyed aesthetically can not be transferred to another set 
of sym bols.^
This distinction is similar to Goodman's four "symptoms of the aesthetic". Cf. 
Goodman's Languages o f Art: An Approach to a Theory o f Symbols (Indianapolis, 
Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 1976)
For a discussion of this distinction, see Chapter 5 of Information Theory and Esthetic 
Perception by Abraham Moles; Joel E. Cohen, translator (Urbana: University of
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We see then, that an art work presents dual symbolic messages: semantic and 
aesthetic. We may think of a message as some connected series of elements drawn from 
a store of symbols that conveys some set of data. A spectator may understand the message 
if  he or she is acquainted with the store of symbols used to encode the message. The store 
includes any number o f individual symbols assembled in a way that is decipherable or 
known to the spectator. For example, the letters on a printed page may represent some 
collection of individuals that are the same as those included on other pages, but the 
information conveyed by the symbols goes beyond the letters. The set of all letters, for 
example, comprises the symbolic repertoire, but the particular combination o f letters 
conveys information that goes beyond the individuals of the repertoire. So, individual 
letters may be combined into words, phrases, sentences, and paragraphs with formal 
structures, such as grammars that govern the combination of words into sentences and 
paragraphs.
Grounded upon the symbolic repertoire, the semantic content of a work is the 
universal, objective, and familiar structure. It is usually utilitarian and purposive. The 
most important feature is that it is always logical. It uses the symbols and laws of logic 
common to all languages and is thus translatable. Because it is translatable, the
Illinois Press, 1966)
We might also postulate a third message beyond the semantic and the aesthetic and 
suppose that art works also conveys emotional messages. For the purpose of this 
argument, we will ignore this possibility.
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piopositionai functions that are expressed may be true in different media: print, pictures, 
cinema, etc. For example: a picture can convey the information that a bridge with a car 
traveling across it collapsed. The account in a newspaper, with approximately the same 
propositional content, might read, "A car, travelling across an ancient bridge, was thrown 
into the water when the bridge collapsed under its weight." A cinematic portrayal might 
show the car driving onto a bridge and the structure giving way and plunging the car into 
the icy depths of the river below. The semantic content o f the account is translatable with 
very little difference in meaning.
Such is not the case with aesthetic content. The aesthetic content o f an art work 
is specific to its medium and does not admit of translatability. The aesthetic import of a 
symphony can not even be approximately portrayed by a photograph, or even a masterful 
painting. Nor can the meaning of a poem by Goethe be conveyed by a master animator 
or cartoonist. Aesthetic content admits only of transposition, approximation, and vague 
description.
While aesthetic and semantic content in the work o f art are independent in that they 
obey different sets of rules and conventions, they are materially connected and contrast and 
juxtapose one another through the various elements in the work of art. The semantic 
content may be rigid or flexible and the aesthetic content may be more or less intricate and 
rich in content.
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For example, the semantic content of speech varies with the use to which it is put. 
Hence, conversational speech is weighted heavily toward semantic content, and we find 
an emphasis on logic, grammar, and sentence structure while the aesthetic content is 
goierally light Poetry, on the other hand, is weighted heavily with aesthetic content with 
less emphasis on semantic content. So, for example, accent, syllabic stress, rhythm, vocal 
modulation and speed become more important than semantic elements.
On the other hand, "pictures," to use a broad term for paintings and photographs, 
may exhibit semantic elements such as subject, the relationship of objects, perspective, and 
anatomy. The aesthetic content may be comprised of some aspect of style, the 
juxtaposition of and dominance o f colors and objects, and perhaps techniques such as the 
use of brush strokes, dots, or the elongation of figures in order to achieve a desired effect.
Theatrical productions also exhibit this counterpoint o f semantic and aesthetic 
elemoits. The premise of the play, the plot, the story, the grammatical structures together 
comprise the semantic structure. The aesthetic may be expressed by the movements of the 
actors, their tone of voice, their facial expressions and gestures. Also, the sartorial 
combinations and the simplicity or elaborateness o f sets combine to impart aesthetic 
impressions. All o f these convey something beyond the given set o f symbols to generate 
some state o f mind in the spectator or receptor. For example, we might think of the 
admirable unity o f drama and music in a Mozart opera where the transposition of key may 
express inconsolable, unrelieved grief and human impoverishment as we find in Don
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Giovanni or in the music by Verdi in Rigoletto where the melody, the key, and the rhythm 
combine to express the sobbing of a human voice.
However, music generally has slight semantic content. What semantic content 
music does impart generally involves fairly complex and rigid features such as the score, 
the notation, which may include trills, pizzicato, and legato, and such melodic and 
harmonic features as polyphony, and directions for the orchestration of a work. Duration 
and pitch, resolution of chords and reversion to tonic chords also contribute to semantic 
content.
Despite this semantic rigidity, the primary information conveyed is largely 
aesthetic. We find the range of aesthetic information to be enormous and exceeds the 
information provided through strictly semantic features. While the history of music has 
been one of progressive attempts to structure and codify musical notation, musical 
structure is nevertheless encoded in musical scores that are only approximations of the 
work intended by the composer. A musical performance is tantamount to a collaborative 
effort between composer and performer or conductor. Every performance is an 
interpretation of the score. Even in cases where the performer or conductor exerts great 
effort to rq)roduce the composer's intention authentically, there is variation in the capacity 
of the performers, from vocal timbre to virtuosity on an instrument, to differences in the 
construction of instruments. All of these affect tonality. Something as simple as the
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distribution o f instruments in an orchestra varies from one performance to the next and the 
concert hall is itself an acoustical device that figures into the performance.
Dance is an art that, even more than music, has comparatively slight semantic 
content. Advances have been made in this century to notate and preserve choreography. 
Usually the semantic repertoire includes such elements as the timing and the steps and 
certain elemaitary movements and positions. But, dance as an art employs an enormous 
range of symbols that can not be notated, such as the interaction o f light and shadow, the 
energy between the dancers, combination of colors and fabrics. The combination of 
gesture, bodily movements, and music combine to present an aesthetic message that goes 
beyond the given symbols.
The aesthetic and semantic content of most works of art involve complex messages 
that are expressed simultaneously, using several modes of expression. Theater, for 
example, presents auditory, spoken and visual messages at the same time. In some arts, 
certain messages are more prominent or important than others. In music, for example, 
when one attends the symphony, the visual message is of far less importance than the 
auditory message. In dance, however, the auditory and visual messages are of equal 
importance.
A question we might ask, then, is why do we find some works of art engaging even 
after, for example, we memorize all of the words of King Lear, yet go back to the theater
See Mole, 139, for statistical studies o f the length of different parts o f Beethoven's 
Ninth Symphony under various conductors, along with variations in tempo..
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to see it performed again and again? The reason is that the aesthetic content is rich. Even 
if  we memorize and draw the semantic content out completely, we find that the aesthetic 
density is greater than we can grasp even when we are given multiple opportunities to 
assimilate it. We address the work of art many times, just in order to reduce the 
phenomenological content of the work and to assimilate the information that is encoded 
in it.
Aesthetic information, then, transcends the available collection o f symbols to create 
a desired impression or experience. Aesthetic content influences internal states of mind 
and does not correspond rigidly to the symbols used to express it. On this analysis we can 
explain a subject's fascination with a particular work and will go to a museum to 
experiaice the same painting, or read the same book, play, or poem over and again. The 
aesthetic message is not exhausted by repeated perception of the art work. The aesthetic 
realization of the work exceeds the given symbol or collection of symbols. As Abraham 
Moles says: "The peculiarity of the work of art is that its richness transcends the
individual perceptual capacity.
We may infer from this that one o f the features of great art is the density of 
aesthetic information encoded in the work. When aesthetic information exceeds the 
subject's perceptual capacity, he or she is drawn to the work again and again. It is a 
fascinating note about musical performances that the public comes to hear what it already
Moles, 166.
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knows. Patrons of symphonies tend to reject experimental music and music with which 
they are un&miliar. They come to hear what they have already heard before. Novelty is 
only a part o f the attraction. Yet, we do not want to see art that is banal. This is another 
problem with art that is misused and repeated mindlessly in the media, as mentioned 
before; it becomes commonplace and trite. Yet, as Moles, shows, novelty or originality 
conforms to unintelligibility. We have to have some familiarity with the semantic and 
aesthetic contents in order to find a work intelligible. This may be one reason that Moles, 
in experimental studies, found high rates of statistical redundancy in a work of art, 
especially musical works, where it is customary for thematic presentations to be repetitious 
and varied in order to bring down the level of novelty or unpredictability and render the 
music familiar to us as we listen to the work. A work, to be intelligible, must exhibit 
features that are familiar in order for us to apprehend its novelty.
m .
Aesthetic content of a work, which induces a state of mind or an impression is 
C£q)able of exceeding the informational content of purely semantic aspects of a work. Yet, 
it is the aesthetic content that expresses information making it possible to connect art and 
other social processes in a culture. Art, created under historical and cultural conditions, 
tends to preserve and impart the artist's vision of these influences to others. As an organ
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of human communication, art makes possible shared perceptions of the world, cross- 
cultuially and across time. Art contributes to mutual understanding among people divided 
by social, national, historical, religious, and ideological prejudices and distinctions. Art 
can bridge the divisive elements of human society and unites people for the solutions of 
the great human demands that confront all people.
For example, Goethe, aware of this aesthetic content in literature, realized that he
lived in an age when artistic development anticipated a global or universal process of
unifying literature. He once said:
I am more and more convinced that poetry is the universal 
possession o f mankind, revealing itself everywhere, and at 
all times, in hundreds and hundreds of m en.... National 
literature is now rather an unmeaning term; the epoch of 
World-literature is at hand, and everyone must strive to 
hasten its approach.
Along these lines, another German scholar, Fritz Strich, noted that world literature 
is, for Goethe, akin to literary space in which poets and writers of different nationalities 
can be heard speaking to all the peoples of the world.
In order to illustrate his thesis, Goethe identified stages in the evolution of art:
1. Mythological: the development of symbols to convey meaning and mythical 
creatures to facilitate interpretation of human events.
John Oxenford, translator. Conversations of Goethe with Eckermann (New York: E.P. 
Dutton & Co., Inc., 1930) 165-166.
F. Strich, Goethe und die Weltliterature (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1957) 59.
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2. Classical antiquity: the development of images and ideas common to all 
humans
3. Medieval: unity in art is provided by dominant religions
4. National: art frees itself from the overview of religion, develops in 
conjunction with a national language and the national and cultural self- 
realization of a group o f people
5. World: the state of art where there develops an artistic need to go beyond 
the limitations of national and cultural boundaries.
With respect to these stages, Goethe saw Romanticism as an artistic movement that 
supplied an interest in other cultures, especially their peculiarities and differences. 
Anticipating Hegel, Goethe saw art as a vehicle for interaction at a universal, or at least 
a global, level and a mode of affirmation o f human, as opposed to cultural, social, or 
national, values. World culture is the end of this evolutionary drive and is based on the 
unity of and interaction of all cultures.
Goethe thought that, in virtue of this universal or global art, the artist would be 
able to reveal the essential nature of humanity by examining human relationships. We 
would think that this investigation into the nature of our humanity would result in the 
merging o f art from different areas o f the world. This is exactly what Goethe did when 
he presented a Europeanized version of Persian mystical poetry, an instance of 
universalized art.
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He envisioned a universal art that could facilitate the exchange of spiritual and 
cultural values across individual and collective boundaries; an artistic transcendence of 
temporal and cultural limitations. Goethe thought that when we reach the point where we 
view art as synthesis o f universal human values, we must evaluate art in terms of the 
values expressed in the work. We may not justifiably apply undifferentiated criteria to the 
works of artists everywhere; rather we must rely on a criterion of universal humanity 
expressed through art and as it applies to all people everywhere.
This leads us to suppose that there is a relationship between art and thought that is 
at least as ancient as that between language and thought. At one time, a certain view about 
the relationship between language and thought predominated—the view that language is 
simply an agent of transmission for thought. Current research makes it clear, however, 
that language is not a passive vehicle for thought, rather, language and thought are 
symbiotic aspects of human communications. Words without thoughts are little more than 
the sounds that we find in the world around us. Sometimes, according to these theories, 
we may have thoughts that we find too vague or ambiguous to express in words, but 
thought requires language.
Although not without his critics, Benjamin Whorff, who pioneered linguistic and
cultural research, says:
When linguists became able to examine, critically and 
scientifically, a large number o f languages of widely 
different patterns, their base of reference was expanded; 
they experienced an interruption of phenomena hitherto held
90
universal, and a whole new order o f significances came into 
their ken. It was found that the background linguistic 
system (in other words, the grammar) of each language is 
not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but 
rather is itself the s k ^ r  o f ideas....W e cut nature up, 
organize it into concepts, ascribe significances as we do, 
largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize 
it in this way - an agreement that holds throughout our 
speech community and is codified in the patterns o f our 
language."”
Whorff believes that our thoughts are shaped by the language we speak. He 
supports his hypothesis with intriguing examples from the Zulu culture—for instance, 
whoe the Zulus have words for red cow and white cow, but do not have a word for 'cow'. 
Without such a word, the Zulus do not have a corresponding abstract concept for the 
category 'cow'. Researchers find further examples among aborigines in South America 
who have words that distinguish various kinds of parrots and palms, but do not have a 
concept for 'parrot' or 'palm tree'.
But what about those thoughts that are vague and somehow out o f the reach of our 
linguistic capacity? This is one of the functions for art even among ancient humans. It 
is apparent that even in the dawn of early man, art functioned as a way o f expressing the 
desire and will of Cromagnon, when he painted the herds of animals he wished to hunt and 
overpowCT. Art expresses certain vagaries and abstractions that escape semantic ordering.
Benjamin Lee Whorff, John B. (Carroll, editor. Language, Thought and Reality 
((Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1956) 212-214.
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It is an expression o f those desires, beliefs, and longings of the human spirit that defy 
linguistic codification. Art is the voice of our species.
We also see ait function as a historical, cultural and political instrument when the 
values and tastes of predominating classes within a society dictate status or the popularity 
of works of particular artists. For example, in the contemporary art world, certain classes 
or groups of people, such as art critics, academics, museum curators and gallery owners 
generate certain accepted aesthetic judgements. But, Pierre Bourdieu notes (in "The 
Aristocracy of Culture," in Media, Culture and Society) that aesthetic preferences are often 
class-based, such that the highly educated tend to prefer Bach preludes and fugues and the 
less educated tend to prefer Strauss waltzes.*"
Thus, conveying aesthetic content, art gives voice and comprehension to some of 
our deepest, often unarticulated, human values, especially in terms of the universal 
features of human life. If we take art to be a natural symbol of culture, the artistic 
experiences of one culture may be interesting and instructive to the people of another 
culture. Not only does art link individuals across history and across cultures, it provides 
a link between various modes of social consciousness that we find extant in a society at any 
time. Art is significant with respect to a world view. It crosses over various views o f the 
world that are exemplified in the social structure of any community of people. The 
aesthetic content of art enables it to function in ways that allow it to span these various
*" V. Pierre Bourdieu, "The Aristocracy of Culture," in Media, Culture and Society: A 
Critical Reader (London: Sage, 1981), 167.
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social projects. It functions as a search for understanding values and reality, the grounds 
and concepts that express the fundamental beliefs of a society; it functions cognitively as 
it provides knowledge o f the world about us; it functions as a sociology as it reveals our 
attitudes to others as part of a society, a culture, and as a nation; it has links to morality 
insofar as it is a study o f individual conduct; and, just as Plato feared, it is political as it 
expresses political views. The work o f art is grounded on its portrayal of reality, whether 
rq>resentative or illusory, including the prevailing morality, ideology, and general world 
view.
All of these may be revealed through the aesthetic content of the work o f art. So, 
also, ideological content may be conveyed through the aesthetic content o f a work because 
of the states of mind o f those who create and perceive the work.
A work of art is a kind of microcosm: it reflects the world as a whole through its 
various media. Yet, in virtue of its aesthetic content, a work of art may be perceived 
differently by people in different epochs, countries, and even geographies, because of 
differences in personality, experience, age, education, and so on. Because of the depth 
and richness of its aesthetic content, a good work of art is potentially open to diverse 
perceptions and interpretations.
IV.
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This is not to take the idealist position that the content o f art is subjective rather 
than objective, which is to say that the work is constituted in the consciousness of the 
subject, the theoretical foundation of Kantian aesthetics. Rather, it seems reasonable to 
expect a spectator to approach an art work from a human standpoint, one that is molded 
by but not reducible to one's culture, nationality, and epoch, or other influences on a 
profoundly personal level. It is not possible to cognize art outside of the personal 
standpoint; although it is admittedly an altered standpoint, one that is universalized and 
emptied of self-interest. Yet, we should not lose sight of the fact that the personal and 
subjective z^rehension of an artwork functions in the context of objective features of the 
work.
As it involves a synthesis of the subjective and the objective, the aesthetic content 
of an artwork, as we have seen, is a counterpoint of semantic and aesthetic content. The 
synthesis o f subjective and objective, of semantic and aesthetic, o f individual and 
universal, o f subjectivity and intersubjectivity, involve the creative participation of the 
spectator in the perception of the work.
Thus, the content of the work may be objective, but the aesthetic apprehension of 
the work is mediated by the subjective, even intersubjective, standpoint of the spectator. 
Further, because it is objective, the content of the work is an object in the world, 
indq)endent of its interaction with spectator or artist and any relevant interpretation of it. 
But, we must not err by defining a work only in terms of its objectivity; this leads only to
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confusion. Art is bound up with experience. It is experiential and rides on a subject's, 
indeed a community o f subjects', response(s) in the presence of an aesthetic object.
One proof of the objectivity o f the work is its c e c it y  for universal significance. 
In fact, it is this universal significance of aesthetic content that renders the work open to 
diverse interpretations, as well as historical and cultural relevance. For instance, Maksim 
Gorky, after reading Balzac's Eugenie Grandet, said he understood his own stingy and 
mean grandfather, having read a description of Eugenie's father. This is not to say that 
he liked his grandfather more after having read the description, just that something he 
hadn't seen in his own grand&ther was opened to him after he read about father Grandet. 
Art broadens individual perspectives. It gives something to us cognitively that is often 
closed to us otherwise.
The point of this is that both aesthetic experience and the artwork are social 
products. Art, while grounded in individual experience, is nevertheless found in the 
contett of social institutions and interactions that are responsible for a work, that articulate 
it, define it, and help to give it its particular form. These institutions include museums, 
art galleries, recording studios, record companies, newspaper columns by art critics, 
printing presses, book publishers, radio stations, and even corporate earnings reports, as 
some Marxist philosophers so gleefully indicate. All of these elements figure into the 
finished work of art and bear some influence on the spectator's response to the work.
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A subject is capable o f any number o f interactions in the world: with other 
subjects, with the environment, or with things and ideas in the environment. The subject 
does not passively enter into these interactions, but rather, actively participates in them; 
she undergoes certain modifications as a result of her interactions. The artist resides in 
just such an interactive environment and derives the substance of his work A’om the 
influences of his culture and society. We can say this even if we grant Kant's point that 
the artist's genius creates a new idea in every important work of art. The genius of the 
artist is to quicken our cognitions in a way that can not be taught by science or instruction 
and expresses and communicates ideas to other subjects. Kant thinks the artist is able to 
render the abstract and ineffable universally communicable.'"
The artist's expression and artistic vision are dependent upon the essential feature 
o f his or her social being. As a social being she interprets and integrates her experiences 
against the background of this integration and offers her art as an expression of her own 
vision in this social world.
While communication of his experiences to others may not take priority in the 
intentions of the artist, the audience is always a potential dimension of the art work. Art 
is a social and institutional product. As an artifact, art has the capacity to communicate 
because it expresses something about certain features of the world and because at least 
some of this communication is carried in the aesthetic content of the work. It is through
Immanuel Kant, Kritik o f Judgment, trans. J.H. Bernard, D.D. (London: Macmillan 
and Co., 1892), Section 49.
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symbol and meaning that art unites human beings in a universal community of meaning.
As John Hospers says:
a work which has no effects on us means nothing to us, and 
whatever effects it does evoke constitute its meaning for us.
As we become more acquainted with the work of art, the 
effects it evokes in us gradually change, but in that case its 
meaning for us....gradually changes too....Its meaning may 
or may not be describable in words—in most cases it is not, 
since few if any states o f mind (particularly affective states) 
are describable to the satisfaction of the person who 
experiences them.'"
The aesthetic content o f the work is not subject to the kind of rigid regulating 
principles that govern the semantic content of the work, and functions as a less restricted 
mode of communication. The domain of art is the totality of life. Art serves to project, 
articulate, and interpret experience. Whatever the experience, it is the substance of art, 
transformed into an aesthetic offering of intrinsic worth and import. The product of art 
is nothing less than articulation and expression of the essence of the human experience. 
It spans the experience of generation and culture, gives substance to the ideals of human 
unity and intersubjectivity, and enhances our capacity for autonomous activity. I now 
wish to turn our attention to a further discussion of art and autonomy in relation to 
community.
John Hospers, Meaning and Truth in the Arts (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 
1964) 75.
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Chapter 4
Art and Autonomy in the Context o f Community
One of the implicit themes we have unfolded in our discussions of the 
interconnections between art and autonomy has been the underlying assumption that 
autonomy and art are human expressions that occur only in the context of community. I 
now turn our attention to these interconnections, in part to gain some understanding of the 
ontological frameworks of human experience and intersubjectivity. In doing so, I draw 
heavily on Charles Taylor's discussion o f identity and personhood that are relevant to my 
views about the interconnection between art, autonomy, and community.
I.
An undeniable feature of personhood is that we are creatures who are defined by 
more than our biology. We participate in a social reality that gives further ground to our 
being. A social reality that is a particular configuration of history, culture, family, and 
circumstance. As individuals we are defined by this social structure before we ever 
contribute to it. Human beings are a social construct. We enter this domain as passive 
participants, learning to become a part o f the community as we enter into ongoing 
activities: languages, rituals, games, beliefs, traditions, customs, and art. We make
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ourselves intelligible to others as we learn to participate in this community, to become 
members of the community. As we do so, we also become intelligible to ourselves. The 
public domain precedes the private and our reliance upon community is absolute, a 
message Wittgenstein went to great lengths to teach us.
Only after we establish ourselves in the public domain do we enter the private, 
where we learn to vocalize internally, to imagine, to experiment upon, and to extend the 
boundaries of our existence. We enter into a quest to become persons, even autonomous 
persons, as we interact with the world as it is given to us. This quest is a process where 
we learn to appropriate and internalize given ways of being human and to expand upon that 
process.
A great deal of what we are about as we construct our lives is to make sense of that 
process of becoming a person in a social context. Charles Taylor, in Sources o f the Self, 
observes that in contemporary society, our sense of our selves is the product of our 
understanding of the good along with our understanding of our social bonds and relations. 
We imderstand ourselves against a background of four terms: (a) our notions of the good, 
(b) our understanding of the self, (c) the kind of narrative which allows us to make sense 
of our lives, and (d) our conception o f society, which involves a notion of what it means 
to be a human agent among other human agents."^ The connections we draw between 
these elemaits contributes to the ideals we live by and the terms in which we see ourselves
““ Charles Taylor, Sources o f the Self: The Making o f the Modem Identity. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press) 104-105.
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and make sense of our beliefs and actions. We make further sense o f these elements of 
our moral construction as we leam to articulate them and to reconcile them with the 
suppressions and constraints o f social life.
Making sense of our lives involves identifying the qualitative distinctions that 
contribute to our definitions o f ourselves and to understanding our place in the social 
scheme; qualitative distinctions that give us reasons for justifying our ethical and moral 
beliefs. Taylor believes that a common mistake in contemporary philosophy has been to 
attempt precise distinctions between evaluative or normative judgments and so-called 
descriptive judgments. Hume called this the ‘is/ought’ distinction and G.E. Moore 
elaborated upon a version of this distinction, naming it the “naturalistic fallacy." The 
presumption was that the universe is value-neutral in the absence of human agents, and 
that non-evaluative descriptions of terms or events are coextensive with evaluative 
descriptions of terms or events."^ But Bernard Williams has shown that there are a range 
of key value terms, such as: ‘courage’, or ‘brutality’ or ‘gratitude’ that are unintelligible 
if  we do not cast them as evaluative descriptions. The upshot of this point is that in at 
least some areas of human concern, “descriptive" and “normative" terms are inseparable.
According to both Williams and Taylor, in order to understand the meaning of 
value-laden terms, we must also grasp the social context that underlies use of such terms.
Taylor discusses this problem in Chapter 3, section 1 of Sources o f the Self.
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In particular, we require an understanding of the social currency that constitutes the 
common purposes and needs that define perceived obligations o f people in a particular 
society, as well as some understanding of the people’s perception o f the good. That is to 
say, we can make sense of evaluative terms only against a particular socially constructed 
background o f beliefs that is, for all practical purposes, just as real and just as objective 
as any observation of the natural world by science. This language of evaluation is a real 
and objective part of our world because it is an explanatory device that allows us to make 
sense of our world. Says Taylor; “What better measure of reality do we have in human 
affairs than those terms which on critical reflection and after correction of the errors we 
can detect make the best sense of our lives?""®
Our evaluative terms are indicators o f what it is to live in the universe as human 
beings, and we err when we try to offer sharp distinctions between neutral descriptions of 
the world and evaluative or normative descriptions o f the world. Admittedly, without 
human agents, there would be no evaluative descriptions of the world. Nevertheless, the 
reason these evaluations are more than just subjective projections on the world is that they 
are socially constituted, and as such, figure into the world as it is given to us, and not the 
world as projected by us. Our evaluations of the world are not mere projections, they are 
the very ground o f our world.
"® Taylor, 57.
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n.
A feature of contemporary society is the multiplicity o f goods, particularly moral 
and aesthetic goods, which various individuals value and prioritize in different ways. The 
ways in which we organize and commit to these goods provide direction and structure in 
our lives. But, we are often confused about our own priorities and commitments, and one 
way to annul these confusions is to articulate and share our vision o f the good in our lives. 
Our articulation of these goods also figures into the construction o f our moral identities 
and the construction of our collective identities, our communities. These are the issues I 
wish to examine next.
As members of contemporary culture, most of us have moral notions about rational 
self-mastery, the importance of ordinary life and family pursuits, freedom, benevolence, 
the demands of universal justice, self expression, and expressive self-fulfilment, to name 
a few."^ Most o f us are moved to some extent by these goods, as well as others not 
enumerated. Often we hold these goods in a hierarchical arrangement where we value self 
expression, family life, and justice more than, for example, self-fulfilment and 
benevolence. No matter how any one of us values these goods, we usually hold some
I am indebted to comments made by Robert Solomon and Kathleen Higgins at a 
seminar sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities at Utah Valley State 
College in May, 1997. Further inspiration for these comments comes from Charles 
Taylor’s Sources o f the Self chapters 3, 4, and 25.
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good or goods as of overriding importance, perhaps our relation to God or our 
commitment to close family relationships."* This is not to say that our commitment to 
upholding these goods is free of dilemma or conflict concerning the demands imposed by 
our valuation o f these goods, or our decisions about which goods override others in 
importance on various occasions.
Our arrangement o f and commitment to these goods guide the decisions we make 
concerning the direction of our lives. We define ourselves in the context of them and make 
judgments about the behavior of those around us in relation to these hypergoods. Says 
Taylor:
For those with a strong commitment to such a good, what it 
means is that this above all others provides the landmarks 
for what they judge to be the direction o f their lives. While 
they recognize a whole range of qualitative distinctions, 
while all o f these involve strong evaluation, so that they 
judge themselves and others by the degree they attain the 
goods concerned and admire or look down on people in 
function of this, nevertheless the one highest good has a 
special place. It is orientation to this which comes closest 
to deGning my identity, and therefore my direction to this 
good is of unique importance to me. Whereas I naturally 
want to be well placed in relation to all and any of the goods 
I recognize and to be moving towards rather than away from 
them, my direction in relation to this good has a crucial 
importance. Just because my orientation to it is essential to 
my identity, so the recognition that my life is turned away 
from it, or can never approach it, would be devastating and 
insufferable....While all the goods I recognize, however 
much they may admit of lesser or greater attainment, allow 
for a yes/no question concerning the direction of my life in
118 Taylor calls these “hypergoods", p. 62-63.
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relation to them, if I am strongly committed to a highest 
good in this sense I find the corresponding yes/no question 
utterly decisive for what I am as a person. For people who 
understand their lives this way, there is a qualitative 
discontinuity between this one good and the others; it is 
incomparably above them, in an even more striking fashion 
than they are seen as incomparably more worthwhile than 
the ordinary things we all desire in life; but I see the love of 
God or the search for justice as itself incommensurably 
higher than this fulfilment."”®
These “hypergoods” are often the source o f tension and conflict within a person and 
with respect to other persons, but most commit to some hypergood or other as a move 
toward a higher moral consciousness. In some cases people hold a hypergood in higher 
esteem than other goods of a society, and this hypergood may also be the basis of 
challenge and rejection o f other goods. It is often the basis for serious and challenging 
dilemmas in our moral lives.
We often confront such dilemmas generated by a commonly accepted value in 
contemporary society; for example, the notion of universal justice or benevolence. 
Universal justice and benevolence is a value that encourages us to treat all human beings 
equally, r^ardless of race, gender, social class, or religion. Even if we number ourselves 
among those who subscribe to this hypergood, we realize we sometimes fall short of this 
ideal. Moreover, this idea has evolved over time from societies based on social 
hierarchies, flawed instantiations of the value, and by challenging various practices and
Taylor, 62-63.
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beliefs that Ml short of the ideal. As our accq)tance of a hypergood becomes established, 
it becomes a standard by which we assess other goods in society, and it may also alter our 
views of these goods. Our view o f these goods may extend beyond our own culture 
leading us to make judgments about the goods of societies o f the past as well as 
contemporary societies.
Taylor tells us that our accq>tance of these hypergoods is conditioned by a number
of factors, among them our own histories. Our moral development may depend upon our
efforts to reduce moral error and purchase epistemic gains. For example:
I see that I was confused about the relation of resentment 
and love, or I see that there is a depth to love conferred by 
time, which I was quite insensitive to before. But this 
doesn’t means that we don’t and can’t argue....and arguing 
here is contesting between interpretations o f what I have 
been living.
The story of our moral progress as individuals and as societies often rests upon our 
ability to reinterpret the good, to assess it in a new way, and to progress in our moral 
experience. Very often this progress is generated by and facilitated by argument, by 
contrasting views, which serve to refine our moral positions. Taylor notes that our 
acceptance of hypergoods is not a moral move that we make in isolation. We are moved 
by hypergoods in “a complex way" and we do not “think of these things entirely on our
Taylor, 72.
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own and monoiogically...."'^* This move is not a subjective experience, one that confers 
value upon a good, rather there is some qualitative discrimination that is involved in our 
seeing this as a moral good, something about it that is valuable and moves us to desire it. 
These goods somehow function as standards for us, independent o f our own desires, 
inclinations and choices.
Such qualitative discriminations orient us to think o f some things as important or 
valuable that govern our actions, emotions, and intuitions about ethical matters. Such 
discriminations are often at play before we are able to articulate them. These 
discriminations shape our moral practices, which may evolve in our lives, as well as over 
cultures and over time, as they express the moral ideal.
Unfortunately, qualitative discriminations and affiliated views o f the good may be 
used to suppress and dominate other people. In obvious cases through history, the honor 
ethic that exalts the warrior with attendant fame and glory exalts men and gives an 
ancillary role to women, or minorities. Other views have proclaimed universal spiritual 
values that promoted inequality among people and the social exclusion o f supposedly 
inferior beings. In our own day, contemporary social critics note that our modem ideal 
of rational disengaged freedom is a force that tends to foster the domination of a male or 
female orientation. This is not to say that all qualitative discriminations or hypergoods
Taylor, 73.
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fost^ inequities and injustices; we only need to note that some stimulate social domination 
and injustice.
An antidote for such injustices and distorted visions o f the good may be a 
heightened ability to articulate the underlying values and qualitative discriminations 
underlying these visions. We are all familiar with moral conflicts that turn on 
incompatible hypergoods, such as the demand of universal and equal respect coupled with 
the demand of self-determining freedom against the things we have to sacrifice in order 
to effect those hypergoods. Most o f us struggle with issues that involve retributive justice 
on the one hand and the avoidance o f death and suffering on the other; the conflict 
between reverence for life and our capacity to choose the course o f our own lives; the 
demand for universal justice, beneficence, and equality, on the one hand, and the demand 
for personal freedom and self-legislation, on the other. Conflicts like these are the source 
of many contemporary moral dilemmas.
Moreover, in order to share our views of the good with others, to reason about 
such distinctions, we have to articulate them in some way or other. Taylor claims that 
resolving various moral dilemmas involves dialogue, but dialogue presupposes our ability 
to identify and articulate our relevant views of these hypergoods that anchor our moral 
views. Articulating our views is not only a social enterprise, it is a historical one. In 
order to understand our contemporary sense of the good, to glimpse values and distinctions 
that elude our awareness, we have to view it in relief against previous moral models. We
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must search for ways to articulate our moral vision that include not only the historical 
moral enterprise, but the philosophical one as well. Underlying this project is the effort 
to conduct a kind of moral archaeology in order to disinter "...the great unsaid that 
underlies widespread attitudes in our civilization."'^
Contemporary understanding o f our interpretation of the good and its application 
in our lives also affects contemporary articulations of the self. Taylor notes the 
intertwining of our identities and our moral orientations. We gain a sense of our selves, 
of who we are, within the context of our orientation to the moral goods and values in our 
lives. We associate different senses of the good with different ideas about human agency 
and the self. Thus our moral notions are inextricably bound up with our sense of the self. 
Says Taylor; “To trace the development of our modem visions of the good, which are in 
some respects unprecedented in human culture, is also to follow the evolution of 
unprecedented new understandings o f agency and selfhood."'^
We delineate and articulate our qualitative distinctions in the context of certain 
frameworks. Frameworks that are the configurations of the beliefs that enable us to make 
meaning and sense of our lives. These frameworks may represent the intersection of 
culture, historical epoch, environment, experience, and so on. We think, feel, judge, 
peceive within these frameworks, holding some actions and modes o f living as desirable
Taylor, 104. 
Taylor, 105.
108
and action guiding. One aspect of our contemporary defining framework is that our ability 
to express or articulate our values allows us to make sense of our lives.
As modems, we tend to admire and respect abilities in individuals that involve,
among other things, transformations of the will that enable people to dedicate themselves
to others or to the universal good. We also value vision and expressive power. For some
reason, says Taylor, there is some set of
ideas and intuitions, still inadequately understood, which 
makes us admire the artist and the creator more than any 
other civilization ever has; which convinces us that a life 
spent in artistic creation or performance is eminently 
worthwhile. The complet of ideas itself has Platonic roots.
We are taking up a semi-suppressed side o f Plato’s thought 
which emerges, for instance, in the Phaedrus, where he 
seems to think of the poet, inspired by mania, as capable of 
seeing what sober people are not. The widespread belief 
today that the artist sees farther than the rest of us, attested 
by our willingness to take seriously the opinions about 
politics expressed by painters or singers, even though they 
may have no more special expertise in public affairs than the 
next person, seems to spring from the same roots. But there 
is also something quintessentially modem in this outlook.
It depends on that modem sense...that what meaning there 
is for us depends in part on our powers o f expression, that 
discovering a framework is interwoven with inventing.
Just as Plato identified a connection between the framework of our beliefs, our 
moral views, and the place of the artist in this network, other contemporary philosophers
Taylor, 18.
Taylor, 22.
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also recognize the association between moral practices and art. Aristotle offers the place 
o f music in moral education: “...m usic has a power o f forming the character, and should
therefore be introduced into the education of the young There seems to be in us a sort
o f affinity to musical modes and rhythms, which makes some philosophers say that the 
soul is a tuning, others, that it possesses tuning.""*^  As we have already seen, Kant notes 
the resonance between the aesthetic and the moral realms. Kathleen Higgins argues: 
“Western aesthetics has become skeptical of the easy connection that most of the world 
makes between music and ethical life. In particular, the field’s tendency to treat music 
[art] as autonomous structural object and to minimize concern with the holistic character 
o f musical [artistic] experience...has obscured the experiential bases for recognizing 
music’s symbolic and motivational roles with respect to ethical living."*^
In his Tractaws Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein says that ethics and aesthetics 
are one.*“ He sees ethics and aesthetics as areas of concern that go beyond the empirical
Aristotle. Politics, Book v m . Chapter 5, 1340b, translated by Benjamin Jowett. From 
The Basic Works o f  Aristotle. Editor, Richard McKeon. New York: Random House, 
1941, p. 1312.
Kathleen Higgins. The Music o f Our Lives. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
139.
Ludwig Wittgenstein. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1963. Section 6.421. Also see his Philosophical Notebooks, 2nd Edition. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, 83-86.
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and the logical, that belong to the unsayable, that give us a global perspective that are part 
o f the mystical and are of “absolute value".*”
Wittgenstein seems to make a distinction between what we might distinguish as 
vatical and lateral thinking. Vertical thinking is logical thinking, characterized by making 
judgments, by operating within the frame of reason, by codifying and developing concepts. 
Vertical thinking often dq)ends upon memorization, and utilizing fixed conceptual models 
and sequences of ideas, as well as established and existing relations. Lateral thinking, on 
the other hand, opoates on the margins of reason. Lateral thinking involves new ways of 
thinking about things, original thinking, the ability to make intuitive jumps and steps (I 
hesitate to call them inferences) that are not logically or rationally based. Lateral thinking 
is often a vehicle for establishing new relations and meanings. Both kinds of thinking are 
necessary to human functioning and complement one another.
On the basis of this analysis, creative and critical thinking are inextricably bound 
together. What this means is that we can not be creative without at the same time being 
critical. Nor can we be critical without being creative. Like an ethical judgement, an 
aesthetic judgment, or an artistic act, is a critical judgment about the world. Ethical and 
aesthetic judgments are intersections between the given and the possible. Both are creative 
and critical acts conjoining the actual and the potential.
*”  Wittgenstein, Tractatus, section 6.45.
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Along these lines, Wittgenstein, like Taylor, sees the aesthetic and the ethical 
embedded deeply and necessarily in a complex cultural background. We cannot isolate 
either endeavor. Just as ethics is a feature of our social, moral, political world, art is an 
aspect o f that same world. To deny this is to risk fragmentation that renders only 
surrogate satisfactions through art instead of unmediated encounters with reality.'^
Taylor also recognizes that the Greeks approached life and ethics as an aesthetics 
of existence: a quest for a beautiful and harmonious life. The Greeks evince none of the 
modem malaise associated with the fragmentation and compartmentalization of life that we 
face in contemporary culture. The were strongly inclined to assess the good life 
holistically, as a unified whole. We recall Solon’s reminder to “consider no man happy 
until he is dead”. A person’s life should be evaluated in terms o f an organic whole rather 
than as a collection of discrete parts. So, for Aristotle, and even Homer, we get a sense 
that a disastrously inappropriate end would twist beyond rq>air the hitherto satisfying unity 
o f a life. For the Greeks the study of ethics amounted to the search for a formula that 
would generate a satisfying and well-formed life that was maximally free of disharmonious 
misfortune. We see Aristotle establish one strat^y for achieving this life by centering and 
contouring life in the web o f an interlocking set o f aims directed to a particular end.
Arthur C. Danto makes a similar claim in his works. Cf. Beyond the Brilla Box. New 
York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux. Also, see The Philosophical Disenfranchisement o f Art. 
New York: Columbia University Press, especially Chapter 1.
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In short, the Greeks adopted an aesthetics o f life. We craft our lives with an eye 
to unity, just as an artist crafts a work of art. “‘The Good life,’ the ultimate aspiration of 
ethics, requires the balanced and harmonious operation of these basic aspects o f our 
beings....""' The quest for the good was a kind o f art o f living based on general formulas 
and ideals rather than categorical moral prescriptions. This is the moral strategy Charles 
Taylor, among other contemporary philosophers, advocates. And, as we shall see, these 
moral aspirations are facilitated by the experience o f art through its symbols and media.
IV.
We have seen that there is an interconnection between our moral aims and our 
identity. 1 wish to examine this connection more fully because both factor into a 
conception of autonomy. We orient our selves in moral space with our intuitions about 
the good. Our moral nexus constitutes us as persons, indeed, we are not without this 
framework of beliefs. We are unable to function at all without some sort o f moral 
background assumptions in place.
One feature of the moral aesthetic is that we aspire to the good, the beautiful, the 
sublime. The “most basic aspirations of human beings [involve] the need to be connected 
to, or in contact with, what they see as good, or o f crucial importance, or of fundamental
Higgins, 5.
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value. In other words, we seek meaning in our lives; meaning that is constituted by 
and constitutive of the conformation of our values, goods, and hypergoods. These goods 
and values may vary from one person to the next, as well as from one culture, temporally 
and geographically, to the next, but what does not vary is our concern with some web of 
these issues. So our identities may be ordered by our arrangement o f values and goods, 
depending upon our historical and cultural environment, but the fact remains that our 
identities are defined by our moral and spiritual orientation.
Our aspiration to live in the context o f the good also gives meaning and direction 
to our lives. We assess our lives with respect to our movement toward or away from the 
good. The movement, or lack of it, can motivate some of the most intense conflicts in our 
lives. Yet, the point is that our fundamental motivations govern who we are. It is a basic 
feature o f human existence—that we are never defined as what we are, because we are 
creatures in a constant state of flux, of changing and becoming. We become who we are 
over time, through infancy and childhood, into more or less autonomous agents, taking our 
places with respect to the good. Our lives have direction, an inescapable feature of 
meaningful human life.
Thus, as we define our identities, we find these inescapable features; we are 
oriented to the good, this orientation is always changing and becoming, and my life itself 
is, as Solon implied, is an unfolding story. This becomes another condition o f making
Taylor, 42.
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sense o f ourselves, o f configuring our identities: “that we grasp our lives in a 
narrative....our lives exist also in this space o f questions, which only a coherent narrative 
can answer. In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion o f how we 
have become, and of where we are going.
Implicit in this discussion is the notion that our knowledge of ourselves figures into 
our idoitities. Charles Taylor notes that a distinction of the modem identity is the process 
of self- exploration and radical reflexivity that were foreign notions to the ancients, 
certainly before Augustine,*”  and a fixture of the modem identity after Freud. As we 
explore ourselves we establish our identity, the assumption behind these explorations being 
that we do not already know who we are. It amounts to a quest for discovery.
Self-knowledge becomes the path to self-acceptance. When we understand the
limits o f our own existence, we also locate ourselves in the world. For Taylor, we may
...seek self-knowledge, but this can no longer mean just 
impersonal lore about human nature as it could for Plato.
Each of us has to discover his or her own form. We are not 
looking for the universal nature; we each look for our own 
being. [This is a kind] of reflection which is intensely 
individual, a self-explanation, the aim of which is to reach 
self-knowledge by coming to see through the screens of self- 
delusion which passion or spiritual pride have erected. It is 
entirely a first-person study, receiving little help from the
*"" Taylor, 47.
*”  Taylor discusses this feature of identity in Chapter 10 of Sources o f the Self.
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deliverances of third-person observation, and none from
‘science’,
V.
Various philosophers and social scientists postulate theories about the working of 
society. Some, such as Hobbes, Rousseau, Condorcet, the latter two products o f the 
French Enlightenment that stresses a rationalist approach to the world, see democratic and 
free societies as the result of collective and contrived activities. They construct theories 
about social design, usually proposing a scenario o f intelligent human beings coming from 
a state of nature and entering into a social contract that fosters equality and the protection 
o f individual freedom. Historically, this theoretical base grounds modem totalitarian 
democracies. Other thinkers, such as Adam Smith, Hume, Montesquieu, and some 
Scottish philosophers reach a different conclusion. Theirs is an essentially empiricist 
approach that finds the ground of freedom in spontaneity and the absence o f coercion. 
What is more, they see the origin of institutions in a free society not as the result of 
contrivance or design, as the Rationalists do, but as the result of stumbling upon them, by 
trial and error, by the serendipitous social development of certain principles. These 
Empirical philosophers stress the growth o f the institutions of freedom, as well as of
Taylor, 181.
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morals, language, and law in the context o f cumulative growth and it is only within this 
context that human reason progresses and operates successfully.
Friedrich Hayek notes that the Romans also had a concept of human freedom that
is grounded on community. He quotes Cicero, who pays homage to the Roman Cato, who
was discussing the virtues o f the Roman constitution over other political orders;
[because it] was based upon the genius, not of one man, but 
o f man: it was founded, not in one generation, but in a long 
period of several centuries and many ages of men. For, said 
he, there never has lived a man possessed of so great a 
genius that nothing could escape him, nor could the 
combined powers of all men living at one time possibly 
make all the necessary provisions for the future without the 
aid o f actual experience and the test o f time.'^
In the Empirical tradition, we have a body o f social theory that views many of the 
traditions and institutions of free societies as developed on the basis o f experience, under 
conditions that foster the long-term development o f individual freedom, but at the time 
may not have been so understood. The laws and institutions that form the framework of 
individual autonomy are sometimes thought to evolve by a process o f natural selection 
reminiscent of Darwin's theory in biology. On the basis of experience and dialogical 
interactions, social institutions and laws evolve that may not have been designed and 
invented to effect a purposive social order, but are the result o f complex and random 
contributions o f many individuals together and over time.
Cicero is quoted in Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1959. p. 57.
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Our autonomy is a fuith^ product of the communal traditions and institutions that 
we inherit. The rules and expectations that govern our societies are both a consequence 
of and a prerequisite for individual autonomy. We are able to engage in an intersubjective 
environment, to make plans and act on our expectations successfully because other 
members of our communities conform to unspoken expectations about conduct and 
demonstrate a regularity in their actions that are a product o f habit. These habits and 
expectations may not be coerced or explicitly commanded or directed. Rather they are 
conventions, often unconscious, unarticulated, and unexpressed, that govern and order 
social interactions. More often than not, social and individual freedom depends upon 
voluntary conformity to these conventions and deeply ingrained moral beliefs.
There is a distinctive view about this lack of coercion with respect to social 
convention and behaviors. Hayek argues that it is probably conducive to individual and 
social freedom that rules should be observed in most cases, but that the individual ought 
to be able to transgress those rules on occasion when he or she sees it as somehow 
worthwhile.*^’
Given the social nature of the individual, it is evident that we learn and function 
and progress in the context o f other people. Our world is intersubjective and communal. 
Our knowledge and understanding can be won only when we as individual participants 
engage in and identify with the life of the community. Living in community increases our
Hayek, 62-63.
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possibility o f accomplishing more than we might accomplish alone. To be a participant 
in a community o f inquiry is to voluntarily engage in communal discourse with others. 
Such discourse may involve probing our logical, epistemological, aesthetic, metaphysical, 
and moral assumptions. From this, it is also apparent that reality is not given to us as 
isolated subjects.
If by “objective", we mean a comprehensive understanding of our world, an 
objective view of reality can not be adequately known by an individual seeker. Descartes 
was wrong. Objective knowledge is a thoroughly intersubjective activity, the result of 
human communal activity. We can see that objective knowledge implies a community that 
combines many insights and talents in order to arrive at some consensus, which is then 
tested against experience and recognized as tentative until some set o f subjects assent to 
a proposition. From this we see that there is also no such thing as an objective knower, 
or a self who experiences the world independently of the social community to which she 
belongs. From an epistemological perspective, knowledge is mediated by our social and 
moral order. As individuals we are defined by and define the social structure. Just as 
from an ontological perspective, reality is mediated by language. At least we can say that 
language is intermediary between world sensed and the world effected. Without language, 
human behavior becomes nothing more than a matter of stimulus and response, and we 
become little more than animals. In our journey to autonomous personhood, we respond
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to those around us, and we do this using tools that render us able to establish this bond 
with others—to communicate. .
When we say we know something, we presume that any kind o f knowing depends 
upon the questions we ask, the kind o f knowledge we seek, the assumptions we take for 
granted, the perspectives we take into account, and the context in which we undertake the 
inquiry. If Plato is right, and truth is the end o f all inquiry, it also comes only at the end 
o f infinite inquiry, by an infinite number o f inquirers working together in a community 
that may stretch across time and culture. A community of inquiry is necessarily 
characterized by dialogue and this dialogue necessarily consists in an interchange between 
persons with different views, different frames o f references. The higher development of 
persons stands on dialogue and a community o f inquiry.
We saw above that our sense of self is a condition that involves articulacy, to use 
Charles Taylor’s word. Articulacy is essential to each of us so that we may recognize our 
aspirations toward hypergoods that ground and stabilize our moral and social existence. 
Articulacy brings “...us out of the cramped postures of suppression...partly because it will 
allow us to acknowledge the full range of goods we live by. It is also because it will open 
us to our moral sources, to release their force in our lives."”* When we articulate the 
goods of our lives, we have a better grasp on them. On these lights, art empowers. We 
see that art is an enterprise through which we make sense of our lives by juxtaposing
Taylor, 106-107.
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ourselves in relation to the meaning, value, and goods of our experience. Just as words 
often have potent moral force to express something within us, so art shares in this ability, 
often tapping into a source in ourselves that may have been previously unknown or felt. 
This is the reason catain stories have moral force. It may be that the affinity humans have 
for art is its capacity to articulate the unsayable, conferring meaning and substance upon 
the unspeakable. When we fail to articulate the meaning and values o f our lives, we risk 
losing contact with it; in short, we risk dehumanization. Articulacy is a condition of 
personhood and, by extension, of intersubjectivity.
As a form of discourse, of dialogue, articulacy is a feature o f our participation in 
a social order, a way of connecting and resonating with those around us. Dialogue 
between persons with different views and different frames of reference allows us to 
develop ourselves. This view is validated and justified on the grounds that we profit 
intellectually, morally, aesthetically, and socially when we engage different perspectives, 
illuminate existing social and political relations, and showing the deficiencies of one 
perspective rather than another as we shape ourselves and engage in the great human 
conversation. In order to resonate with reality, we necessarily respond to those around us. 
And we respond by articulating, through dialogue and discourse.
With respect to articulacy, Taylor points out that:
...the moral conflicts o f modem culture rage within each of 
us. [Articulacy opens] us to our moral sources, to release 
their force in our lives. The cramped formulations of 
mainstream philosophy already represent denials, the
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sacrifice of one kind of good in favour o f another, but 
frozen in a logical mould which prevents their even being 
put in question.*”
This view o f autonomous personhood is validated and justified on the grounds that 
it has the capacity to offer different perspectives, illuminate existing social, political, and 
moral relations, and show the deficiencies of narrow perspectives.
Art fits within this view of discourse with its ofiering of complex cultural projects 
grounded on theoretical and opaque ideologies that may be examined only from within the 
context of community. The skills required to interpret and appreciate art are socially 
acquired skills, accomplished only, as we have seen, within the context o f a community 
o f persons. Art is a system of discourse with its own semiological codes and structural 
terms. When we understand the formal features of art, we open ourselves to the 
possibility of understanding art as a body o f discourse and to the methods we use to gain 
access to this discourse.
Moreover, art is the expression o f an internal dialogue, which also presupposes 
community. Says Taylor, it is “through language [and art that] we remain related to 
partners of discourse, either in real, live exchanges, or in indirect confrontations. The 
nature of our language and the fundamental dq>endence o f our thought on language makes 
interlocution in one or other o f these forms inescapable for us."*‘*° We may change the
*”  Taylor, 106-107.
*"° Taylor, 38.
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form or the locus o f communication, but we can never sever ourselves altogether from a
context of community. An ontological precondition for personhood is language and
connection to others. Art is an expression of this longing for connection and is a vehicle
for emotional connection to others that we can never derive from rational discourse.
Higher levels o f personhood develop as dimensions of various kinds o f relations:
authenticity is self-referential and one dimensional, autonomy is dual relational and two
dimensional, but art, like language is triadic, three dimensional, dependant upon both the
self and the other in the context of the world. Taylor elaborates:
Our “conversation" with the absent and dead is, of course, 
mediated by the works of oral and written culture, by 
sayings, sacred writings, works of thought, poetry, and 
works of art in general. These are originally conceived as 
figuring in a conversation. They are destined to be taken up 
and heard again or read repeatedly. The hermeticism of 
much modem art may make us think the contrary. But a 
reflection on artistic form might overcome this impression.
All o f our central art forms emerge out of earlier modes of 
social celebration or rite, be they tribal dance, liturgies, 
original Greek theatre, or sacred painting. I believe that 
further reflection and study would show that what we class 
as artistic form even to&iy—that is, what allows us to 
recognize some collection of words as a poem or some 
pattern of colours as a painting, and the like—is closely 
connected with the property of encapsulating or revealing 
something (in principle) for anyone. In this way, they retain 
their connection with the original context of the most 
“primitive" art, a context of social enactment. One thing a 
work of art is in its essence...is a bit of “frozen" potential 
communication.
141 Taylor, Sources o f the Self. Endnote #15, p. 526.
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VI.
Having examined the communal nature of art, I now wish to turn our attention to 
the idea that artisan repression of human experience. Once again, we find the ethical and 
aesthetic intertwined. Various ethical and aesthetic goods exist only inso6r as they are 
articulated, and may not even count as goods without some form o f articulation. Thus, 
our understanding of a good, anything that is valued, worthy, or desirable, becomes 
available to us both individually and culturally, only when it is given expression in some 
way. Moral and aesthetic traditions develop and change as they are given new expression 
and articulation. Culturally specific visions of the good are correlates of the different 
languages that have evolved within cultural matrixes. We are compelled to articulate and 
express our sense of the good because this articulation and expression humanizes us by 
giving our lives meaning and direction. Without such articulations and expressions 
concerning the foci o f our lives, of the things that move us and direct us, our lives lack 
unity and meaning.
This is not to say that the purpose of art is simple communication. Such a view is 
simplistic. Nor is art simple expression, designed to elicit emotional responses. We can 
specify many possible purposes for art that go beyond cognitive or emotional content. To 
list a few: the apprehension of structure or form, the social significance of art, the display 
o f craft or mastery (virtuosity), imparting wisdom, including moral wisdom, imitating
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nature or human action, praising God or displaying the goodness or mercy of God, a 
component of ritual practices, religious or otherwise, and relaxation, distraction, or 
amusement. Very often, the purpose of art is little more than a strategy to get us to grasp 
or contemplate a particular object.
A peculiar feature o f art is that our reaction (cognitive or emotional) arises 
spontaneously and not in response to the artist’s intention to produce it within us. Our 
reaction must be our own doing and not one that is manipulated in us. An art work may 
articulate “...complex, subtle, and intrinsically valuable emotional or cognitive content. 
The purpose is not to create in us a specific attitude toward this content or to get us to 
recognize or otherwise react in any intended way to a state we are supposed to sense in the 
regarded artist...."*'*^  Art has the capacity to frame experience, to point to certain stances 
that might otherwise escape us. But, says Dipert, while we may know that Dickens was 
greatly concerned about social conditions in mid-nineteenth-century London, we may 
nevertheless find his description of these social conditions laden with meaning and value, 
even if we do not take his concern seriously, or we ignore it, or even if we fail to have 
similar attitudes toward such conditions. Nevertheless, Dipert argues that the purpose of 
art is
to articulate, to put before our mind’s (soul’s) eye, to get us 
to grasp or “relate to” some emotional or conceptual content.
With regard to propositional (cognitive) attitudes, the
Randall R. Dipert. Artifacts. Art Works, and Agency. Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 178.
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distinction between attitude and content is relatively clean, 
but between emotional attitude and emotional content the 
distinction is less helpful. For one thing, some emotional 
states, such as moods and general feelings of well-being or 
dissatisfaction may have no clearly conceptualized content. 
It is an attitude, if we are forced to describe it....'**
It becomes ever more clear that conventional linguistic devices, even when we 
subject them to logical improvements, simply fail to successfully represent “...truly 
complex, subtle, or emotionally laden contents that we see in earnest normative, 
theological, or cultural/social phenomena."'** Wittgenstein also recognized this limitation 
of language and saw that “forms of life" (Lebensformen) may be articulated only in art 
works and in life itself. Natural languages are inadequate to represent or to describe the 
emotional content of human emotion. He notes that Balzac was acutely conscious o f this 
limitation:
The content o f Balzac, what he was trying to get us to 
apprehend is not just that the human condition is complex 
and interesting. This content we could easily enough 
paraphrase. In other words, Balzac was interested in 
portraying in his monumental series of novels a certain kind 
of complexity o f the human condition that requires...a// of 
what he had to say and that if “translated" into a 
substantially different medium, such as a Venn diagram or 
a careful philosopher’s paraphrase of the “point" o f his 
novel, would defy human graspability. Since human 
graspability was his expectation and intention, no other
143 Dipert, 180. 
Dipert, 185.
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medium suffices. Consequently, we cannot describe in 
terms (much) more succinct than the novel itself “the" 
purpose of Pere Goriot—\i  we are going to specify precisely 
and accurately the “content” of what it is B alâc intended his 
reader to ponder.
One implication of this position is that some complex emotional or noncognitive 
elements are most adequately rqrresented in media developed precisely for those purposes. 
Another implication is that translation from one medium to another (even from one 
language to another, if  the work is generated in a particular language), loses the richness 
and depth o f its original medium. The medium is integral to the “message" of a work. 
Thus, as Taylor and Higgins observe, Richard Strauss may write a tone poem Also Sprach 
Zarathustra, but even had it been Strauss’ intent, the music can never adequately render 
Nietzsche’s work.
We see that one o f the purposes of art is to stock our minds with propositions, 
emotions, and other “higher-level" nonperceptual thought contents—with expressions of 
existence. Art crystallizes patterns of experience that pervade the range of human 
experiences, so that we can absorb them without having had to live through and learn them 
by a slow process o f induction. Art gives us a range of experience we would otherwise 
never have had. It is a kind of accelerated experience machine.
But, art also functions as a kind of archaeology of our own human experience. If 
our access to nature is through an inner voice or impulse, then we can only fully come to
Dipert, 184.
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know this nature by articulating what we find within us. When we express something, we
make it manifest in a given medium. So, observes Charles Taylor, I express my feelings
in my face, or I express my thoughts in the words I speak or write. I also express my
vision o f things in some work of art, perhaps a novel or play.*^ A peculiarity of artistic
manifestations is:
[the artwork] doesn’t imply that what is so revealed was 
already fully formulated beforehand. Sometimes that can be 
the case, as when I finally reveal my feelings that I had 
already put in words for myself long ago. But in the case of 
the novel or play, the expression will also involve a 
formulation of what I have to say. I am taking something, 
a vision, a sense of things, which was inchoate and only 
partly formed, and giving it a specific shape.
Interwoven in the communal and dialogical nature o f art, we should not overlook 
its ideological character. Modem cultures tend to insulate art from ordinary life, a 
tendency John Dewey and Arthur C. Danto d e c r y . T h e r e  are several conflicting views 
about art, one aspect of which is the ideological myth, pervasive in modem society, that 
all art is good. We ensconce or present art in museums, theatres, or concert halls, 
surround them with formality and ceremony and generally insulate them from moral
See Taylor, Sources o f the Self Chapter 21, Section 2.
Taylor, 374.
See: Arthur C. Danto. The Philosophical Disenfranchisement o f Art.New  York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986. Also see: John Dewey. Art As Experience. New 
York: Perigee Books, 1980.
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assessment. We are indoctrinated to believe that what is aesthetically significant cannot 
simultaneously have moral significance, as in the "art for art’s sake” movement of the last 
century. Our culture tends toward a mystical regard for art, viewing it as the repository 
of eternal truths that places it beyond moral judgments and censure. Carol Duncan 
observes:
...in our society, art—along with all high culture—has 
replaced religion (that is, among the educated) as the 
repository of what we are taught to regard as our highest, 
most enduring values. As sanctified a category as any our 
society offers, art silently but ritually validates and invests 
with mystifying authority the ideals that sustain existing 
social relations. In art, those ideals are given to us as 
general, universal values, collective cultural experience,
“our" heritage, or as some other abstraction removed from 
concrete experience. Physically and ideologically, art is 
isolated from the rest o f life, surrounded with solemnity, 
protected from moral judgement. Our very encounters with 
it in museums, galleries and art books are structured to 
create the illusion that the significance of art has little or 
nothing to do with the conflicts and problems that touch 
common experience. Established art ideologies reinforce 
this illusion. According to both popular and scholarly 
literature, true artistic imaginations transcend the ordinary 
fantasies that class and sex prejudices and the bad faith that 
beset other human minds. Indeed, most of us believe that 
art, by definition, is always good—because it is o f purely 
esthetic significance (and the purely esthetic is thought to be 
good), or because it confirms the existence o f the 
imagination and of individualism, or because it reveals other 
"timeless” values or truths. Most o f us have been schooled 
to believe that art, qua art, if  it is "good” art, is never bad 
anyone, never has anything to do with the oppression of
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the powerless, and never imposes on us values that are not 
universally beneficial.’^ ®
This attempt to exalt art masks its force to influence people, institutions, and 
societies for good or ill. And it may be nothing more than self-delusion to claim that art 
has no force. Architecture certainly has the capacity to inspire awe and reverence and 
dread. We only have to think of the great cathedrals of Europe designed to instill awe and 
worship in the people; or the great temples and pyramids in Egypt built for the same 
purposes, but directed toward other deities. There are no end o f institutions that build 
great and spacious buildings to subjugate and intimidate through awe and wonder so that 
people will not recognize that the institution lacks legitimacy. All o f the trappings may 
be included: fine fabrics, brilliant colors, art treasures, marvelous craftsmanship, size, 
elegance, and expense. We have only to think of Hitler’s massive building program in the 
days o f the Third Reich where he admittedly had entwined social and aesthetic goals in 
mind when he built art museums, government buildings, and huge meeting places. This 
use o f architecture abounds today with our ostentatious shopping malls, large bank 
buildings, sky scrapers, and government buildings to name a few. Elegance and 
pretension are often ploys and manipulations enjoined to mask institutions for the empty 
shells that they are. There are those who would use one o f the high arts, architecture, to
*‘® Carol Duncan. The Aesthetics o f Power: Essays in Critical Art History. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 118-119.
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cause us to lose sight o f the significant or profound, just as there are those who use 
architecture to help us to recognize the profound and significant.
For example, in the case of another of the arts, we have only to think of occasions 
when we were moved or energized by a particular piece o f music. Music certainly has 
potent force in these cases, force that extends to generating relationships between people 
in an audience, or who vicariously join together through a recording. On occasion, music, 
like art in general, may also prompt us to examine our values and orientations. Kathleen 
Higgins notes “...m usic’s capacity to engage our intellectual, emotional, and physical 
natures simultaneously, its suitability for promoting social cohesions, its reflection of 
practical and ideal modes o f human social interaction, its ability to stimulate reflections 
regarding our basic values—consider the role of music in churches—all these are basic 
features of musical experience."*^
Higgins further identifies the cultural aspects of music that may generate alterations 
in our values and self-r^ard. Often the music of other cultures and societies reflect values 
that contrast ours and, when our cultural attitudes and values are opaque to us, may make 
them more ^>parent to us. Conversely, music and art may demonstrate the possibility of 
other attitudes toward being human, being a social creature that may encourage us to 
reevaluate our own.*** As we have seen previously, our own values may remain hidden
*“  Higgins, 4.
*** Higgins, 172.
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from us, but the art of other cultures and civilizations can present a contrasting foil to 
throw our values into relief.
Art functions in another way that contrasts with the conceptual impotence of art. 
In modem Western societies, the artist often sets himself or herself against the conventions 
of his or her society. This is a feature o f advanced contemporary pluralistic societies. In 
the Western European art tradition, the twentieth-century artist, in contrast to the more 
traditional artist of previous centuries often aims to alter the convictions of members of a 
society rather than to confirm them. The artist often intends to show the members of a 
society how things are “...so as thereby to awaken them from their somnolence or release 
them from their self-indulgent ideology, to illuminate them, or energize them into action, 
or console them."*”
vn .
Society often orients people to accept a sort of psychological conditioning process, 
not with overt propaganda, but through the consensus o f conceptual habits. It is possible 
for language and value systems to obscure our real lives from us. Indeed a society’s 
conceptual system often has a life of its own, abstracted from the real processes of the 
society. Roger Taylor believes this happens when a “conceptual system or language.
*”  Nicholas Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds o f Art. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 362.
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which derives from human beings dealing with the world, is abstracted from its sphere of 
employment and thence hounded with great logical precision for logical consequences. 
The inaccuracy that creeps in stems from a turning away from the real processes of the 
world.""^
So it is that many assumptions that function as part o f our background beliefs are 
givens, not usually the object of exploration or belief. They are the ground from which 
we go on to examine and explore other issues that we believe or doubt. We rely on this 
background information, this social construct in order to navigate our worlds. Similarly, 
the social dimension of art is often masked, but this dimension is at least potentially a part 
of the experience of art. The relationship, especially in contemporary society, may be 
mediated by critics, institutions, auctions, and so on, but it is nevertheless fundamentally 
a social relation.
As an essentially social endeavor, art is created, displayed, shared, and 
remembered in social contexts. It articulates value, especially those values significant to 
members of a community, or a culture, or a civilization. These values may include, but 
are not limited to, living well, getting along with others, overcoming pure self-interest, 
bang recq)tive to other members of the community. In doing so, art provokes analogical 
thinking and addresses symbolic interpretations that prevail within a community. Art 
serves as a mode of encounter with a world outside o f us, a world of lived, social
Roger Taylor. Art, An Enemy o f the People. Sussex, England: Harvester Press, LTD, 
12.
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experience. At the same time it is a medium that empowers the individual with those tools 
that denote wholoiess and greater c^)acities o f reason, self-legislation, and acceptance of 
oneself—all qualities that one develops within a social context.
Again turning to music, Roger Scruton notes that a precondition o f enjoyment of 
the musical experience, and, I might add, of art in general, is the existence of a 
community of appreciators.^^ Art, moreover, often generates community bonding, with 
music, public monuments, and aesthetic “events" the most likely vehicles for communal 
aesthetic experience. The communal nature of the arts is sometimes in itself sufficient to 
create a community, albeit a short-lived one, as Kathleen Higgins reminds us that 
Woodstock created a community among listeners not so many years ago. Works such as 
the Viemam War Memorial create a community among its visitors, as do open-air band 
and symphony concerts.
As a social construct, language indicates, points to, or signals processes of the 
world and these processes themselves can not be categorized by means of static definitions 
because they are processes, a feature of an ongoing and changeable reality. Art and 
language are devices which we humans use to cope both socially and individually with a 
changing world. As we have seen, language and art are basic categories o f the human 
world. What this means is that human life without language and art are unimaginable. 
Both are fundamental human dimensions.
Roger Scruton. “Musical Understanding and Musical Culture," in Whca is Music? 
Editor, Ed Alperson. (New York: Haven Press, 1988) 353-354.
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People connect with one another through time and across cultures through their 
artistic symbols and traditions. These symbols and traditions also connect people, along 
with the theories and practice o f art, to the underlying theories, assumptions, and 
theoretical traditions within a society. Symbols function as culturally significant vehicles 
that represent a repressed complex through various associations. Thus, there is deep 
continuity between works of art and the symbolic expressions o f ordinary life. Such 
symbolic, artistic expressions presuppose a code accessible to those whom the 
communication addresses. These expressions demonstrate the penetration of meaning 
within a culture by both expressing the inexpressible and by expressing the expressible 
more efficaciously.
For example, the moral force o f Guernica does not derive from Picasso’s attempt 
to depict a fascist dictatorship, nor to represent reality. The reason generations of people 
of all cultures are drawn to this painting is its expression of universal human emotion and 
fear, the bitterness and tragic suffering o f imperilled human existence. Even when the 
memory of the historical event itself is lost on those generations who view it, the universal 
significance and reality of this work, the deepest cosmic truths, overcome the limitation 
of ideology and dogma. Charles Taylor makes the further observation that sometimes art 
transfigures the unthinkable into something the human mind can assimilate. One of the 
motivations of post World War n  poetry “grows from the insight that to capture the most 
degraded or devastated reality in poetry involves a transfiguration whereby it can be
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confronted, and borne without flinching by the human spirit....Finding a language for 
horror and destruction can be part of a fight for a spiritual survival. The artist, if 
serious, projects something that he or she believes is there for all o f us, an aspect of reality 
universally available, but gives it to us symbolically, through the lens o f his or her own 
sensibility.
An example of symbolic expression is Jazz music. Jazz, as we know it, is the 
product of an intersection of cultures. But, it began as a subversion and a challenge to a 
dominant white American culture. The music came into being as a reaction to racial 
domination, in which culturally oppressed blacks did not, indeed could not say what they 
really meant. It originated as an expression of the American black identity that was 
decoded by other like-minded individuals. Jazz evolved as a symbolic expression, as a 
form of communication, that defined a community of understanders, a community of 
persons who were expected to grasp the symbolic expressions of the subculture, and who 
were in turn defined by that symbolic expression. The definition was reciprocal: what was 
a subculture deAned by the persons contained in it also came to deAne those persons. 
After World War n , European culture assimilated the genre, with Europeans viewing it 
as a unique characteristic of American culture as a whole, and not as an expression of 
black American subculture. Thus, the European appreciation of Jazz grew out of its 
evasive, deceptive, double-dealing beginnings.
Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, 485.
136
Another message we gain from the genesis and cross-cultural impact o f Jazz is that 
through art, we may engage in imaginative associations in the context o f ordinary life that 
offer possibilities for the ordering o f human activity that is without threat or injury. Art 
in general allows us to explore our place in the world, to imaginatively explore various 
ways o f being in the world and of encountering others. In the case of Jazz, a certain 
subculture o f American blacks challenged their reality through the symbolism of a musical 
genre, and distilled another reality, one that ultimately rose above racism and subjugation. 
It is as if the Jazz musicians of the 1930's generated a new, racially unbiased reality 
through the music. Once again, we see aesthetic and moral sensitivities intertwine as 
related enterprises, giving credence to Plato’s claim that “...m usical training is a more 
potent instrument than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the 
inward places o f the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace and making the 
soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or of him who is ill educated ungraceful.
The story o f Jazz further attests to the notion that aesthetic appreciation is often 
class-bound and partial, especially as it is given to us in the dominant aesthetic theories of 
art in Western philosophy. That is, these theories view art as a kind o f cultural possession 
that reinforces the distinction between intellectuals and dominant classes, on the one hand, 
and the dominated, on the other. To characterize the aesthetic disposition as
156 Republic. Book m , 401, as cited in Philosophies o f Art and Beauty: Selected Readings 
in Aesthetics from  Plato to Heidegger. Editor, Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, p. 28.
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“disinterested" and separated from everyday and practical concerns is an ideology that 
emphasizes the privileged conditions of a few and enables them to distance themselves 
from the demands of raw existence. This description aptly characterizes the musical 
division we find before World War II, when there was a great deal of disdain for and 
rejection of Jazz by American middle and upper-class white society. A popular aesthetic, 
however, refuses the criterion o f disinterestedness, and working classes see the work as 
justified if it exalts and captures a reality o f significance and importance.
It is through art that we determine what matters to us, individually, culturally, and 
communally. As a human endeavor, art, like science and language, is a way humans have 
of mastering reality. Art often discovers new areas o f reality, making them visible or 
audible, where hitherto they had been outside of our grasp.
Ernst Fischer notes: “It is not the function of art to break down open doors but 
rather to open locked ones. But when the artist discovers new realities, he does not do so 
for himself alone; he does it also for others, for all those who want to know what sort of 
world they live in, where they come from, and where they are going. He produces for a 
community...."'^
And why is it that communities and cultures deem it important to express these 
real, important, and transcendent truths symbolically and artistically? We might wonder 
why medieval Europeans, (or modem adherents o f religion, for that matter) wanted art,
Ernst Fischer. The Necessity o f Art: A Marxist Approach. Anna Bostock, translator. 
Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963. 210.
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drama, paintings, and sculptures that expressed religious themes when they had first-hand
expression of those themes in the Bible and related devotional works. Nicholas
Wolterstorff thinks part o f the answer is a human desire to tangibly manifest the
meaningful and valuable. He says;
...one caimot escape the impression that there is in man a 
deep desire for concreteness, that there is in man a deep 
dissatisfaction with merely holding in mind his religion, the 
history of his people, his convictions as to what is 
important, and a passionate wish instead to make all this 
concrete, in story and play, song and dance, painting and 
sculpture. Aristotle sets us on the wrong track with his 
suggestion that the principle benefit o f dramatic tragedy lies 
in the emotional purging we undergo by virtue of the fear 
and pity induced in us by the drama. Surely what above all 
gripped the Greeks in watching the tragedies of their 
dramatists was that there, before their eyes, were being 
unfolded the stories and histories so important to them as a 
people.***
Thus, art is a particular instantiation of the universal, an instance in which a 
particular object carries universal import. As we saw, Kant had a limited vision of art’s 
capacity to access the supersensible within us in the Third Critique, as an embodiment and 
revelation of the noumenal, the infinite. With Kant, we derive a conception of the artist 
and poet as seer, as one who commands the power of mystical awareness and vision. The 
transcendental is thus mediated through the artist and the medium.
*** Nicholas Wolterstorff. Works and Worlds o f Art.. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 
360.
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Of course, we should not forget that one product of the Romantic era is the notion 
that the universe is organized according to principles that can not be grasped by disengaged 
reason. A further legacy o f Romanticism is the view that the universe is essentially 
enigmatic, with the condition o f intelligibility being full engagement in it. And this 
conception was a backlash to the Enlightenment, an era that viewed the universe 
simultaneously as void of premoral purpose and the locus o f cataclysmic change.
There is an aspect to personal autonomy that becomes apparent through these 
endeavors. Art frees us by allowing us to transfigure degradation, disorderliness, 
ordinariness, and mediocrity. Expressivism, a contemporary formulation o f Romanticism 
is the basis for individuation and self-definition. The late eighteenth century gave rise to 
the notion that each individual is unique, different, and original, and that individual lives 
are defined in the light of this uniqueness. Charles Taylor notes that the real import of this 
enhanced view o f one’s distinctiveness influenced our notion that our lives are original 
paths we forge according to the obligations imposed upon us by our individuality.*”  
Expressive individuation has become one of the cornerstones o f contemporary culture. 
Historical origins of these ideas may be found in the Christian notion of the variety of 
spiritual gifts with which every individual is uniquely endowed, expressed by Paul in the 
New Testament letters. This position was taken up again by the Puritans, who believed
Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, 375.
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the good life for one may not match the good life for another and that each person has a 
unique calling which can not be exchanged.
Contemporary aesthetic theory reflects this preoccupation with Expressivism and 
creative originality. Art as a social institution is reinterpreted and given a central place in 
contemporary culture because creation and expression are increasingly central to our 
understanding o f human experience. Art is no longer viewed as mimesis, as an imitation 
of reality. Rather, art is now viewed as an expression, a manifestation o f reality that 
simultaneously realizes and completes r e a l i t y .T h e  artist is both creator and seer. Art 
is the locus o f this expression o f reality, manifesting what is hidden or revealed in the 
world around us. Such expressions turn on the creative imagination which articulates the 
unsayable, the ungraspable. It is a feature of the human condition to desire to know, to 
master, to understand our world. Science has a place in this quest, as does art. Where 
science represents our best human efforts to unearth the secrets o f the universe, it is art 
through the creative imagination that allows us to tolerate the unknown, the unmastered.
As Ernst Fischer eloquently puts it:
...man, being mortal and therefore imperfect, will always 
find himself part of, and yet struggling with, the infinite 
reality that surrounds him. Again and again he must face 
the contradiction of being a limited T' and at the same time 
part of the whole....Our aim is not unconsciousness but the 
highest form of consciousness. But even the highest 
attainable consciousness o f the individual will not be able to 
reproduce the totality in the T’—will not be able to make one
Taylor, Sources o f the Self. 376-377.
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man encompass the whole human race. And so, just as 
language represents the accumulation of the collective 
experience of millennia in every individual, just as science 
equips every individual with the knowledge acquired by the 
human race as a whole, so the permanent function o f art is 
to re-create as every individual’s experience the fulness of 
all that he is not, the fulness o f humanity at large. And it 
is the magic of art that by this process o f re-creation it 
shows that reality can be transformed, mastered....like 
Proteus, he [the artist] can assume any form and lead a 
thousand lives without being crushed by the multiplicity of 
his experience....our limited ‘I’ is also marvelously enlarged 
by the experience of a work of art; a process of 
identification takes place within us, and we can feel, almost 
effortlessly, that we are not only wimesses but even fellow- 
creators of those works that grip us without permanently 
tying us down.'®’
v m .
Through art, we derive a vision of ourselves, as individuals and as members of a 
community. It is this vision of ourselves in community that I now wish to examine. It 
should be clear by now that there is a symbiotic relationship between art, morality, and 
society. They are intertwined aspects of our social beings, and expressions of one aspect 
imply related connections of the others. Our social and political structures and realities 
are reciprocals of our artistic expressions, and so on. These aspects may be encoded
'®' Ernst Fischer, 223-224.
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differently or offered in varying symbolic forms, but they are all manifestations of the 
same ideological structures that define our cultures and social realities.
One implication o f this view is that there is no such thing as an apolitical artwork. 
The artwork inherent in various social and political orders necessarily expresses certain 
nuanced values, however obliquely. Art is internally connected with all other aspects of 
communal life. Changes in art theory indicate changes in other aspects of the social order 
and changes in culture or society give notice of changes in art theory.
Charles Taylor supports this observation, noting that alterations in the underlying 
moral vision of the nineteenth and twentieth century were related to changes in the theory 
and practice of art, particularly views about the enhanced powers of the creative 
imagination.Conversely, changes in the theory and practice of the arts also affect our 
understanding of society as well as our moral plight. A tendency toward “inwardness” is 
one of the trends we find in contemporary art. Inwardness is a corollary of subjectivism 
in which public access to the “cosmic order o f meaning”'^  ^ is impossible. In order to 
explore the order in the world around us and within us, we have to appeal to a kind of 
personal resonance. This ideal contrasts markedly with the ideal of disengaged reason that 
was the legacy of the Enlightenment. While this ideal has some currency, we err if we 
think it an accurate picture of human agency. The undeniable fact is that we are embodied
Charles Taylor. Sources o f the Self. 510. 
Taylor, 512.
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agents, living in dialogical conditions, inhabiting time in a specifically human way. We 
delude ourselves if we think that we are able to access a so-called objective reality. In line 
with this theoretical shift, we see a philosophical move away Aom portraying the human 
predicament in terms o f a subject/object dichotomy, otherwise known as the egocentric 
predicament. Rather, philosophers began moving toward a characterization o f human 
existence as a social construct. The product of language and dialogical exchanges between 
agents, language and discourse in general are not simply contingent and external to the 
agent, but fundamentally constitutive. This amounts to a Kantian analogue that our 
orientation in social space is one of the inescapable attitudes of our existence.
Another theory of social existence, based on Lockean individualism, places great 
emphasis on a view about universal and equal rights as well as on intimate relationships, 
especially familial ones. Both of these views give some prominence to the inherent dignity 
of human beings. Such a vision of human dignity combines the notion that others are 
deserving of recognition with minimal levels o f respect. Discussion about universal, 
natural, or human rights that has great currency in contemporary society connects respect 
for human life with the notion of autonomy. And autonomy is crucial to our 
understanding of respect. Our notions of autonomy are also driven by the background 
pictures of human nature and the human circumstance of any epoch. For example, Taylor 
notes that the Enlightenment gave us a picture o f humans as disengaged subjects, breaking 
free of our “comfortable but illusory sense o f immersion in nature, and objectifying the
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world around us."‘^  The Kantian theory pictures humans as rational agents and the 
Romantic theory pictures humans as “developing, “flourishing," and “driven to self- 
expression."
Underlying these conceptions o f what it is to be human is the notion that respect 
for persons appears to be a universal moral practice, with evidence o f practices that accord 
with some such conception in every society. Taylor notes that in higher developed 
civilization in the West, respect for persons is generally articulated in terms o f rights that 
are central to our moral and legal codes. Under modem interpretation, our sense of 
respect for persons turns on freedom and self-control. Respect for persons, combined with 
other connected moral demands such as human welfare and the affirmation of ordinary 
life, color our understanding of integrity and autonomy. Since Locke and M ill, our 
understanding of autonomy lends credence to the view that in order to facilitate a person’s 
moral development, we must respect individual differences, even when those differences 
lead to practices that we may find repugnant. As a result, contemporary culture places 
maximum importance on the expressive power of the individual. To respect a person’s 
integrity one must also protect his or her freedom to develop and express opinions, to 
legislate the course of his or her own life, and to determine the essential meaning o f his 
or her own life.
Taylor, Sources o f the Self, 3.
For an analysis of the interconnection between these aspects o f moral personhood, see 
Chapters 1 & 2 of Sources o f the S elf
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This conception also has consequences for a simple subjectivist approach to art.
Subjectivism implies a narrow focus, one that is confined to the perceived reality of the
agent. With subjectivism, we find a focus on personal mental characteristics or states that
arise from one person's awareness o f his or her own states and processes. Modem works
of art tend to go b^ond subjectivism to express what is universal to being human, and this
is what makes art convincing and moving. For often, when we are deeply touched by art,
we are drawn to those deeper, more general and universal truths that are inaccessible in
other ways. It is art that moves and touches us because it expresses those fundamental
principles that define us as humans. Concerning this notion o f inwardness, Taylor says;
...inwardness is...a part o f the sensibility o f the modernist 
sensibility....And what is within is deep: the timeless, the 
mythic, and the archetypical that are brought forth by Mann 
or Joyce-or Jung, whose work is fully a product of the 
modernist sensibility....may be transpersonal. But our 
access to it can only be within the personal....[It] may take 
us beyond the subjective, but the road to them passes 
inescapably through a heightened awareness o f personal 
experience.***
There are virtues as well as dangers to the modem trend that emphasizes 
inwardness, and this trend becomes palpable in the art it informs. One consequence of this 
move is the contemporary issue of self-affirmation through creative imagination that is 
unique in human history. Charles Taylors thinks that the creative imagination plays an 
integral role in our view of the good in our world. The transformation of our stance and
*** Taylor, 481.
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our outlook help to bring about the truth it reveals. This means that the creative
imagination helps complete what it reveals. Thus, our orientation toward ourselves, other
selves, and the good does not simply enable us to recognize a good, rather, it helps us to
bring this good about. Our developed capacity to see good empowers good, and as such,
functions as moral source, according to Taylor. Concerned with the modem definition of
the self, Taylor thinks this is a step on the way to internalizing our moral sources. This
means that we no longer look for moral sources that are external to us. We are
conditioned to look within to discover them. This ability has the effect of a self-
affirmation, a kind ennobling of ourselves. Says Taylor:
Along with the sense o f our dignity as disengaged, free, 
reasoning subjects, alongside our sense o f the creative 
imagination as a power o f epiphany and transfiguration, we 
have also this idea o f an affirming power, which can help 
realize the good by recognizing it.***^
Since this modem view of the self tums on our sense o f self-affirmation and our 
power to transfigure and interpret the world within, we no longer think of ourselves as 
dq)endent upon external sources for access to nature or to God. This is not to say that our 
understanding of this self-affirmation and self-realization subordinates all vision o f art, 
personhood, morality and society to personal fulfillment. To do so would be to devalue 
other important features of human life, features, such as: community affiliations, 
obligations of marriage and Amily, loyalty to traditions and established social institutions.
Taylor, 454.
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We lose a great deal when we concentrate on self-fulfilment to the detriment o f these 
defining relationships. Indeed, Taylor notes that when we place the demand of self- 
fulfilment over these other affiliations, we fail to sustain our connection and identification 
with the community that public freedom requires.’®*
This connection to others is founded on a dialogue we enter into with them. Our 
lives are fundamentally dialogical. Dialogue is the substrate of all communication and 
stands for all elements of address and response between persons. When we think of 
dialogue at its most basic level, we think of face-to-face interactions between individuals 
who participate in a community of meaning. We find many patterns o f dialogue: over 
distance as in e-mail or letter-writing; prelogical, as in a smile between mother and infant; 
prelinguistic, as in pointing and gesturing; indirect, as in art; thematic, as in various kinds 
o f performance or directed activities, and so on. The point 1 wish to emphasize is that 
‘dialogue’ encompasses the rich scope of human languages of expression and interaction, 
languages that include the language of art. All o f these languages and interactions define 
us since we are initiated into this dialogue the moment we are bom. We do not acquire 
these languages in isolation; these languages define us and provide the frameworks for our 
lives.
Because we are human, we define ourselves socially long before we define 
ourselves as individuals. Community is ontologically basic to our notion o f the self and
'®* Taylor, Ethics o f Authenticity. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991) 35.
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o f human agency. Even our individual identities are established in the context of
significant others. This development takes on paradoxical dimensions in our adolescent
years when we flout convention and outgrow our parents’ supervision. But, even this
struggle to establish our individual identities, our efforts to free ourselves from the
perceived constraints imposed by our parents, or our schools, or our societies, necessarily
involves basic levels o f interaction with those around us. We never escape this great
conversation. Taylor makes this point in The Ethics o f Authenticity: “. ..we are always in
conversation, in some cases, our interlocutor is God, or an audience, but we are always
within the context of the community."’*” Elsewhere, he says:
I am a self only in relation to certain interlocutors: in one 
way in relation to those conversation partners who were 
essential to my achieving self-definition; in another in 
relation to those who are now crucial to my continuing grasp 
o f languages of self-understanding—and, o f course, these 
classes may overlap. A self exists only within what 1 call 
‘webs o f interlocution’.’™
We can not achieve autonomy without others, just as we can not create art outside 
of the context of community, and just as we can not reason without others. The ultimate 
criterion which establishes our autonomy is self-legislation and self-control, both 
dimensions o f “reasonableness," and all o f which we develop only within a community. 
We constantly establish our identities, and our autonomy, in the context of the natural
’*” Taylor, The Ethics o f Authenticity, 35. 
’™ Taylor, Sources o f the Self 36.
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world and communal worlds. Autonomy is a kind of process that presupposes 
interdependent selves, selves who can detach in certain ways from some o f the given 
traditions of their historical communities, perhaps. But selves who nevertheless define 
themselves in some community; selves who are somehow defined by communities. 
Community is constitutive of human agency. We are autonomous, even rational, in a 
social context. This point is often lost in the Western philosophical tradition hearkening 
back to Descartes and Locke, with its emphasis on the subject-object dichotomy in their 
definitions of human selfhood and the conception o f autonomy that rides on that 
distinction. But we are acutely aware that this picture o f human identity is flawed because 
it neglects the relational aspects o f the self. Kant and Mill both understood that this 
communal aspect o f developed or autonomous personhood, a version of overcoming 
narrow self-interest, is a moral ideal and presupposes a desire to establish a sense of 
solidarity and community with other human beings.
In Sources o f the S elf Charles Taylor notes that our culture has encouraged and even 
demanded detachment from one’s historical roots, that is, from historic communities 
defined by birth. This detachment derives from both Greek and Hebrew roots. For 
example, Hebrew prophets were often people who challenged the abuse o f a 
community in order deliver God’s message. Similarly Greek history gives us the 
heroic figure of Socrates who stood against popular Athenian opinion in order to rescue 
philosophical reason. Yet, these legendary figures were nevertheless defined by 
another kind of community—a community of like-minded individuals, that places these 
figures in relation to the language and visions o f others. 37.
See John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism. Editor, Oskar Piest. Indian^lis: Bobbs- 
Merrill, 1957. 40, 42-43. Also, Friedrich Schiller. On the Aesthetic Education o f 
Man. Translator, Reginald Snell (New York: Ungar, 1954) 138.
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Many o f the values and goods of our lives are acquired only in the context of 
community, and art is one of those goods. How many times is our experience of a work 
of art, whether music, film, dance, drama, or architecture, enhanced or diminished as we 
enjoy them with others? As Taylor goes on to say. The very form o f a work of art shows 
its character as addressed.”'^ Even though we sometimes think of the artist (or the 
ascetic) as a solitary individual, creating art in isolation, we must recognize art for what 
it is: a part of the great human conversation. Because art describes a social relation, at its 
most basic, it reminds us of our common humanity across cultures and across time. It 
serves to remind us that we are fundamentally human, in a world of human beings, in the 
range o f human experience. Any mode of human existence that is narrowly subjective, 
that fails to account for either the demands of our relationships with others, or to demands 
that require us to reach beyond ourselves, to transcend ourselves, are destined to self- 
destruct. Autonomous lives are those that honor the ethic o f our relationships with others 
as we live out our lives within a communal space, even while aspiring to self-legislation 
and some measure of control over the course of our own lives.
IX.
Taylor, Ethics, 35.
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Leo Tolstoy in What is Art? expresses the view that the purpose o f art is to unite 
humanity into a universal community. He thinks that art has the unique capacity to unite 
human beings through evoking and communicating emotion. Tolstoy’s was an early 
articulation of the Romantic rebellion against the tenets of Neoclassical art by denying the 
supremacy of reason in art and life and conceiving of the creative imagination as the 
ultimate human faculty. With the advent o f Romanticism, as we have already seen, 
subjective percq>tions b^an to be thought of as cognitively significant. The objective as 
the criterion and test o f and source of knowledge was superseded by the subjective. One 
of the great contributions of the Enlightenment had been a move to validate data as 
universally and objectively true, beyond momentary subjective states of the individual 
investigator, whether mathematician, scientist, or philosopher. Tolstoy and the Romantics 
turned this traditional view on its head. With them, an exceptional individual, especially 
an artist, could serve as a conduit o f truth. Indeed, the Romantics taught that it was 
precisely whai extraordinary individuals gave expression to their most intense and personal 
emotional states that we might gain a glimpse o f the infinite and eternal. While reason 
might yield knowledge o f a common sort, artistic imagination was necessary to gain 
insight into the reality that escaped the senses.
A further implication of the Enlightenment was a stance that generated the 
subject/object dichotomy—distance between subject and the world, and the disengaged 
subject of Descartes and Locke. Some of the most significant and influential philosophical
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and artistic discoveries of the twentieth century have been those that describe the subjective 
engagement o f individuals in the world. The philosophies, from Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Husserl, and Wittgenstein, for example, attempt to overcome the subjective/objective 
dichotomy which generated concq)tual divisions between humans and the world, between 
logic and sense impressions, and between humans themselves. In art, the Impressionists 
explored the notion that we perceive the world in the matrix of structures we ourselves 
formulate. They discovered that experience is necessarily mediated and art is an 
instrument o f interpretation as well as transformation. In the twentieth century art 
becomes a frame through which the artist and the spectator exercise the creative 
imagination in order to refract experience.
Art uniquely fits this agenda, to bridge the gap between public and private 
experience. This is Dewey’s, Tolstoy’s, Danto’s, and Higgins’ doctrine as well: art 
crosses the divide that emerges with our twentieth-century predisposition to fragment 
public, social, and collective aspects of experience from personal, private, and individually 
acquired experience. Of particular interest in our examination is art’s capacity to align one 
person’s thought, language, and affective dimension with those of another. As evidence 
of this, we have only to think of aesthetic experiences that involve intersubjective empathy 
and often shared delight, making the social connections between people apparent. We find 
occasions of this intersubjective connection when people come together in the concert hall
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or the gallery, or even when coming together to listen to a compact disc or to enjoy a 
coffee table art book.
One memorable experience was the magical moment when my children and I joined 
a crowd gathered around a blind 1)lues" guitarist on a street comer in Atlanta. For a few 
moments at least, a crowd of hurrying commuters were transfigured into a community. 
This community lasted only long enough for the singer to finish two moving songs, but 
the crowd around him were united in their diversity and in their response to singer’s art. 
Art has an affective dimension that involves intersubjective empathy and shared delight and 
makes apparent the social connections between people. Kathleen Higgins, who focuses 
on the musical experience, observes: “Like any shared profound experience, listening to 
stirring music, which touches one’s sense of what one is, has a socially binding effect on 
those who share the listening experience. The personal differences that divide the 
members of the audience seem less serious than this shared intense experience."'^ "
One of the great delights of poetry is its insights into the personal life and response 
of another. Through poetry we can come to know another not just as a perspective, but 
through a perspective we both come to share, evai for a moment. We join in a nexus that 
intersects our points of access to the social order. These moments of aesthetic participation 
can generate friendships, but also engage the individuals concerned in interactions that 
transcend the experience itself. We see many examples o f this in history and in our own
™ Higgins, 152.
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experience. As Higgins notes, music, in particular, “...can be employed to urge solidarity 
within a faction, it is almost uniqudy suited to incite a sense of community among people 
who have little else in common besides appreciating it."*’* This accurately describes the 
musical evmit my children and I experienced in Atlanta, when hurried commuters entering 
a rail station stopped for a moment to chat and smile and commune under the unifying 
spell of an artist’s humble offering.
On another note, I recall my oldest son’s experience when he visited the Holocaust 
Museum in Washington, D.C. Here were historical memorabilia and photographs, along 
with sculpture, drawing, music, architecture, and painting designed to evoke emotional 
reaction and sentiments among the participants. One is certainly struck by the 
overwhelming grief and pathos the exhibits evoke, but once again, one finds that the art 
creates a community dedicated to the memory of the Holocaust victims and to a communal 
resolve to oppose such occurrences in the future. This heightened consciousness is, in 
many ways, a consequoice of twentieth century art’s agenda to emphasize self-expression 
and the use of symbols to express the inexpressible .*’* All of which gives us an increased 
ability to unite as individuals in community. Perhaps this accounts for the use of art in 
many cultural traditions as a vehicle to promote harmonious living. It is the very nature 
of the dialogue that is evoked by art that we are drawn together as a community, as it
*’* Higgins, 151.
This is a point my young child touchingly noticed at age 12, but could articulate only in 
a childish vocabulary.
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simultaneously enhances our individual abilities to discover, define, and legislate 
ourselves.
Chapter 5 
Conclusion
If we search the history of philosophy we find the notion o f autonomy, in one way 
or another, as the locus o f presuppositions and theories about personhood and moral 
decision-making. In the golden age of Greek philosophy, we find Plato telling us that the 
highest development o f personhood is under the influence o f the rational soul, that pure 
and intellectual part of the self that acts solely on the basis o f rationality. Centuries later, 
Augustine proposes a doctrine that the truly free person is one who subjects himself or 
herself to the rational part of his or her soul. Combined with this, we have Augustine’s 
picture of the self as an inner domain revealed by turning our gaze inward. In a sense, 
Augustine encouraged us to discover ourselves, to plumb our own unknown depths and to 
thereby encounter God by looking inward.
After Augustine, we find the next significant doctrine o f autonomy with Rousseau 
who discusses the collective expression o f the general will as a community of self- 
l%islating persons. Here, autonomy is an expression o f the interests o f every individual, 
the collective interest expressed in the context o f community. This theme is picked up by 
Kant, for whom autonomy is the expression of a free and highly developed moral person, 
able to express the moral law by engaging the will. Kant stresses the concept o f individual 
freedom as self-determination. Our reverence and veneration of the moral law is a
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consequence o f our rational agency, a status unequaled anywhere in creation. Only the 
rational agent has the dignity that cornes from recognition o f and willing adherence to the 
moral law. Yet, Kant’s moral philosophy, while a philosophy o f freedom, is open to the 
criticism that rational agency alone does not constitute a complete description of the moral 
agait, nor can the isolated agent achieve autonomy in a social vacuum. This is a point of 
which Kant was aware and which he attempted to rectify in the Second Critique. A 
variation on Kant’s version of autonomy, self-government by impartial observers, later 
becomes the basis of John Rawls’ theory. Even John Stuart Mill expresses views about 
personal autonomy in On Liberty, despite the obvious tension with his views about 
utilitarian ethics (although one might also construct an argument about the place of 
autonomy in utilitarianism).
Any search of the literature dealing with autonomy yields a notion of autonomy that 
appears to be a constellation of concq>ts and a term that is used in a variety of ways. Joel 
Feinberg echoes this notion when he argues that there are at least four basic meanings of 
the term ‘autonomy.’*^  Current topics in the literature that deals with autonomy address 
a variety o f issues such as: purported distinctions between ‘autonomy’ and ‘freedom’, the 
relationship between autonomy and free will, autonomy and justice, autonomy and 
paternalism, autonomy and belief formation, and so on. The discussions appear to have 
little to do with the traditional Kantian notion of autonomy, but many theorists
Joel Feinberg. Harm to Self, Vol. 3 of The Moral Limits o f Criminal Law. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986. Chapter 18.
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acknowledge their indd)tedness to Kant for linking autonomy as a property of persons with 
their capacity to act on principles of morality and justice. But, discussions o f autonomy 
also ground other, seemingly unrelated, theoretical issues in education, medicine, 
community and, as I have argued here, in aesthetics.
Gerald Dworkin has worked out an explicit theory of autonomy that rides on a 
distinction between lower- and higher-order desires.*’* Lower-order desires are those that 
ground the actions o f an agent, which means that the agent has a desire to do either X or 
Y. Higher-order desires are those that ground lower-order desires, so that one has a desire 
to desire either X or Y. Something o f course has to be said about the formation of these 
preferences in order to establish conditions for autonomy. It is entirely reasonable to say 
that these preferences may figure into the conception o f personal autonomy to a greater 
degree than the acquisition of goods. Feinberg and Dworkin propose certain conditions 
of autonomy: luck, self-possession, individuality, self-determination, moral independence, 
integrity, and self-control, along with some logical and moral criteria. Susan Wolff 
proposes minimal levels of sanity foundational for ascriptions of autonomy.*’® Without 
diverting attention from the issue at hand, which is the connection between art and 
autonomy, it is clear that our conceptions of autonomy figure into the notion of persons
*’* Gerald Dworkin. The Theory and Practice o f Autonomy. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988) Chapters 1 & 3.
*”  Susan Wolff, “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility," in Responsibility, 
Character, and the Emotions, ed. Ferdinand Schoeman. (Cambridge: (Cambridge 
University Press, 1988)
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in social and moral theories, as well as our respect for persons. As such, the place of 
autonomy in societies is certain to contain ideals such as equality, human dignity, and the 
worth o f persons. Personal autonomy gives us a picture o f human existence as a 
meaningful and significant enterprise.
Charles Taylor makes implicit assumptions about autonomy in his discussions of 
the good life that center on authenticity and moral personhood. There are compelling 
reasons for making the case that autonomy is constitutive of moral agency, no matter how 
construed, that gives value to human experience. It is clear, however, that there is a kind 
of tension that arises between our ideal of autonomous personhood and our ideal of social 
life. How do we (or do we) balance our commitment to those principles that justify and 
regulate a well-ordered and self-sustaining society with our individual desires, reasons, and 
ends? How do we (or do we) control our own dispositions and desires in the face of 
efforts of a healthy community to socialize us, especially when a good deal of that 
socialization occurs during an individual’s prelogical, uncritical stage o f life? As Dworkin 
notes, autonomy appears to place us in conflict with our ties to others, our commitment 
to most principles, and our social institutions that engender respect for authority, tradition, 
leadership, and so on."° Any talk about procedural autonomy leads us to recognize the 
need for minimal levels of self-esteem, the ability to think for oneself, and the warrant to
Dworkin, 12.
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think and function contrary to the will and wishes of the group. Thomas Scanlon
recognizes this conflict when he says:
...[an] autonomous person cannot accept without 
independent consideration the judgement of others as to 
what he should believe or what he should do. He may rely 
on the judgment of others, but when he does so he must be 
prepared to advance independent reasons for thinking their 
judgment likely to be correct, and to weigh the evidential 
value of their opinion against contrary evidence."'
Yet, it is in line with the great liberal tradition to construe an ideal o f persons living 
in democratic societies as the very exemplification o f communities of self-governing, self- 
legislating individuals. A fundamental normative value of democratic community is the 
commitment to foster and value personal autonomy equally among persons, and it is 
similarly the case that autonomous persons will contribute value and meaning to the life 
o f the community, a lesson we leam from Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. These 
philosophers added momentum to radical developments in political and social theory by, 
for example, turning the locus of social contract theory (Locke) to the individual. They 
fostered the notion that a community that prizes individual liberties and rights is 
complemented by individuals who model autonomous development. Since political 
institutions arguably derive their legitimacy from its citizens, political autonomy 
presupposes recognition of and respect for democratic rights of participation. While there
Thomas Scanlon “A Theory of Freedom of Expression" in Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 1 (1972) 216.
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may be toision between the autonomous person and an ideally democratic community, it 
also seems that they sustain one another as well.
As persons, none of us is immune to social influences. All of us are conditioned 
to one degree or another to reside in our culture, our epoch, and our community. The 
argument I have proposed in these pages is that art, along with social experiences, helps 
us to establish our understanding of personal autonomy by making it manifest through 
some medium. This is particularly the case with the literary arts and film, and with music 
as well. As examples, we might think of the moments of awareness when certain 
protagonists intuit their own c^»city to live their lives according to their own lights. We 
have only to remember Elizabeth Bennet, the heroine of Jane Austen’s Pride and 
Prejudice, who spurns offers of marriage from men she does not respect. Henry James’ 
heroine Isabel Archer, in The Portrait o f a Lady, refuses marriage to any suitor, at the risk 
o f income and social position in order to live her life according to her own lights. Or 
consider Jean-Paul Sartre’s protagonist in Nausea who creates art in order to lend 
authenticity and integrity to his own life. Finally, a roughly contemporary Frank Capra 
film. Lost Horizons, introduces a hero, Robert Conway, who risks everything he has in 
order to return to a community void of greed and dissent because he recognizes this as a 
place where he might “be himself".
There is another side to art’s influence on personal autonomy. Not only does it 
demonstrate fictitious (or non-fictitious) events that contribute to a character’s personal
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int^ration, but it may also influence the spectator to interpolate the same principles into 
his or her own life. For example, Nora, the housewife in Ibsen’s play A D oll's House, 
faces a choice between remaining in a marriage of bad faith or of forging her own destiny. 
While one may read and sympathize with Nora’s plight, perhaps a spectator might be 
inspired to improve his or her own stultifying circumstances. It might not mean in every 
case that he or she might leave a marriage, but it might bring the reader to scrutinize his 
or her own motives and responsibilities within the context of an intimate relationship.
A significant aspect of current philosophical discussions of personal autonomy, 
then, is Dworkin’s notion of preference satisfaction. Most people genuinely desire good 
things, both for themselves and for those around them. Most people seek balance and 
meaning in their lives. Once again, we might think about Robert Conway in Lost 
Horizons, a man who had position, personal wealth, and future security. He had satisfying 
familial relationships and as well as a maximal range of political and social liberties. 
Nevertheless, Conway believed his life lacked meaning somehow, and was willing to 
sacrifice other life goods in order to achieve a kind of fulfilled and unified existence that 
we might associate with autonomous personhood. It is this ability to pursue their own 
desires within the limits of morality, under their own control, in harmony with their inner 
selves that best characterizes autonomous agents. As we have seen, this view might collide 
with some Freudian perceptions o f the person as the unwitting product of his or her
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unconscious forces that work jointly with social forces to influence personality formation. 
Under Freudian descriptions, autonomy is at best unfounded, and at worst, imaginary.
Autonomy requires at least an ability to know ourselves, to define ourselves, and 
to direct oursdves. Such self-knowledge and self-directedness amounts to more than the 
control one exerts over an intentional act, somewhat analogous to Dworkin’s first-order 
desires. It amounts to having some sort of responsibility for our true selves.*” On 
Taylor’s and a number of the other philosophers’ views cited here, we are responsible for 
our characters and for the actions we generate. Taylor in particular argues that our 
freedom and responsibility as agents turn on our capacities to form and alter our true selves 
and our second-order desires by reflection, assessment, self-criticism, redefinition, and 
revision. In practical terms, what this means is that we are able to shed undesirable 
characteristics and behaviors and assimilate new ones in the light of a self-evaluation based 
on criteria involving some set of articulated and unarticulated principles or ideals we hold 
dear (or perhaps on the basis o f nothing more than what is rational and reasonable).
An account o f autonomy that appeals to this level of reflectiveness and self­
definition is one that also takes on the characteristics of a skill. It may be a skill we are 
not explicitly taught, but is a kind of learning curve that reflects our ability to integrate our
182 Cf. Dworkin. Cf. also Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a 
Person," Journal o f Philosophy 68 (1971), 5-20. Cf. Gary Watson, “Free Agency," 
Journal o f Philosophy 72 (1975), 205-220. Cf. Charles Taylor, “Responsibility for 
Self," in A.E. Rorty, ed.. The Identities o f Persons (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1976), 281-199.
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own experiences and principles with those o f others, to develop resources to deal with our 
circumstances, to act on the basis of our own deliberations, to choose a life plan and the 
flexibility required to deploy it. We add to our conception of autonomy, as a state of 
one’s character, the conception that it is also a kind o f proficiency or achievement. As 
with any kind of proficiency, there are more familiar ways to engage autonomy and 
autonomous behaviors and other, novel ways to engage autonomy. Thus, when we define 
ourselves as autonomous beings, we may do so by behaving in accordance with established 
rules and practices, but we also have the option o f reaching out to new practices and new 
ways o f defining ourselves. However we picture autonomy, we never quite escape the 
Kantian view that the radical autonomy o f rational agents confers a definition of human 
dignity and significance to that life which is self-chosen.
Behind all of this is Locke’s Enlightenment ideal o f disengaged and procedural 
reason. As we have seen, this ideal is not unique to Locke although he was the first 
philosopher to spell out the relation between the disengaged stance and rational control of 
self. Locke is one of the first philosophers who connects the notion of a rational, self­
responsibility with an ideal o f personal freedom or independence, a theme articulated by 
Kant as well. As Taylor notes, our inheritance of this modem ideal of disengaged reason 
also gives rise to a reflexive stance with respect to ourselves and our behaviors.'" 
Disengaged reason requires us to turn our gaze inward and become aware of our own
Taylor, Sources o f the Self, Chapter 9.
165
activity and the processes that constitute our characters. We are responsible for the 
processes that form and shape us, thus making it imperative that we critically examine our 
habits, our thoughts, our beliefs, and so on.
If we characterize expressions of autonomy in this way, it is clear that the creative 
imagination and the arts figure into novel expressions of autonomy. Sometimes given 
prescriptions for autonomous personhood fail to satisfy some set of individuals and they 
seek out other avenues for such achievement. To do so, to propel oneself in new 
directions requires an act o f imagination, Danto’s "as if". Imagination that allows us to 
envision some way o f living our lives that is not given from immediate, personal 
experiences, that allows us to imagine certain goods and abilities in our lives that we then 
attempt to exemplify. Art is the vehicle of imagination, a medium by which we might 
entertain the merits o f certain courses of action and states of being. The creative 
imagination through art enables us to bridge the gap between social and institutional 
expectations and one’s personal ideals, desires, and life plans.
We find necessary interactions and reciprocities between community and the 
autonomous self. Not all o f these interactions stifle autonomy, indeed, as we have seen 
many of them contribute to one’s autonomy. But some do limit us. Genuine proficiency 
in autonomy makes it possible for individuals to legislate themselves, to control their life 
plans, to put themselves in charge of their destinies, all within the context of a social 
background. Autonomy empowers individual transfigurations when social and community
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limitations impose unaccq)table restraints on an individual’s authenticity, transfigurations 
that may deviate from accepted social and community models of behavior.
There is a fit betweoi reasonableness, individual control, innovation, and personal 
autonomy. We are free when we can remake the conditions of our own existence, when 
we can dominate the things that dominate us. We prize autonomy as a process that 
empowers us to int^rate the many divergent and sometimes conflicting forces and values 
in our lives so that we may enrich our selves through self-definition, self-discovery, and 
self-legislation. There is a kind of synergism embedded in this description of autonomy, 
indicating that the procedural application simultaneously involves independence from and 
dependence upon community in such a way as to align ourselves with reality as fully 
constructed human beings.
Having said this, it should be clear how the notion of aesthetic disinterestedness 
fails to fit into a functional and instrumental picture of art. As we have seen, if  we accept 
the idea that art has the power to influence us as well as our community, then we can not 
accept the Kantian notion of disinterestedness that defines beauty as a purely intrinsic 
value, an end in itself. We may sympathize with Kantian and neo-Kantian motives to 
purify art in order to establish its worth apart from and above the realm of instrumental 
value. This approach represented one attempt to protect art from ruthlessly dominant 
instrumental approaches, from a grossly debasing instrumental rationality, and to protect 
it from ordinariness, banality, and narrow problem-solving.
167
The contributions of philosophers such as Dewey and Danto and Wittgenstein, 
however, make it clear that for something to have human value, it must in some way 
serve the need o f people and enhance their lives and development so they might cope with 
the world. Dewey specifically rejects the artificially imposed opposition between 
instrumental and intrinsic value, "...a philosophy o f art is sterilized unless it makes us 
aware of the function of art in relation to other modes o f experience."'*^ He argues that 
the special function and value o f art is not directed to specific ends, but serves a variety 
of ends. Charles Taylor’s analysis in Sources o f  the similarly indicates that at least 
one function of art is to enhance our immediate experience, thus furthering other ends we 
may pursue.
Art, through the use o f creative imagination, keeps us alive to the power to 
experience the ordinary world in its fulness. But, art does more than this as mentioned 
before. Self-discovery and self-realization, primary aspects of autonomy, involve creative 
imagination, just as creative imagination figures into the creation of art. Imagination also 
transfigures the real through the power of art to symbolize reality. Art exhibits dual 
functions as it reflects reality as well as reconfigures it. Just as autonomy involves 
originality, often scorning convention, tradition, and authority, so does the creation of art. 
As we have seen, we can construe both as a self-definition in dialogue.
**^  John Dewey, A n As Experience. (New York; Perigee Books, 1980) 12.
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Another thread we have followed in these pages has been the relation between
autonomy and an aesthetic of life. Personal autonomy amounts to something more than
a radical individualism, a theme we find in Kant, Rousseau, and Taylor. On many
accounts, autonomy is intimately bound with notions of self-realization. John Stuart Mill,
for example, discusses freedom as a condition for self-realization:
He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his 
plan o f life for him has no need of any other faculty than the 
ape-like one o f imitation. He who chooses his plan for 
himself employs all his faculties. He must use observation 
to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather 
materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when 
he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his
deliboate decision It is possible that he might be guided
in some good path, and kqjt out of harm’s way, without any 
of these things. But what will be his comparative worth as 
a human being? It really is of importance, not only what 
men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it.
Among the works of man which human life is rightly 
employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in 
importance is surely man himself.
Autonomy as a kind of aesthetic of life requires a sense about one’s life and one’s 
life projects, which intersect the private and communal aspects of one’s life. Its 
importance derives not only because it is a desired end in itself, but because in many ways, 
it is the ground o f developed moral personhood, an argument Kant proposes. There is a 
kind of circularity to this autonomous self-realization that Joel Feinberg comments on:
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty. Ed. David Spitz (New York: Norton, 1975) 56.
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The highest good for man is neither enjoyment nor passive 
contentment but rather a dynamic process of growth and 
self-realization. Self-realization consists in the actualization 
of certain uniquely human potentialities, the bringing to full 
development o f certain powers and abilities. This in turn 
requires constant practice in making difficult choices among 
alternative hypotheses, policies, and actions.*^
Autonomy further involves our ethics, our politics, and our art. The circularity 
consists in the notion that we must achieve some degree of autonomy in order to realize 
our selves, and that realization further contributes to autonomous development. As we 
have seen, this quest for autonomy is a private quest with public dimension. The 
expression of our private thoughts borrows from shared language, techniques, and 
mediums of the past to develop them, oftai in novel ways, Paul Gomberg makes the same 
point:
...there is something right about the idea that we should be 
self-governing in deciding what to believe. In those areas 
where I am competent, as competent as or more competent 
than others, I am autonomous to the extent that I investigate 
and discover information, to the extent that I have learned 
how to think on my own and apply that skill to extend my 
knowledge. To the extent that I rely on others, I am not 
individually autonomous. But most of our knowledge is 
social. Where groups carry out cooperative investigations, 
they may be collectively, not individually autonomous. The 
idea of being individually sovereign in deciding what to 
believe is unrealistic, except in narrow domains where one
186 Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973) 21.
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is especially competent or in contexts—if any exist—where 
we all are or should strive to be equally competent/”
If we think o f autonomy as a process (or a state) of self-l^slation, any information 
that makes us more effective at the process also makes us more autonomous. Art figures 
into this enrichment o f the self through linguistic, cognitive, psychological, social, and 
aesthetic changes that are mutually supportive if not outright collaborative as Charles 
Taylor argues. For Taylor, and Dewey as well, art is a vehicle for social, political, and 
ethical progress on both communal and individual levels. This is a reason that we are led 
to suspect aesthetic theories that institutionally compartmentalize high art. Such 
compartmentalization renders high art elitist and separate from the lives and experiences 
o f ordinary people. To theoretically distance high art from ordinary human experience and 
human projects amounts to a form of socio-cultural oppression, a theory of art that is 
necessarily exclusionary and repressive.
There is little question that works of art have functioned historically as instruments 
o f social criticism, transformation, and even protest. One has only to go to the comer 
bookstore to find novels, poems, and plays of incisive social satire. Nor must these works 
be radically political in order to persuade. One of the fascinating potentialities of art is its 
capacity to invite visions of other worlds and ways of life that can help us realize that our
Paul Gomberg, “Autonomy and Free Expression." Journal o f Social Philosophy, Vol. 
25, Issue 2, Fall, 1994. 97-104.
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own social and cultural practices are neither necessary nor ideal. Such visions open the 
way for individual and social change.
Other critics charge that high art can not help but implicitly endorse or reinforce 
the status quo. At one time, it was a kind of aesthetic emancipation to theoretically free 
art from its traditional role of serving political, religious, and social institutions, it seems 
counter-intuitive to assert the radical autonomy o f art from social and ethical practice. 
Although serving the status quo describes some art, historical as well as contemporary, 
especially art that is created under some sort o f patronage, it fails to capture the larger 
picture of art’s influence. A refutation o f this charge requires little more than indicating 
that one o f the benefits we derive from historical art turns on its ability to function 
conditionally, to show us both how things were and how things could be. We might take 
it to be one of the positive contributions of Marxist and feminist criticism that aesthetic and 
art theory are viewed as deeply political and moral, thus open to social and moral 
criticism. What might seem to be a social necessity or a function of human psychology 
or community, turns out to be contingent under the purview of artistic interpretation. 
Duchamp’s, Waritol’s, and Rauschenberg’s often satiric conferrals of artistic status upon 
mass-produced functional objects like Brillo boxes, beds, and bottle racks are illustrative 
of a contemporary effort to consciously establish this interconnection between art and the 
lives of ordinary people.
172
Aesthetic gratification, self-discovery, self-enrichment, self-determination, not just 
in the practical experiments of living our lives, but often through a more cautious option 
of “trying on" new ways o f being, or new vocabularies of self-reflection that enable us to 
take on virtual lives and experiences. Our efforts to define ourselves, to engage 
autonomous lives, while private, unshared, and unsuited to argument, are nevertheless 
influenced by social constructivism. And this constructivism has parallels with art. As 
Taylor says:
The notion that each one o f us has an original way of being 
human entails that each of us has to discover what it is to be 
ourselves. But the discovery can’t be made by consulting 
pre-existing models, by hypothesis. So it can be made only 
by articulating it afresh. We discover what we have it in us 
to be by becoming that mode of life by giving expression in 
our speech and action to what is original in us.'^ ^
Taylor sees a “close analogy, ev«i a connection, between self-discovery and artistic 
c r e a t i o n . . . . A s  a result of expressivist trends in contemporary art, that is, that art is no 
longer conceived as an imitation of reality, we have come to understand art in terms o f a 
creation, and the artist as a creator. We have seen that Taylor thinks these ideas coalesce. 
As ordinary persons we define and formulate ourselves through expression and even more 
does the artist become a model of human experience venerated as an agent of original self­
definition and the creator of cultural values. The artist discovers himself or herself through
'** Ch?x\e&T?iy\ox, The Ethics o f Authenticity. 61. 
Taylor, 61.
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the work created. In order to do so, the artist may invent a new artistic vocabulary of 
some sort (a new way of painting, melodic and tonal structures in music, new symbolism 
and style of literature, and so on) and make certain self-discoveries through the creation 
of the art. Along these lines, Taylor observes that self-discovery requires poiesis— 
making.*”
Each o f us has our own way of expressing what it is to be human; we have our own
“measure". If I am fully autonomous, my humanity is not an imitation of anyone else’s.
And because there is no pre-existent model for any one of us, we discover ourselves by
articulating, by expressing what is original in us. The danger is that I might compromise
my own inner nature and originality if I unreflectively submit to social pressure to
conform. Acting out of my own autonomy means that I articulate, discover, and define
myself according to my own originality. Yet, as we have seen, we define our identities
against a given background of things that matter to us. These things, social influences and
contexts, are given to us and order our lives in some significant way. They come from
beyond us and somehow make it possible to develop autonomously. Says Taylor:
If to define myself is to bring what is as yet imperfectly 
determined to full definition, if the paradigm vehicle for 
doing this is artistic creation, then art can no longer be 
defined in traditional terms. The traditional understanding 
of art was as mimesis. Art imitates reality. This of course 
left a number of crucial questions open: in particular, the 
question of what kind and level of reality was to be imitated.
Was it the empirical reality surrounding us? Or the higher
*”  Taylor, Ethics, 62.
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reality of the Forms? And what was the relation between 
them? But on the new understanding, art is not imitation, 
but expression in the sense discussed here. It makes 
something manifest while at the same time realizing it, 
completing it.‘®‘
So it is that with art as a vehicle, we can articulate these possibilities, o f wholeness, 
of autonomy, whether as creator or spectator. Art has the potential to raise our 
consciousness about ourselves as individuals and about our communities. It is supported 
by human relationships and contributes to our abilities to live our lives with a measure of 
dignity and autonomy, all of which require connection with other human beings. The 
great significance of art lies in its functional aspects: how it is appropriated and deployed, 
its dialogical capacities, and its potential for promoting progressive social and moral 
agendas. Art, itself, is a relation that connects us to other persons, thereby contributing 
to personal autonomy, and drawing us into that universal conversation that partially 
10 constitutes the human experience.
191 Taylor, Sources, 376-377.
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